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INTRODUCTION 
Stina Torjesen & Indra Øverland 
Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections in November 2005 became an arena 
where domestic and – according to the contributors to this volume – interna-
tional actors battled for influence and control, using both formal and infor-
mal means of contestation. This report highlights the role of international 
observer missions in the 2005 election processes, and presents in-depth as-
sessments of the pre- and post-election situation in Azerbaijan.  
The six articles presented in this volume have been produced by leading 
scholars and development practitioners in Azerbaijan. This is the second 
scholarly publication within the project ‘Network for Election Observation 
and Exchange’, which focuses on Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The key aims of the project have been to enhance the participation of ob-
servers from the region in international observation missions and to facilitate 
research on the role of election observation in democratic development. Fur-
ther information on the project is presented at the end of this introduction.  
The 2005 elections in Azerbaijan are interesting for several reasons. First, 
the conduct of the elections sheds light on the level of democratisation in a 
country. In addition, assessments of oil-rich Azerbaijan offer interesting in-
sight on the relationship between energy wealth and democratisation. Sec-
ond, the elections in Azerbaijan received considerable international atten-
tion. They were seen as a test case of whether the wave of regime change 
that had affected Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan would spread to other 
countries in the region. International actors, regional and global powers and 
multilateral organisations, were thought to play important formal and infor-
mal roles before and after the elections. Third, the role of Russia in the elec-
tion process was particularly interesting. For the first time, a large number of 
Russian observers served within the Office for Democratic Institution and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) election observation mission; Russia’s distinct in-
volvement in the election process seemed to signal new trends in Russia’s 
strategy towards observation and observation missions in the post-Soviet 
space. Fourth and finally, the case of Azerbaijan also highlights the meth-
odological and technical aspects of election observation. Among other 
things, there was extensive – and arguably problematic – use of exit polls. 
Azerbaijan has also recently introduced a comprehensive election law, which 
significantly altered the administration and conduct of the elections.  
This introduction briefly discusses some of the points mentioned above, 
indicating key questions and challenges for election observation that arise 
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from a study of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections. Then follows an out-
line of each of the six articles presented in this volume. The introduction 
ends by offering further information about the ‘Network for Election Obser-
vation and Exchange’  
A common theme in assessments of the elections in Azerbaijan has been 
the relevance of international actors to domestic political processes in the 
country. Multilateral organisations such as the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) – both of 
which list Azerbaijan among their member-states – have been particularly 
prominent. Considerable attention has also been devoted to the activities of 
key regional and global powers with an interest in the affairs of Azerbaijan, 
the most significant ones being Iran, Russia, Turkey and the USA. Analyti-
cal perspectives premised on geopolitics are often employed in order to 
make sense of the actions of multilateral organisations and foreign powers 
towards Azerbaijan. Arguably, however, the case of international rivalry 
over the election outcome in Azerbaijan highlights both strengths and weak-
nesses of a geopolitical analytical perspective.  
Geopolitics is concerned with the impact on interstate relations of the 
spatial dispositions of continents and oceans and the distribution of natural 
and human resources (Agnew, 2003). States with the greatest material capa-
bilities are most likely to survive in the international system. This triggers a 
competition for resources on a global scale by the most powerful states. 
Azerbaijan is seen as a country where there is a strong likelihood of strategic 
rivalry for control and influence by external states – due to its position as an 
energy producer and energy transmitter, as well its increasingly important 
military strategic location, i.e. proximity to Iran and to military theatres in 
the Middle East and Central Asia and its location on Russia’s southern bor-
der. A key premise of the geopolitical perspective is the assumption that 
states are unitary and coherent actors that express and implement one unified 
strategy. Nation states, rather than international organisations or other trans-
national actors, are given analytical priority. 
Assessments of Azerbaijan and the elections that have used geopolitics as 
the analytical frame have highlighted the competition between Russia, the 
USA and powers as a central aspect of the ‘battle for Azerbaijan’ during the 
2005 election period. It is certainly true that both the USA and Russia pro-
actively engaged with actors in Azerbaijan before and after the elections. 
However, there are significant weaknesses in explaining the actions under-
taken by these and other actors solely in a geopolitical perspective. Azerbai-
jan had been a problem for Russia since 1993. The country had refused to be 
part of Russian-sponsored (hegemonic) multilateral organisations like the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and had used other powers 
(Turkey and the USA) to counterbalance Russia’s influence. In other words, 
Azerbaijan under presidents Heidar and Ilham Aliev had not been a loyal 
ally. Russia had been unable to realise many of its strategic interests towards 
the country, such as control over production and transport of oil and gas. 
Why, then, should Russia decide to give active and substantial support to 
Ilham Aliev’s factions in the parliamentary elections of 2005? Why not sup-
port factions that could guarantee better future terms for Russian interests? 
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Why back a political leadership with proven past and present links with what 
is generally regarded as a key adversary of Russia in the region – the USA?  
Geopolitical assessments do not provide adequate answers to these ques-
tions. Moreover, geopolitical frameworks tend to underplay the role of actors 
from within the country when accounting for why events unfold as they do. 
There is little tangible evidence available, which could prove that the USA 
or Russia played roles beyond being important advisors, facilitators and en-
dorsers of various political actors in Azerbaijan, including the opposition and 
the political leadership. The central players in the events during the elections 
were the local and central levels of government as well as the various fac-
tions of the opposition movement and other political parties. A geopolitical 
perspective, however, diverts attention and explanatory focus away from 
local dynamics and the formal and informal strategies employed by domestic 
actors – and as such may be ill-suited to further our understanding of Azer-
baijani politics.  
A geopolitical assessment would not expect US and Russian interests to 
coincide in Azerbaijan in the way they did – both offered support (in the 
form of overall recognition of the election result) to Ilham Aliev and the po-
litical factions loyal to him. In contrast, an assessment of regime type offers 
greater insights into the specific international constellations associated with 
the election process in Azerbaijan. Arguably, the key driving force in the 
international game for Azerbaijan (as well as other areas of post-Soviet 
space) is not primarily geo-strategic competition. Rather, the ‘fault lines’ of 
the international relations of the region run, between, on the one hand, con-
servative local powers and outside forces that stress continuity and status 
quo in governing techniques and leadership, and on the other hand local 
powers, local forces and outside powers that seek reform in governing tech-
niques and renewal in leadership.1 The first group includes Russia and many 
CIS countries; the latter includes Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan (only partly) 
and the countries of Europe and North America. This, arguably, has been 
one of the central dynamics of the international relations of the region over 
the past two years. Such an analytical approach can explain why Russia 
chose to back previously disloyal segments of the political elite. The impor-
tance of regime similarities seems to have trumped strategic concerns.  
An additional problematic feature of a geopolitical perspective on inter-
national relations of the region is the tendency to overlook the extent to 
which the OSCE itself as an institution has become a battleground for the 
frictions between status quo and reformist states in the region. The political 
manoeuvring that has taken place within this organisation is, however, a key 
event in the international relations of the post soviet area – which deserves 
greater attention and assessment.  
Increasing scrutiny of the work OSCE came with a joint Russia–Belarus 
proposal for OSCE reform at the year-end conference in Sofia 6–7 Decem-
ber 2004. Russia raised the spectre of blocking the adoption of the 2005 
budget if moves towards reform were not endorsed. Since then, Russia has 
                                                     
1  Jennifer Welsh (1999) argues for attention to differing regime dynamics in how interna-
tional relations are assessed. She discusses the international dynamics of revolutionary 
versus status-quo states in the context of English approaches to the French Revolution in 
1789.  
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developed plans to enhance the security co-operation of the organisation and 
limit the OSCE’s work in the sphere of democracy promotion – including 
election observation.2  
The problematic role of the OSCE for a country like Russia that supports 
“status quo” regimes was highlighted during the overthrow of President 
Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan after the parliamentary elections in February and 
March 2005. Immediately after these events, Russian Foreign Minister Ser-
gey Lavrov stressed that those who tried to destabilise the situation in Kyr-
gyzstan had used the OSCE’s monitoring assessments; he added: ‘they 
[those trying to destabilise Kyrgyzstan] have appealed to these assessments 
of the OSCE. Russia cannot but note that such a thing was allowed’.3  
The Russian reform drive in relation to the OSCE has in some ways cre-
ated greater participation in election monitoring by Russia. Russia and other 
CIS states have increased substantially the number of CIS observers that 
serve in CIS-organised observation missions. Russia has also advocated for 
including a greater share of Russian speakers in ODIHR missions. For the 
ODIHR election observation mission in Azerbaijan Russia deployed an un-
precedented 81 short-term observers (out of 617 short-term observers). 
However, the Russian observers expressed immediate disagreement with the 
overall ODIHR assessment. One month later, Russian Foreign Minister Lav-
rov drew the following conclusions from the Azerbaijani experience:  
 
There definitely are double standards in OSCE’s activities, especially in the hu-
man rights sphere. This is a fact that cannot be avoided. The OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights proves that with its work on observ-
ing elections. At the beginning of November Russia sent a large group of its ob-
servers to join the ODIHR mission at the Azerbaijan parliamentary elections. 
Our observers saw that the ODIHR’s work was non-transparent, closed and basi-
cally completely alienated from the joint OSCE leadership bodies and from the 
individual member states as well. This results in biased political opinions made 
in the OSCE’s name although they are not co-ordinated with all member states. 
Such ways of OSCE’s work have to change as soon as possible.4  
 
Russia’s behaviour and statements raises the question of what its reform 
drive will imply for the organisation. Will there be a strengthening and pri-
oritisation of the security dimension of the OSCE’s work over its activities 
in the sphere of democracy promotion and election observation? Are these 
efforts initiated so as to weaken the OSCE prior to the Russian presidential 
elections in 2008 and to lessen the significance of the OSCE during elections 
elsewhere in the region? What significance will this have for international 
election observation missions, including ODIHR?  
These new developments also raise direct challenges for ODIHR and 
other international observation missions. Are there ways in which interna-
tional observation missions can protect themselves from being caught up in 
                                                     
2  Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 (148), 16 December 2004, ‘OSCE “reform” – or a new lease on 
life?’  
3  Itar-Tass news agency, 30 March 2005, ‘Kyrgyzstan Trouble-makers used OSCE’; article 
made available through Lexis-Nexis.  
4  Financial Times Information, 7 December 2005, ‘OSCE needs reforms, Russia’s Lavrov 
says for Slovene daily’, BBC Monitoring, from Lexis-Nexis  
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rivalries between reformist and status quo oriented powers in the region? 
Can further consolidation and awareness on ‘objective methodologies’ as 
well as more diverse composition of observation teams strengthen the role 
and status of observation missions? What should be the relationship between 
CIS observer missions and ODIHR missions? Are there synergies between 
the two, with a potential for developing co-operation? Is the increasing atten-
tion, and challenge, towards the activities of some observer groups an indica-
tion that the international norms of election observation and adherence to 
democratic procedures may in fact have become more consolidated – more 
effective, but also more controversial?  
These are questions urgently in need of debate – but unfortunately a de-
tailed examination lies beyond the scope of the present volume. Here in this 
brief introduction the aim is merely to highlight the ongoing challenges fac-
ing election observation, and to encourage further research on these issues.  
Several of the contributions in this volume touch on some of the ques-
tions raised above. The contributions provide for great diversity of views, 
and it should be noted that the editors do not share all the views of the con-
tributors to this volume, but that we do nonetheless believe that they deserve 
attention. 
Leila Alieva in her article ‘International observation missions: assess-
ments of the 2005 parliamentary elections’ argues that there is a connection 
between some of the conclusions of the international observer missions and 
the strategies of some countries have towards Azerbaijan. She outlines the 
various observation missions and highlights the divergent nature of the re-
ports issued by these missions. Alieva also presents findings related to the 
conduct of exit polls, and raises serious concern over their use and effect. 
Her article also discusses the extent to which foreign powers can influence 
the government and opposition groups in Azerbaijan, and draws attention to 
the special geopolitical context of Azerbaijan.  
In Ulvi Amirbekov’s article the focus shifts from international observation 
to the domestic institutional structures for election observation. ‘Frameworks 
for election observation in Azerbaijan: institutional improvements but little 
impact?’ assesses key past and present features of Azerbaijan’s election leg-
islations and describes the evolution of election observation in Azerbaijan 
since 1991. Amirbekov argues that election observation has become increas-
ingly important in Azerbaijan, but that it nevertheless faces several serious 
constraints. 
Zafar Guliev in his article ‘Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan: democ-
ratic expectations versus imitated realities’. He provides a comprehensive 
outline of the elections held in Azerbaijan since 1995 and compares the re-
cent parliamentary elections to past ones. Guliev identifies key patterns in 
the strategies of the political leadership during the 2005 elections, and as-
sesses the activities of other domestic and international political actors. He 
argues that the elections failed to meet important democratic standards and 
that many features of the elections were poor imitations of a democratic 
process rather than a real one. Using a geopolitical framework, he assesses 
the activities of international actors with the use of a geopolitical framework, 
arguing that Moscow and Washington had common interests in supporting 
Heidar and Ilham Aliev.  
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In ‘The 2005 parliamentary elections as a mirror of politics and society in 
Azerbaijan’, Zardusht Alizade identifies the key actors of the election proc-
ess and shows how these players interacted. Alizade argues that the political 
process associated with the election period highlights core structural features 
of Azerbaijani society, and, with reference to these, offers explanations for 
central developments in the political life of the country.  
Rustam Seyidov complements Alizade’s work with a detailed account of 
various segments in the ruling elite in ‘The post-election situation: who rules 
Azerbaijan?’ Seyidov assesses the behaviour of the leadership during the 
elections and debates the significance of the role of the opposition politician 
Rasul Guliev. He also analyses the wave of arrests of top government offi-
cials that came just prior to the elections, and offers insights on the political 
affiliations of certain criminal elements in the country. He concludes with 
reflections on the present and possible future role of Islam in the politics of 
Azerbaijan.  
In their article ‘Economic implications of the parliamentary elections: 
symbiosis of politics and economics’, Torgrul Juvarly and Ali Abasov pre-
sent insights on how the economic condition of Azerbaijan impacts on poli-
tics and governing institutions. Despite frequent reference to oil and its po-
litical effects, few studies have examined this central issue in detail.   Juvarly 
and Abasov present original material that sheds new light on the political life 
of Azerbaijan. They contend that there is a symbiosis between politics and 
economy in Azerbaijan, and highlight the interaction between the private 
sector and the state-controlled part of the economy. They also assess the de-
gree to which institutions designed to regulate the economy operate in a 
sound manner. As long as the symbiosis of politics and the economy contin-
ues, they argue, it will be difficult to ensure a healthy development of Azer-
baijan’s economy.  
  
Network for election observation and exchange 
 
The present volume is the second publication produced within the project 
‘Network for Election Observation and Exchange’. The initiative is funded 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented jointly by 
the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs. It has both a research and a practical component. The research 
part seeks to facilitate research on election observation and democratic de-
velopments in Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia. A key aim is to en-
able and facilitate research by scholars from the region.  
Increasingly, international election observers are playing a prominent role 
in political developments in the former Soviet states. Some election observa-
tion missions have been criticised for being too heavily influenced by West-
ern ideas and for unjustly propagating Western standards and practices on 
these newly independent countries. A core idea behind the project is that 
election observation should not create a top–down relationship between 
Western and non-Western countries, but that all countries should have the 
chance to participate in the international community and be involved in on-
going efforts to strengthen democratic and human rights norms. It was 
against this backdrop that the Norwegian Helsinki Committee in the first 
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phase of the project invited 24 participants to observe the parliamentary elec-
tions in Norway on 12 September 2005. This mission wanted to stress that 
election observation is not meant solely to reflect power discrepancies be-
tween rich and poor countries: it concerns universal standards applicable to 
all countries, and for which all countries should agree to be put under outside 
scrutiny.  
The project has aimed to facilitate participation in international election 
observation missions by observers from Moldova, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia; to strengthen capacity and networking in Moldova, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus on election observation; and to facilitate research and analysis 
on the role of election observation in Moldova, Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus for democratic developments in the region.  
 
Key project outcomes from the first phase include:  
 
¾ 27 observers from Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia moni-
tored the Norwegian parliamentary elections on 12 September 2005. 
A report detailing their findings and suggesting improvements has 
been submitted by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee to the Nor-
wegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development.  
 
¾ 24 observers from Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia moni-
tored the local elections in Kyrgyzstan on 18 December 2005. Their 
report, with findings and suggestions for improvements, has been 
submitted to the Central Committee for Elections and Referenda.  
 
¾ Networking between election experts, researchers and civil society 
enhanced in the sphere of election observation in the region.  
 
¾ A Webpage with election observation resources and news have been 
launched, http://www.cac-elections.net  
 
¾ Two NUPI reports comprising nine articles by scholars from the re-
gion are being published – one of which is the present volume. The 
other report offers in-depth analyses of the role of international elec-
tion observation missions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005  
 
¾ A seminar has been conducted at the OSCE Academy Bishkek: 
‘Role, Effect and Status of Election Observation in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus’.  
 
The first phase is now completed, but NUPI will continue to include at-
tention to analytical issues associated with election observation in the period 
ahead – including facilitating research and publishing relevant analysis. 

 INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION 
MISSIONS:  
ASSESSMENTS OF THE 2005 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS  
Leila Alieva 
1. Introduction  
 
This article argues that the conclusions drawn by international observation 
missions in Azerbaijan were closely intertwined with the overall approaches 
and policies that outside powers had maintained with the country. It high-
lights the divergent nature of the reports and conclusions presented by the 
various election observation missions. It also discusses the complexity that 
the conduct of exit polls added to the assessments.  
Signals from foreign powers have mattered greatly to the choices made 
by the government and opposition groups in Azerbaijan. In the case of the 
USA and Europe, however, their multiple agendas and diverse interests, 
along with their fear of losing out in security and energy dialogues with 
Azerbaijan, served to limit their levers of influence on Azerbaijan’s govern-
ment, and the way it organised the parliamentary elections in 2005.  
Azerbaijan and the West: Historical Relations  
 
Azerbaijani society had high expectations for the Western (US and Euro-
pean) assessment of the parliamentary elections. The West is perceived as 
consisting of democratic states: these are expected to promote, and stand for, 
democratic changes and values in states currently in transition, such as 
Azerbaijan.  
These expectations are also connected with the identity of Azerbaijan. 
The country made Western integration a strategic priority of its foreign pol-
icy, and has joined the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as well as developing its rela-
tions with the European Union. This trend stems from a deep historical tradi-
tion, particularly marked since the second half of the 19th century, whereby 
the Azerbaijani upper class, elite and intellectuals were leading a reform 
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process aimed at a Western European model. The process manifested itself 
in the formation of the national industrial bourgeoisie, the development of a 
multi-party system, the latinisation of the alphabet, the creation of a type of 
European-style secular education, and other measures. This took place from 
the 19th to the early 20th centuries, before the occupation by the Bolsheviks. 
High expectations among the people of Azerbaijan regarding the West’s 
principled position were also reinforced by the recent shift in the security 
paradigm of the US administration. The Bush administration had made de-
mocracy promotion a priority and an important part of its official rhetoric, 
and had also supported the revolutionary changes in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. All these factors created widespread hopes that the West, unlike 
other external actors such as Russia, would introduce a value-based approach 
to the assessment of elections, and that this would be an important element 
of the democracy-building process. The ‘value-based approach’ (or the 
‘principled approach’) is the opposite of an interest-based approach.  
Azerbaijan and the West: Changing Expectations, Growing Apathy 
 
These expectations, however, gradually waned with each election, declining 
in particular after the 2003 presidential elections. The societal dynamics, on 
the one hand, and the interests of the external actors, on the other, were often 
divergent: this was demonstrated in both the 2003 and 2005 elections. While 
the 2003 elections were characterised by a high level of electoral activism 
and hope for change, as reflected in the unprecedented high turnout 
(71.23%), the Western states now seemed to prefer a situation involving a 
transfer of power to the heir of the president. For this reason – and with the 
exception of the Embassy of Norway – they gave a very soft assessment of 
the fraudulent election and post-election violence. This significantly affected 
the general political apathy of the population and caused a steep drop in 
turnout – only 46% in the 2005 parliamentary election. 
The apathy was also connected with the consistent failure of ‘elections’ 
as an institution. According to local observers, the opposition party Musavat 
had led the race in the 2000 parliamentary elections; similarly, by many ac-
counts, the 2003 elections indicated that the Musavat party leader, Isa Gam-
bar, received a high percentage of the vote. Furthermore, on the eve of the 
2005 parliamentary elections, some polls (for instance, the NED-sponsored 
poll, conducted by the ADAM Centre) showed that the opposition bloc 
Azadlyg was rated first. All three of the elections were significantly falsified 
in order to tilt the outcome in favour of the ruling elite.  
As to the continuation of the status quo in political developments in 
Azerbaijan, the interests of all the major external actors (including Russia 
and the USA) coincided. This was exemplified by the relatively soft assess-
ment of the presidential elections in 2003 made by international organisa-
tions, except for the group of 188 observers of the IDEE, and local observ-
ers. In some cases there was even direct political support for the ‘dynastic’ 
transfer of power.  
This left the opposition and civil society isolated in their efforts to change 
the trend of consolidating non-democratic rule. Most importantly, it limited 
the chances of building a publicly controlled, democratic institution before 
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the major inflow of oil revenues begins (expected to start next year). Thus, 
the most recent set of presidential elections in Azerbaijan demonstrated how 
diverse agendas have affected the conclusions of the external actors in regard 
to the elections, and how this in turn influenced the future of state-building 
in the country.  
2. Major External Actors 
 
There were three major external actors during the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions in Azerbaijan: the USA, Europe and Russia.  
International Delegations  
 
Five delegations from European and Euro-Atlantic organisations were joined 
in the International Observation Mission: 
 
• OSCE/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR), which had 43 election experts and long-term observers 
from 18 participating states, and nearly 500 short-term observers 
during the Election Day, with Geert Heinrich Ahrens as head of 
mission;  
• the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), led by Alcee L. 
Hastings, President of the OSCE PA and a special co-ordinator 
for the short-term observers;  
• NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), headed by Mark 
Clapham;  
• the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
led by Leo Platvoet  
• the European Parliament (EP), headed by Marie Anne Isler Be-
guin – a total of 617 from 42 countries.  
 
The USA and Russia  
 
Although the US assessment was conveyed within the common statement of 
the International Observation Mission, during the pre-election period the 
USA continued as an independent and influential actor in the post-election 
developments in Azerbaijan.  
Similarly, although there was a group of Russian observers within the 
OSCE mission, Russia also sent observers as part of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and Russian Parliament Missions. Thus, there were 
three missions with considerable Russian participation: those of the CIS and 
OSCE, along with the mission of the Russian Parliament itself. 
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The Larger International Community  
 
As compared to the elections in 2000 and 2003, the 2005 elections in Azer-
baijan were characterised by considerable interest on the part of the interna-
tional community. Besides the observers, the elections were attended by a 
large group of journalists from some of the world’s leading TV channels, 
newspapers and journals. In total, there were 1,586 foreign observers, 301 
journalists and 17,014 local observers. 
The whole election year demonstrated a high level of interest on the part 
of the USA, Europe and Russia – three critical actors in these elections. 
Their interaction with the Azerbaijani political and civil actors during the 
pre-election period, both in public and behind closed doors, had the effect, 
perceived by many, of empowering certain political groups - with particular 
effect on government-opposition relations. This acted to shape an image of 
the West, as well as its interests, and not least its policy priorities, in the 
whole of Azerbaijani society. The year 2005 was marked by several visits by 
high-ranking members of the US government, the US Congress, European 
organisations, as well as visits of leaders of the Azerbaijani opposition to the 
European states and the USA. 
Reactions to the External Interest  
Government 
 
According to some sources, the Azerbaijani government made extensive use 
of help from political technologists from Russia, as well as forming a few 
lobbying groups in Washington DC. They worked intensely with foreign 
experts, politicians and influential actors. The main objective in the promo-
tion of the government’s ‘cause’ during the international electoral PR cam-
paign was to create an image of the President as a reformer, struggling 
against a group of conservatives in the government, and facing the resistance 
of local-level executives. This aimed to prove that there was a strong politi-
cal will to conduct free and fair elections, but obstructed by resistance from 
‘below’. ‘Proof’ of this political will of the authorities was shown by two 
presidential decrees (in May and June 2005), directed at improving election 
practices.  
Local People  
 
For the locals, this system had been all too familiar since Soviet times. To 
them, there could be no doubt that resistance to the improvement of election 
practices was to be found at the highest level of power. This expressed itself 
in the resistance of the authorities to agree to the more substantial recom-
mendations of the Venice Commission of the CoE – especially when it came 
to changing the composition of the electoral commissions, and introducing 
an inking procedure, which would weaken central control over the election 
process.  
Assessments of the Parliamentary Elections in March 2005 15 
However, local institutions, candidates, and newspapers kept informing 
the public and foreign observers that there were ‘worrying reports’ of certain 
groups ensuring the victory of specific candidates, in continuation of the old 
tradition of Aliev’s communist rule. These groups were reported to include 
the heads of the district election commissions (who were instructed by the 
presidential administration), the heads of the executive administration, and 
policemen and prosecutors of the regions and provinces. Compared to the 
ruling party, the opposition had very scarce resources at its disposal for in-
ternational and national PR campaigns. Furthermore, it had limited access to 
the most influential media channels, such as television, as these channels had 
been monopolised by the regime ever since early 2000. 
 
Preliminary Conclusions  
 
Compared to the conclusions of the 2003 presidential elections, the prelimi-
nary conclusions of the international observation missions during the 2005 
elections were tougher. The press conference held by the International Ob-
servation Mission on 7 November began with its main conclusion, read by 
the head of the OSCE mission (a congressman from Florida, Alcee Hast-
ings). His statement was met by applause although Hastings’ opening mes-
sage cautiously described the scale of the violations. State Department 
spokesman Adam Ereli backed the conclusions of the International Observa-
tion Mission on the same day. However, Ereli failed to give a clear answer to 
the question posed at the press conference as to whether fraudulent elections 
would have any effect on US–Azerbaijan bilateral relations.  
Even though over 80 of the OSCE observers were Russian, the OSCE re-
port strongly condemned the conduct of the elections as falling short of in-
ternational standards. By contrast, the CIS and Russian missions praised the 
elections as ‘democratic’. 
3. International Assessment of Elections 
 
The USA  
Mixed Messages  
 
The US position in the 2005 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan was per-
ceived as inconsistent. While numerous visits and statements of US repre-
sentatives to Azerbaijan in 2005 signalled a high level of interest on the part 
of the US government in the upcoming elections, there were also signals that 
Washington was not in favour of a Ukrainian or Georgian scenario occurring 
in Azerbaijan. It was (and is still) clear that the situation in Azerbaijan was 
complicated by the security agenda (anti-terrorist co-operation) and the 
country’s hydrocarbon resources. This might have affected the US support 
for democracy in this particular case. These circumstances conditioned the 
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ambiguous and mixed-character signals that the USA sent to Azerbaijani 
authorities and opposition. 
On the one hand, it was encouraging opposition through statements 
which asserted that the Bush administration was supporting democracy all 
over the world. During the visits of both influential civil actors and con-
gressmen, there were meetings with leaders of the opposition. The strongest 
message was found in G.W. Bush’s inaugural address. In that speech, he set 
out a radical departure from US foreign policy, stressing solidarity with op-
pressed peoples everywhere: ‘There is no justice without freedom, and there 
can be no human rights without human liberty.’ During a visit to Azerbaijan, 
Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State and head of the US Na-
tional Democratic Institute, met with leaders of the opposition parties, as 
well as members of the Azadlyg bloc. Ali Kerimli, leader of the Popular 
Front Party, said that the two-hour-long meeting with Ms Albright was not 
only important and useful, but it would also serve as an impetus for the de-
velopment of democracy in Azerbaijan (Turan news agency, 12 July 05).  
On the other hand, the USA praised the commitment and co-operation 
demonstrated by the Azerbaijani leadership at the bilateral level. Madeleine 
Albright stressed that the reasons for the growing interest in the country 
were its important location, its rich resources, its two big neighbours, its pro-
longed conflict, and the forthcoming election. In addition to this, she also 
expressed the hope, belief and expectation that the Azerbaijani people would 
make a transition to democracy through a peaceful evolution. It is notewor-
thy that, during his visit to Baku, George Soros concluded that he did not see 
the grounds for a revolution in Azerbaijan. At a meeting with US Under-
Secretary Paula Dobriansky, the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliev, focused 
on the strategic partnership between the two countries. He assured her that 
Azerbaijan supported the US policy in the area of security and energy. Ms 
Dobriansky in turn expressed the hope that the Presidential decree the on 
elections would be fully implemented and that, ‘(the) US-funded exit polls, 
conducted by independent, objective organisation’, would help to deter elec-
tion fraud. At a meeting with the opposition, she said that the goal of her 
visit was to stress the importance that Washington attached to free, fair and 
democratic parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, and to deliver the message 
that she had arrived in Azerbaijan to support the democratic process in the 
republic. In a statement similar to that of Ms Albright, however, the Under-
Secretary stressed that the USA desired that the democratic changes in Azer-
baijan should occur through evolution, rather than revolution (Zerkalo, 1 
September 05, p.2).  
Similarly, at the end of their August visit to Baku, two US Senators, 
Richard Lugar and Barak Obama, praised the Azerbaijani president’s policy 
by stating that the report of the electoral administration (concerning election 
preparations) had made ‘a good impression’ on them. Lugar made a refer-
ence to the opposition leaders, who confirmed that the procedure of register-
ing candidates for parliament passed, ‘at a good level.’ This he called a ‘step 
forward’ compared to previous elections. At a meeting with the president, 
Lugar made it clear that the practice of repeated voting had to be eliminated, 
and that the Electoral Code had to be improved and properly applied. He 
also referred to the issue of a ‘velvet revolution’ in Azerbaijan. Although his 
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image is connected with revolutions, Lugar stressed that he did not expect a 
revolution in Azerbaijan. He also thanked Ilham Aliev for the support that 
the high level of the relationship between the two countries had created, and 
praised Azerbaijan for its involvement in international anti-terrorism coali-
tions and for providing an air corridor to enable the conduct of anti-terrorism 
operations. 
 
The US Congress Resolution  
 
Besides the visits of the US delegations to Azerbaijan, the House of Repre-
sentatives of the US Congress adopted a resolution (20 July 2005, passed in 
late October 2005 and additionally passed by the Senate), calling on the 
Azerbaijani government to hold fair parliamentary elections. Stressing the 
importance of avoiding any forms of violence (by all sides) during the pre-
election campaign, on Election Day, and in the post-elections period, the 
resolution called on the Azerbaijani authorities to guarantee the freedoms of 
expression and assembly. This was an unprecedented resolution by the US 
Congress in relation to Azerbaijan, and indicated the high level of impor-
tance that the USA attached to the then-upcoming elections there.  
At the same time, by distributing the responsibility for the possible vio-
lence between both parties, it softened the warning message to the govern-
ment regarding the application of force during public protests. Nevertheless, 
the United States expressed its concerns about state violence in connection 
with the arrival of Rasul Guliev, and the related events. The statement of the 
US representative to the OSCE, Julie Finley, distributed on 20 October, 
noted: ‘we remain troubled by reports of police violence during the unau-
thorised demonstrations in Baku on 9 October, as well as by reports that the 
police have detained up to 300 political activists, including up to 20 candi-
dates, on 16 October, in anticipation of Rasul Guliev’s return’. It further ex-
pressed concern that ‘some executive authorities were intervening in the 
campaign in favour of certain candidates, and in some cases have interfered 
with the electoral process’. The US statement also expressed hope that Azer-
baijan would continue its efforts to conduct free and fair elections. (Quoted 
from Turan news agency, 21 October 05) 
Concerns  
 
While Washington expressed its support for a peaceful scenario for devel-
opments in Azerbaijan, and hoped for the political will of the President to 
conduct free and fair elections, there was no doubt at the level of civil soci-
ety and within the opposition that the leadership intended to have controlled 
elections. The opposition was concerned by the degree of the US commit-
ment towards influencing, or preventing, the possibility of the state reacting 
violently towards the public protests – in response to what was, most proba-
bly, going to be another set of fraudulent elections. The positive step for-
ward, as compared to 2003, was found in US policy during the pre-election 
period, as shown by its statements regarding the necessity of respecting the 
freedom of assembly. On the other hand, the US appeals made to both par-
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ties to ‘abstain from violence’ provided the Azerbaijani government with an 
opportunity to use ‘mass disorder’ as a pretext for employing force to quell 
public protests. 
Non-Governmental Actors  
 
Unlike official representatives, non-governmental actors in the USA had 
been sending clearer messages to the Azerbaijani government. In May 2005, 
Freedom House issued recommendations urging the Azerbaijani government 
to demonstrate its commitment to democratic reform. Freedom House once 
again called on the government of Azerbaijan to cease its aggressive denial 
of rights and its violence against opposition activists and political candi-
dates; to allow fair media representation for diverse political views, able to 
reach a national audience; to permit unfettered activity of civil society in the 
election run-up and afterwards. Jennifer L. Windsor, executive director of 
Freedom House, stated: ‘The Azerbaijani government must cease trying to 
silence opposition members, candidates, and journalists, and must ensure 
that, next month, free and fair elections lay the foundation for the future of 
democratic progress in Azerbaijan’ (Turan, 22 October 05). 
 
The USA: Post-Election Conclusions  
The International Election Observation Mission  
 
The US reaction to the elections was conveyed within the International Elec-
tion Observation Mission and was backed by the statement of Adam Ereli, 
State Department spokesman: the 6 November parliamentary elections had 
been ‘an improvement over previous elections in some areas’. However, the 
USA shared the view of the preliminary assessment of the OSCE Observer 
Mission that, despite these improvements, the elections had failed to meet 
several international standards. The decision by the government of Azerbai-
jan to allow large numbers of candidates to register and provide them with 
greater access to the media was praised, as it gave voters ‘a real choice on 
Election Day (…) We are disturbed, however, by credible reports, in se-
lected districts around the country, of major irregularities and fraud that may 
have disenfranchised voters in those districts. We call on all citizens of 
Azerbaijan to address complaints about election violations through legal and 
peaceful channels, and to refrain from violence. We urge the government of 
Azerbaijan to make allowances for the peaceful freedom of assembly, and to 
exercise restraint in responding to protests.’ Thus, the US State Department 
spokesperson shared the OSCE conclusions, but also noted some improve-
ments. However, his message did not specify what consequences fraudulent 
elections might have for the status of US–Azerbaijani relations. 
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 US Congress  
 
The reaction of the representatives of the US Congress was more straight-
forward. Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Sam Brownback, 
stated: ‘Unfortunately, the authorities who implemented the election did not 
pass the test. As is clear from the OSCE assessment, Baku has failed to fully 
observe its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, hindering the democ-
ratic process in Azerbaijan.’ The Helsinki Commission on Security and Co-
operation in Europe is a US government agency that monitors the progress 
of the implementation of the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. ‘The 
high expectation that the elections would move democratisation forward in 
Azerbaijan has, regretfully, not been realized,’ added Commission Co-
Chairman, Rep. Chris Smith. ‘There is not even the pretense that the elec-
tions results are legitimate’, stated Commission Ranking Member, Rep. Ben 
Cardin: ‘It is not at all clear where Azerbaijan goes from here, but I am not 
optimistic. The international community is clearly going to have to make its 
displeasure heard.’ (From Turan news agency release, 9 November 05) 
 
Impact of Exit Poll Results  
 
Even though the US assessment was in line with the preliminary conclusion 
of the International Observation Mission, the major point of reference for its 
subsequent policy was the result of the exit poll conducted by the PA Con-
sulting Company. The poll revealed six cases of obvious fraud and three 
cases where there was a strong indication of fraud. This contrasted sharply 
with the view of the opposition, which claimed that results in the majority of 
constituencies had been falsified. Additionally, the opposition reported 
21,000 nation-wide violations, as well as noting the conclusions of the local 
observers which confirmed that the violations were of a mass character. 
Even the international observers found 43% of the counting to be ‘bad or 
very bad’. Two consequential statements by the US Embassy, and later by 
Assistant Secretary of the US State Department, Dan Fried, revealed the ul-
timate forced reconciliation of Washington’s decision on the outcome of the 
election struggle. The opposition and civil society realised that the scope of 
external support had been narrowed down. 
Internal Responses  
 
Although the Azerbaijani government did not take specific constituencies 
into account (this was identified by the USAID-sponsored exit poll as 
‘fraudulent’), Washington welcomed the 30 November decision of the Con-
stitutional Court of Azerbaijan to annul results in five additional constituen-
cies held to have been affected by electoral fraud. ‘These are positive steps, 
but more needs to be done’, the statement of the US State Department de-
clared, as conveyed by its spokesman, Sean McCormack, in Washington DC 
on 2 December. This statement, along with the speech of the Assistant Sec-
retary of State (at the Enterprise Institute), Daniel Fried, was generally inter-
Assessments of the Parliamentary Elections in March 2005 20 
preted as indicating unambiguous support for the government of Azerbaijan 
This caused deep disappointment among the opposition and in public opin-
ion in general. It was clear that those ten re-runs would hardly be enough to 
affect the nature of the country’s new parliament.  
Europe  
 
The other influential actor in Azerbaijani elections was Europe and its multi-
lateral institutions. Here there was a difference in the assessments of the 
Council of Europe and OSCE on the one hand, and the European Union on 
the other, as well as among the various delegations from European states..  
 
Notable Visitors  
 
During the election year, Azerbaijan received frequent visits from represen-
tatives of European organisations, the Council of Europe in particular. Aside 
from the regular visits made by the monitoring committee representatives of 
PACE (Andreas Gross and Andres Herkel), the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe, Terry Davis, came to Azerbaijan in August 2005. He 
expressed concern about the worsening of the pre-election situation in Azer-
baijan, and appealed to the media to abstain from ‘black PR’. Davis stressed 
that, although the presidential decree of 11 May was a positive signal, he 
was concerned that the relatively quiet June/July pre-election situation had 
worsened in August. The Coe Secretary genera; touched upon obligations 
such as freedom of thought and the media, and said that everything was 
moving very slowly, including the issue of political detainees, which was ‘a 
heavy burden on the shoulders of European–Azerbaijani relations’ (Zerkalo 
,1 September 05). 
The Venice Commission of the CoE, the OSCE and ODIHR  
 
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and the OSCE/ ODIHR 
have worked closely with the Azerbaijani government since Azerbaijan 
joined the CoE in 2001 and since its ratification of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), whose article 3 of 
Protocol 1 concerns the obligation of states to hold free elections. Represen-
tatives of both the OSC and ODIHR have participated in the observation of 
elections since 2000, and, along with the Venice Commission of the CoE, 
worked with the Azerbaijani government on improving the Election Code 
originally adopted on 17 May 2003. It was later amended and adopted by 
parliament in June 2005, after the release of the ‘Joint Recommendations on 
the Election Code and Electoral Administration in Azerbaijan’ by the Venice 
Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, and the Presidential Decree of 11 May 
2005 on ‘(The) Improvement of Election Practices in the Republic of Azer-
baijan’. However, in the Draft Final Opinion of 30 August, the authors con-
cluded that the amendments reflect their recommendations only to a limited 
degree, in connection with minor and technical issues, and that they do not 
fully meet OSCE and CoE standards. On 25 October, just a few days before 
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the election, the Azerbaijani president, faced with mounting pressure, issued 
the second decree (following the first decree of 11 May). This new decree 
allowed for local NGO participation in observation and instructed that an 
inking procedure be introduced; provided for administrative and criminal 
sanctions for violations; and obliged local and central executive authorities 
to create equal conditions for the freedom of assembly. However, he left the 
issue of the composition of the election commissions unchanged. This 
proved that the government stood firm with regard to the most crucial factor: 
that it intended to provide central control over the elections.  
The OSCE and ODIHR Mission  
 
The OSCE/ODIHR deployed their mission on the 5 September, with 18 ex-
perts and 30 long-term observers in the capital and 13 regional centres. On 
Election Day, 6 November, the International Election Observation Mission 
deployed 617 short-term observers from 42 OSCE participating states, visit-
ing more than half of all polling stations in the country. They observed the 
polling and vote count in over 2,500 polling stations, as well as in 90 con-
stituency election commissions after the polling stations closed. The group 
included 62 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 51 from the PACE, 12 
from the European Parliament and 11 from the NATO PA. On 7 November, 
the International Observation Mission held a press conference on the results 
of its observations of the parliamentary elections. The harsh conclusion: 
‘The 6 November parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan did not meet a num-
ber of OSCE commitments, and Council of Europe standards, for democratic 
elections.’ While there were improvements in some respects during the pre-
election period, there was evidence of uncertainty concerning key aspects of 
the process, such as voter registration. Furthermore, the continued restric-
tions on the freedom of assembly, a fundamental right, marred the campaign 
period, according to the mission statement.  
Voting was generally calm, but during the Election Day process it pro-
gressively deteriorated during the counting and, in particular, the tabulation 
of votes. The preliminary statement had a relatively balanced account of the 
positive and negative elements of the elections. In 87% of the cases the ob-
servers had made positive assessments to the voting, while in 43% of the 
cases counting was assessed as ‘bad and very bad’. Observers witnessed the 
following: attempts to influence voter choices; unauthorised persons interfer-
ing in, or directing, the process; and cases of ballot stuffing. Inking proce-
dures, in particular the checking of voters’ fingers for traces of ink, were not 
followed in 11% of polling stations visited, with several polling stations not 
applying the procedure at all. Domestic observers, and some members of 
polling station commissions, were observed being expelled from polling sta-
tions. Ambassador Geert-Heinrich Ahrens, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR long-
term observation mission, concluded, ‘Having read the presidential decree of 
11 May, I had very much hoped for a better election and consequently a 
more positive assessment by the International Election Observation Mission. 
Unfortunately, the results of our observation made this impossible.’ The pre-
liminary report also devoted extensive space to the election campaign (in-
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cluding the media), criticising its bias towards the official party and pro-
government candidates.  
This report was visibly tougher than the one on the presidential elections 
in 2003, which had started with a rather positive remark.: ‘The voting on the 
15 October 2003 presidential elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan was 
generally well-administered in most polling stations, but the overall election 
process still fell short of the international standards in several aspects.’ 
This can be compared to the first sentence of the International Election 
Observation Mission (IEOM) preliminary conclusion in November 2005:, 
‘The 6 November parliamentary elections did not meet a number of OSCE 
commitments and Council of Europe standards and commitments for democ-
ratic elections’. Unlike the assessment of the parliamentary elections in 
Georgia, for instance, the introduction did have an assurance that the institu-
tions represented in the IEOM stood ready to support the authorities of 
Azerbaijan and conduct fair elections. Furthermore, in the report on the par-
liamentary elections in Georgia, the international observers questioned ‘the 
willingness and capacity of the governmental and parliamentary authorities 
to conduct a credible election process’, whereas in the conclusion about the 
elections in Azerbaijan, they praised the ‘political will, expressed by the high 
level authorities’. This was, however, only ‘partially implemented by the 
executives’. This highlighted that the shortcomings were more a result of 
bad implementation than of a lack of political will.  
The composition of the OSCE mission at the 2005 election differed from 
that at the 2003 presidential elections. During the 2003 presidential elec-
tions, the mission had had more than 100 observers from IDEE (the Institute 
of Democracy in Eastern Europe). None of these organisations received an 
invitation in 2005; moreover, Irena Lasota, director of IDEE, was denied a 
visa by the Azerbaijani authorities. This is attributed to the stricter assess-
ment of the Azerbaijan presidential elections in 2003, rather than the as-
sessment of the mission in general (i.e. the ‘special opinion’ within the 
OSCE/ODIHR mission). This time the OSCE had 81 observers from Russia, 
who also expressed their special opinion – but this was of a quite different 
nature, criticising the mission for its assessment of Azerbaijani elections, 
which, it said, were too strict.  
All the same, the OSCE/ODIHR-led mission remained one of the most 
credibly perceived actors in these parliamentary elections. Both the govern-
ment and the opposition made reference to the report. However, the fact that 
two actors with opposite claims repeatedly referred to the same report 
probably indicates that it was too balanced to make a significant effect on the 
situation. For example, the section of the report which stated that 87% of the 
voting went well was often referred to by the government, whereas the oppo-
sition frequently cited the section which stated that counting in 43% of cases 
was deemed ‘bad and very bad’. 
The presidency of the European Union supported the OSCE/ODIHR con-
clusion and urged the government to investigate the cases of fraud which 
took place in a large number of constituencies, and to take relevant action. It 
also appealed to all parties to abstain from violent confrontation.  
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
 
A significant role in the elections was played by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, through the representatives of the monitoring 
committee. They reported to the PACE on the implementation of Azerbai-
jan’s obligations concerning the provision for free and fair elections. The 
change in attitude became evident when, visiting Azerbaijan, representatives 
of the monitoring committee extended the range of regular meetings to the 
leaders of opposition. This was a way of trying to develop a dialogue be-
tween the government and the opposition parties. All three representatives of 
PACE (Leo Platvoet, Andreas Gross and Andres Herkel) were straightfor-
ward in their assessment of the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. Gross 
called them a ‘step back’ for Azerbaijan. This sharply contrasted with all the 
international assessments of elections in the previous years, which had re-
ferred to them as ‘steps forward’. The statements by Gross and Herkel had a 
significant influence on the perception of public, and the democratic con-
stituency, regarding the position of the West in the Azerbaijani parliamen-
tary elections. Most of the opposition, as well as the non-partisan newspa-
pers and the TV channel ANS, devoted considerable space to interviews 
with both representatives, and to discussions around their statements and 
assessments.  
The Norwegian Perspective  
 
Similarly, the Norwegian Ambassador to Azerbaijan was openly critical of 
the elections. He had already gained a reputation as the most principled and 
consistent promoter of democratic values in the country after the presidential 
elections in 2003, when he had raised his voice in defence of human rights. 
The Norwegian government urged the Azerbaijani authorities to punish 
those who were to blame for the parliamentary elections fraud. According to 
a statement issued by the Norwegian Embassy and spread by the local news 
agency Turan on 8 November 2005, ‘The Norwegian government deeply 
regrets that the conduct of the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan far from 
satisfied international standards. The elections are a step back for democracy 
in Azerbaijan.’ 
 
The Council of Europe  
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) rebuked Washington for its support of Azer-
baijani President Ilham Aliev’s regime despite serious allegations of fraud in 
the recent parliamentary elections. Speaking at a press conference, a high-
level delegation from the CoE not only criticised President Aliev and other 
government authorities, but had harsh words for US President George Bush 
as well. 
Leo Platvoet of the CoE also stated that the Council’s impression was 
that election returns had been declared invalid in several constituencies ‘not 
because there was a lot of fraud, but because the candidate of the opposition 
won’. Significantly, the CoE representatives indicated the possibility of at 
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least one punitive measure that the body could take: non-recognition of the 
country’s new parliament. ‘We will accept the parliament when the elections 
are not fraudulent’, said Platvoet. The CoE delegation also expressed its 
dismay with the US State Department’s position so soon after the 26 No-
vember police crackdown on demonstrators in Galaba Square in Baku. 
The EU  
 
A real disappointment for liberal sectors of Azerbaijani society was caused 
by the statements by the EU special representative to the South Caucasus 
region, Heike Talvitiye, who, during his visit to Baku on 22 November 2005, 
‘positively’ assessed the democratic processes in Azerbaijan.  
‘Before the elections, I said that an evolution in events was possible in 
Azerbaijan. Now I have been made certain of that’, stated Talvitiye, who 
said that he interpreted the November parliamentary elections as ‘(a) step 
forward’ as compared with previous elections. At a press conference, 
Talvitiye did admit that some voting irregularities ‘caused serious concern’, 
and urged Baku officials to eliminate these shortcomings within the frame-
work of the law. At a meeting with representatives of the government and 
the opposition, he said that all the disputable issues must be resolved – once 
again, within the framework of the law. (Turan news agency, 23 November 
05) 
 
Europe: Other Opinions  
 
Along with the joint statement, there were also various other opinions among 
Western delegations. When compared to the OSCE/ODIHR statement, the 
assessments from the observers of the European Parliament and the NATO 
Parliamentary Delegation were softer. The Swedish parliamentarian, Goran 
Lindblad, told participants at a Johns Hopkins University teleconference on 
7 November: ‘(the) elections were a sign of a step forward’. Bulgarian ob-
servers gave a positive conclusion, as they had done 2003, and noted Azer-
baijan's improved electoral process (Eurasian Daily Monitor, 17 November 
2005, Vol. 2, No. 215).  
The report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) condemned the 
government of Azerbaijan, stating that the presidential elections in 2003, 
municipal elections in 2004 and the recent parliamentary elections in Azer-
baijan had been falsified. In order to prevent such incidents in the future, it is 
necessary, the report went on to say, to investigate frauds, punish those to 
blame, and ensure uniformity within electoral commissions. If the govern-
ment fails to take these steps and uses force against peace demonstrators, 
then sanctions should be imposed on the country.  
ICG Caucasus Project Director, Sabine Freizer, told journalists that Ilham 
Aliev was personally responsible for the conduct of the elections. She added 
that the world community must exert pressure on the republic. Furthermore, 
she said, it was also necessary to create a group of ambassadors to work with 
the government, the opposition, and the CEC, in order to eliminate viola-
tions, and noted that similar groups had worked rather effectively in Georgia 
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and Ukraine. Since the ICG was closely involved in the resolution of the 
conflicts in the Caucasus, some analysts suggested that the harshness of this 
statement might be interpreted as pressure on the President in order to obtain 
greater concessions in the negotiations process. 
  
Russia  
Russian Involvement  
 
Russia’s interest in the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan in 2005 was 
more profound than in the previous years. In the context of the three velvet 
revolutions – which Moscow had perceived as its ‘defeat’ in the geopolitical 
competition with Washington – Russia increased its attention to the Azerbai-
jani elections. Prior to the 2005 elections, it sent several high-ranking repre-
sentatives to Baku, most notably Sergey Lebedev, head of Russia’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service. It is also worth noting that, against the background of 
the usual refusal to attend the international meetings held in Yerevan, this 
time (prior to the elections on 29–30 September) the Deputy Minister of In-
ternal Affairs of Azerbaijan attended a meeting of the interior minister of the 
CIS in Yerevan (the meetings was led by a Russian minister). The Azerbai-
jani authorities also made extensive use of the services of political technolo-
gists led by Gleb Pavlovskii. It is hardly a coincidence that Vladimir 
Rushailo, executive secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
and head of the CIS monitoring delegation, had praised the electoral process 
ever since his arrival in Baku several weeks prior to the actual vote. Mem-
bers of the opposition blamed Rushailo for interfering in the domestic affairs 
of the country. Following the elections, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
declared: ‘The elections have passed according to Azerbaijani legislation’, 
and Vladimir Putin congratulated his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliev, 
on, ‘successful parliamentary elections’ (Azertaj News Agency, 9 November 
05). 
Russian-Led CIS Missions  
 
Russia led the CIS mission, with a total of 640 observers. CIS observers vis-
ited 3,087 polling stations; 2,838 were also visited by other observers. The 
CIS started its mission on 6 October, with headquarters in Baku and four 
other cities: Gianja, Lenkoran, Nakhichevan and Khachmas.  
CIS Conclusions  
 
Unlike OSCE/ODIHR, CIS highly praised the national legislative basis for 
the election and pre-election situation. The only suggested changes were to 
Article 46.1, in order to allow to the election commissions to include, within 
the lists, those who were not on the lists but had a document confirming their 
residency in the district. They suggested changes to Article 46.1 so as to al-
low voting before Election Day, and to allow voting with a residency-
confirming document for those who were not on the voters’ lists.  
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The CIS conclusion also praised the practice of voters’ IDs and the inking 
procedure, introduced for the first time in Azerbaijan. In a similar manner to 
the other observers, the CIS observers did not notice violations during the 
registration of the candidates. However, unlike the Western observers, the 
CIS did not note any violations of the freedom of assembly or unequal rights 
of opposition candidate campaigning. Similarly, they ignored irregularities 
observed by the IEOM regarding access to the electronic media (TV chan-
nels). CIS monitoring of the media, from 10 October to 4 November, led to 
the conclusion that the TV coverage of the election process had been, as a 
rule, objective and balanced. They stressed, however, that some candidates 
insulted the honour of their rivals, while some called for civil disobedience 
and violence. CIS monitors observed cases of local executives interfering in 
the election in only three districts.  
The CIS stressed the fact that, of 47 appeals to sanction a rally by the op-
position, 38 received a positive response from the authorities. They blamed 
the opposition parties for ‘aggressiveness’ and for creating social-political 
tension. The CIS also praised the procedure for the filing of complaints and 
their review in the courts. The opinion refers to ‘separate cases’ where there 
were violations of election law.  
However, the exit poll was assessed negatively by the CIS, who held that 
the results of the exit polls could not be taken into account, as the polls had 
been implemented with serious violations and falsifications. Similarly, the 
inking procedure was negatively assessed, as it ‘complicated the work of the 
precinct commissions, creating queues, and did not have a quality certificate, 
confirmed medically.’  
CIS and Other International Observers: Comparing Results  
 
The major divergence in the assessments related to the count and tabulation. 
While the IEOM concluded that the count in 43% of the cases was ‘bad or 
very bad’, the CIS observers did not notice any violations. The CIS observ-
ers concluded that they did not consider the individual violations to be of a 
mass character and thus were not seen as affecting the outcome of the elec-
tions. 
At the request of the Russian Federation, OSCE/ODIHR included 81 
Russian experts in the short-term observation mission in Azerbaijan. Some 
analysts suggested that the presence of the Russian observers in 
OSCE/ODIHR was aimed at softening the group’s final assessment of the 
election process.  
The assessment by Russia’s delegation differed from the overall assess-
ment of the elections by OSCE/ODIHR. Furthermore, the Russian issued a 
separate remark, made by the head of the delegation delegation of the Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Chepurin. This statement was far softer 
than the conclusion of IEOM, and focused on the problems related to the 
work of ODIHR itself, rather than on the elections as such. It made reference 
to the fact that no Russian expert had been included in the team of long-tem 
observers and analysts, and sharply criticised the statement by Alcee Hast-
ings and the OSCE/ODIHR press release as being non-objective. The con-
clusion expressed hopes that the opinion of Russian observers in 
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OSCE/ODIHR would be taken into account in the final opinion of the mis-
sion.  
Other Regional Actors 
Iran  
 
Iran sent a delegation of 21 observers, led by the former Iranian ambassador 
to Azerbaijan, Ahad Gazai, currently an advisor to the minister of foreign 
affairs. The delegation opted for a similar pattern to Russia, lauding the elec-
tions and supporting Aliev’s party. The Azerbaijan ambassador to Iran, Af-
shar Suleymani, said that the elections had been democratic and transparent 
(day.az 8 November 05). For Iran, relations with the Azerbaijani government 
are extremely important: as a strategic partner of the USA, Azerbaijan may 
play an important role in the region in the context of Washington’s policy in 
Iran.  
Turkey  
 
Although not openly praising the Azerbaijani elections, the official position 
of Turkey was also supportive of President Aliev and his policies on the im-
provement of the electoral process in the country. Although the Azerbaijani 
opposition has maintained old ties with politicians in Turkey, relations with 
the authorities seemed to dominate in Turkish foreign policy. There were 
particular cases of indignation in public TV speeches of members of an or-
ganisation close to the government in Turkey, the Marmara Group, who sent 
82 observers and praised the elections highly. However, at the societal level, 
there were appeals for the support of the democratic forces in the country – 
like that from the Turkish Centre for Strategic Analysis, which stressed the 
importance of not sacrificing democracy in Azerbaijan for the sake of tem-
porary stability (Baki Xeber, 2 November 05, p.7). 
Assessments by Local Observer Teams  
Local NGOs  
 
Local NGOs had been practising election observation in Azerbaijani elec-
tions since 1998 and had been active in observing the 1998 and 2000 parlia-
mentary elections. However, after 2000, observation participation of local 
NGOs with more than 30% of foreign funding was prohibited by law. De-
spite this, civil society participated in observation on an individual basis in 
the presidential elections in 2003, and in the municipal elections in 2004.  
In October 2005, 10 days prior to the parliamentary elections, a presiden-
tial decree lifted the ban on NGO participation in election observation. Alto-
gether the number of local observers, candidates’ representatives and law-
yers participating in these elections was 17,000. This time, the government 
registered numerous ‘loyal’ observers: these were members of the ruling 
party, whose function was to promote falsifications in favour of the pro-
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government candidates, rather than observe the integrity of the election 
process.  
A few local NGOs and coalitions participated in the observation of the 
parliamentary elections. The largest were two coalitions: the Election Moni-
toring Centre of 14 NGOs and the Consultative Advisory Council for Free 
and Fair on Elections of 48 NGOs. Together these two covered most of the 
republic.  
All NGOs and coalitions were unanimous in their assessment: violations 
took place all over republic, that they had a mass character and that they sig-
nificantly affected the outcome of elections. ‘At least at half of the districts 
should hold by-elections’. The Election Monitoring Centre, which had de-
ployed 2,315 observers in 124 districts, and was led by Anar Mammedly, 
reported numerous falsifications. ‘In the afternoon, the intervention that had 
taken place during the process of elections was of a consistent, mass and un-
controlled nature’, according to a statement of the coalition of the 14 local 
NGOs at a press conference. They were sponsored by the USAID, NDI and 
the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.  
Similarly, the other coalition of local NGOs, led by Arzu Abdullayeva, 
reported that the violations had mass character and had significantly affected 
the outcome of the elections. The appeal issued on 22 November stated that 
the Co-ordinating Advisory Council For Free and Fair Elections united 48 
NGOs and deployed 2,237 observers to monitor the 6 November elections in 
80 constituencies. The appeal drew attention to violations of the law that 
occurred during the elections, and made a statement about voting irregulari-
ties. In particular, these were interference in the voting process on the part of 
the police and executive administration, incorrect lists of electors, the crea-
tion of polling stations in military units, and intimidation of voters and vote 
buying. The Council criticised the Central Election Commission (CEC), 
which had in fact refused to deal with complaints about violations. The hu-
man rights activists and election experts branded the 2005 parliamentary 
elections ‘a failure’. The coalition, in particular, paid attention to the groups 
vulnerable to manipulation at all elections (the military, refugees and IDPs, 
and prison inmates). These were extensively used in many constituencies in 
order to afford victory to the pro-government candidates. Observers noted 
numerous major irregularities in those districts where the leaders or activists 
of the opposition were running.  
The Institute for Peace and Democracy reported numerous violations in 
Baku villages to which its observation mission had been extended. Inall, 249 
observers in 9 districts reported violations like police violence, arrests and 
detention of observers and members of the local electoral commissions, the 
practice of bringing voters to the polling stations by bus, pressuring and 
campaigning for the government candidates at polling stations, and ballot 
box stuffing. Institute observers also noted police violence against women. 
Their observations led to the conclusion that none of the results in the nine 
districts could be trusted. 
Compared to the previous years, there was an increase in the participation 
of local NGOs in election observation. However, the election monitoring 
work was complicated by various factors: the ban on the participation of 
NGOs was lifted only a few days before the election; there was a lack of re-
Assessments of the Parliamentary Elections in March 2005 29 
sources (which in turn prevented the training of civil society representa-
tives); the foreign agencies’ status in the eyes of the authorities very often 
led to pressure and violence against the observers. Yet in some instances 
there were reports that the authorities’ blatant falsifications were deterred by 
the professional, and consistent, work of local observers. The similarities in 
the assessments of the election by different coalitions helped to develop an 
independent, local perspective on the election. 
Other Reports  
 
The head of election headquarters of the Azadlyg bloc, Panah Huseyn, re-
ported that there had been a total of 21,104 violations in 113 election dis-
tricts. He noted that, after the completion of the voting process at 7 pm, the 
police started to arrest observers and steal boxes from the election points. 
Concerning violations that took place during the day, Huseyn said there had 
been a number of cases of interference by the executive organs and votes 
cast without the practice of marking fingers with ink; instances of pressure 
being exerted on observers; cases whereby one voter voted for several peo-
ple; cases of ballot-box stuffing; cases of interference by the police; and in-
stances when the wrong use of boxes was observed.  
The leader of Musavat party, Isa Gambar, declared that they had observed 
‘total falsification’, whilst the chairman of the PPFA, Ali Kerimli, declared 
that the elections did not reflect ‘the will of people of Azerbaijan’ (6 No-
vember 05). 
4. Exit Polls  
Exit Polls and Azerbaijan: Remarks 
 
Exit polls are an important tool in determining the degree of election fraud. 
They have been used to discredit elections in emerging democracies where 
ruling parties were expected to falsify the outcome of the vote. They can, on 
the other hand, also be used to validate the outcome where there has been an 
honest count. 
Exit polls were conducted for the first time in Azerbaijan. The country’s 
legislation does not provide for the conduct of the exit poll, so the practice 
was introduced legally by means of a presidential decree of 11 May 2005.  
There were three exit polls during the November parliamentary elections 
in Azerbaijan, conducted by: 
• Edison/Mitofsky – (Mitofsky International, a private US company) with 
Edison Media Research and CESSI Ltd  
• PA Consulting (USAID-financed)  
• SAAR poll (owned by Alexander Saar, Estonia).  
Mitofsky International conducted the 2004 exit polls for the US media. 
CESSI, a Moscow firm, has worked with Mitofsky on all the Russian exit 
polls since 1993. Mitofsky International and SAAR poll covered all the con-
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stituencies, except for one, while PA Consulting only 65, randomly chosen. 
Renaissance Associates, the company that hired Mitofsky International, was 
a Swiss company, run by a Bulgarian national. 
Mitofsky International  
 
Mitofsky hired three local organisations to work with them on the Election 
Day. Interviewing was divided between the Association for Civil Society 
Development in Azerbaijan (ACSDA) and the Sociological Research and 
Socio-Economic Forecasting Centre (QAFQAZ). ACSDA did the interview-
ing in 90 election districts (or parliamentary districts), and QAFQAZ in the 
other 35. ACSDA had previously done polling for this client, and QAFQAZ 
had worked with Vladimir Andreenkov (Mitofsky’s Russian partner at 
CESSI) for years.  
Mitofsky also hired another Azerbaijani survey company, SIAR (the So-
cial and Marketing Research Centre), to monitor interviewing. There were 
105 monitors covering more than one third of all the sampled locations. Ac-
cording to Mitofsky, the results of the monitoring proved that the local part-
ner, ACSDA, had done an unsatisfactory job. At midday in a key district, 
interviewers at thirteen of their sample polling places in the twenty precincts 
could not be located. Furthermore, many questionnaires simply never arrived 
at company headquarters – likewise with the results reported by the tele-
phone. This was the case in several Baku districts.  
But the greatest challenge was to make the report public. Mitofsky re-
ported that, due to difficulties in relations with their sponsor in making the 
results of the exit poll known to the public, they were able to display their 
results only 20 hours later, after the official and the SAAR Poll results were 
known. According to the Mitofsky exit poll results, independent candidates 
got 39% of the vote. The government party (YAP) candidates had 32%, the 
Freedom Bloc, a coalition of three opposition parties, received 14%, with the 
remainder scattered among various parties. The real differences were in re-
gional support for the YAP. According to the poll, such support appeared 
weakest of all in the capital, in the centre’s neighbouring regions and in the 
northeast of the country. 
PA Consulting  
 
The Agency for International Development (USAID), an arm of the US State 
Department, sponsored an exit poll in 65 of the 125 districts. PA Consulting 
Group of Madison, Wisconsin, was the lead organisation.  
The experts of the PA consulting company announced that their work fol-
lowed four principles: anonymity, political neutrality, transparency and pro-
fessionalism. The data were processed at the Baku centre, with two servers 
and 32 computers, and the results were planned to be reported twice (first by 
telephone and then by the lists brought to the Centre). According to informa-
tion provided by the PA consulting company, CEC selection would be ran-
dom (on a computer lottery basis). 
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SAAR Poll  
 
There was another exit poll, by the Estonian firm SAAR Poll, apparently 
sponsored by the Centre for Regional Development in Azerbaijan (directed 
by Chingiz Ismailov). According to Mitofsky himself, the same people who 
sponsored their exit poll also were involved with the SAAR Poll.  
On 7 November, Andrius Saar, head of SAAR Poll, held a press confer-
ence. It was opened by the chief of the Regional Development Centre, 
Chingiz Ismailov, who stated that 20 representatives of SAAR poll had con-
ducted an exit poll at 1,043 PECs of the 124 CECs. Every fifth one was sur-
veyed, and a total of 800 people were covered in 124 districts. According to 
SAAR, it was difficult to conduct an exit poll in a country with no experi-
ence of it, but they expressed satisfaction with the results. Twelve represen-
tatives had been sent to six regions: Goycay, Ismailly, Gianja, Lenkoran, 
Ali-Bairamly and Saatly.5 Ismailov did not disclose the inviting party or the 
source of financing.  
 
Commentary  
 
There was considerable controversy regarding the exit poll companies. The 
media generally gave credibility to the USAID (or PA Consulting-led) exit 
poll, even though it was funded by the US government, an open supporter of 
stability and the current Azerbaijan government. The United States was also 
known to have urged the issue of fair elections to President Aliev.  
Initially, there was concern relating to the presence of Mitofsky Interna-
tional, as it was supposedly hired by the government with an unknown 
source of financing, but also the activities of PA Consulting activities occa-
sioned certain doubts.  
Biased Procedures 
 
Although the credibility of PA Consulting was highly rated, there were con-
cerns about its selection of constituencies (and the doubtful transparency of 
the process of selection, which had left the opposition leaders in the most 
crucial constituencies out of the coverage); the presence and participation of 
relatives of the local administration in the conduct of the exit polls; the con-
fusion of data and the delayed appearance of the results on the website.  
The practice of not selecting the districts where the leading representa-
tives of the opposition had a high chance of winning became a subject of 
discussions. According to Rauf Arifoglu, ‘society does not consider it to be 
normal that the most popular leaders, professionals, and prominent intellec-
tuals were left out of the CEC exit polls. It is most probable that this was 
done with intervention of the government, and that those CECs will be cov-
ered by exit polls conducted by the companies invited by the government.’6 
Further: ‘The US company announced the constituencies where it will con-
                                                     
5  Baki Xeber, 8 November 05, p.14). 
6  Baki Xeber, 256, 2 November 05, p.11 
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duct an exit poll. Amongst these, none have the most promising Azadlyg 
candidates’. As to the impact that excluding these districts may have had on 
the situation, Arifoglu said ‘it will untie the authorities’ hands’. Among 
questionable aspects of the PR Consulting activities were, as reflected in the 
media: excessive finances at their disposal for the conduct of exit poll; badly 
trained contractors; and confused results, as well as late publication on the 
website (Realniy Azerbaijan, 18 November 05, p.6). Many observers be-
lieved that random selection of electoral districts, made in the presence of 
journalists and NGOs, would have lent credibility to the exit polls.  
The public’s perception, hopes and expectations of the PA Consulting 
Company had significantly weakened by Election Day. The opposition and 
civil society did not trust the partners of the PA Consulting Group, Georgian 
GORBI or local Sorgu companies. A typical example of the lack of transpar-
ency in the conduct of both the election and the exit poll is Constituency 80 
(Fizuli) polling station no. 20. The chairman of the commission was a mem-
ber of the ruling party (YAP), Valida Ibrahimova. The exit poll was con-
ducted by her husband Kerem Zeynalov, while her son was an exit poll su-
pervisor at polling station no.25. 
Limitations  
 
Exit polls can test violations only on Election Day, but not the effect of vio-
lations during the pre-election campaign – which in the Azerbaijan case in-
cluded the intimidation of voters, vote buying, and excessive use of adminis-
trative resources. According to representative of the PACE monitoring 
committee, Andres Herkel, violations were found in more than 40% of the 
cases on Election Day alone. There were many violations in the pre-election 
campaign period as well: people withdrew their candidature under pressure, 
while some candidates were invalidated by courts.7  
After Election Day, the US Embassy issued a statement that the results of 
the exit poll were available at their WebPages. It also stated that the exit poll 
had been by both the government and the opposition parties. Apparently, in a 
move to address public criticism, the embassy had to confirm the four prin-
ciples of the conduct of an exit poll (political neutrality, transparency, ano-
nymity, and professionalism), and that the exit polls had been conducted un-
der multiple control, so the influence of ‘personalities’ was excluded. PA 
Consulting disclosed six cases of obvious fraud, and three cases where there 
was a strong suggestion of fraud. In all nine cases the exit poll disproved the 
officially announced results. Contrary to the announced winner from the rul-
ing party (or its loyal independents), it confirmed the victory of the Azadlyg 
bloc in seven districts, the YeS bloc in one district, and an independent in 
another one. According to exit poll experts the identification of fraud in 
those districts does not mean that the exit polls confirms the lack of fraud in 
the other 56 districts and says nothing about the 60 districts covered by the 
exit poll. 
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Exit Polls and Official Results: A Comparison  
 
The divergence with the official results was as follows: in the case of the 
Mitofsky poll, 16%; SAAR Poll, 12%; and 17% according to the poll con-
ducted by PA Consulting. The results of the exit polls conducted by two of 
the companies, Mitofsky and SAAR poll, in 124 constituencies, did not co-
incide in 25 constituencies. The official results coincided with all three of the 
other exit polls in only 33 constituencies. The results of all three exit polls 
were reported on their websites only after the official data were announced.8 
In general, none of the results of the exit polls were perceived as credible by 
the public. 
 
5. International Assessment and Exit Polls: The Internal Re-
sponses  
 
The Authorities  
Initial Resistance  
 
The government had taken a tough stance during negotiations over the legal 
parameters set to underpin the conduct of the elections. Most improvements 
from the government came as a result of negotiations and pressure from lo-
cal and international actors, and were of a technical character. The govern-
ment consistently resisted any major changes that would weaken the ruling 
elite’s grip on power. At the third congress of the ‘Yeni Azerbaijan’ party 
(YAP), in March 2005, for instance, Ramiz Mekhtiyev said that the democ-
ratic processes in Azerbaijan had been well thought through, had been de-
veloping successfully and that the country had been integrating into Europe. 
Mekhtiyev, head of the presidential administration (and considered to be a 
key person in the design of the elections), said that the government did not 
consider it necessary to change the principles governing the formation and 
membership of the election commissions. The present election commissions 
had been formed on the basis of the recommendations of the Venice Com-
mission and OSCE, so ‘we do not see any necessity to change them’. 9  
As to the harsh criticisms in the OSCE conclusions concerning the elec-
tions, Mazahir Panahov, CEC chairman, requested that this issue not ‘be ex-
aggerated’, because international organisations usually ‘do not praise posi-
tive moments, they focus on shortcomings’. On the whole, he said, ‘the elec-
tions were transparent and democratic’. According to him, the official results 
coincide with the results of the American PA Consulting exit poll by 83%.10. 
In cases out of every 65, there were 6 obvious cases of fraud and 3 strong 
suggestions of fraud). 
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Presidential Response  
 
The relatively strict assessment by the International Election Observing Mis-
sion caught President Aliev by surprise. According to the head of the inter-
national relations department of the presidential administration, N. Mame-
dov, the President was too nervous to go out to journalists and comment on 
the statement of the IEOM. He only partially acknowledged local and inter-
national criticism by saying that irregularities had taken place in a few dis-
tricts, and that his government would take serious steps to address shortcom-
ings.11  At the opening of the newly elected parliament, President Ilham 
Aliev stated: ‘(The) Council of Europe does not consist of only Gross and 
Herkel.’ In most interviews, representatives of the official power would refer 
to the figure of 87% (as mentioned in the preliminary report by the 
OSCE/ODIHR) as proof of the insignificant number of violations. After the 
election, the government strengthened its PR campaign in the main European 
organisations. However, the pre-election situation showed that the greater 
pressure did at least make the government give up on its resistance to the 
introduction of the inking procedure, as well as allowing the participation of 
local NGOs in election observation. It seemed that the government preferred 
to make concessions on relatively ‘safe’ issues (safe for the existing power 
monopoly), while remaining firm on the most crucial aspects of the reforms.  
Utilising the ‘Democracy’ Issue 
 
There was a rather standard continuation of the tradition that had been laid 
down by President Heidar Aliev: the reforms were skilfully used, under the 
façade of democratisation, in order to further centralise and monopolise 
power. This was illustrated in the reaction from President Ilham Aliev to the 
criticism of the international observers and results of an exit poll. As early as 
two days after the elections, he issued a decree instructing that the people 
who had violated the law on Election Day should be punished. In accordance 
with this presidential instruction, the local heads of the executive power of 
three districts were dismissed, and the results in four districts were invali-
dated.  
According to copies of the protocols received by local observers in three 
districts, the opposition candidates were the leaders (and, in one area, an in-
dependent). In violation of the law, the authorities did not re-count ballots, 
but simply annulled the results. Furthermore, 460 polling stations where the 
opposition had a clear victory were eliminated. Of more than 500 complaints 
submitted by the opposition and independent candidates to the CEC, half 
were not even considered, while the other half were declined, as were more 
than 40 complaints filed to the Court of Appeals. 
Cementing the Outcome: the Constitutional Court Decision  
 
On 1 December, the Constitutional Court approved the overall results of 
Azerbaijan’s 6 November parliamentary elections. The court invalidated re-
sults in six constituencies, including one where the chairman of the major 
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opposition, the Popular Front (PFPA) party, Ali Kerimli, had run. Prior to 
the decision, Kerimli had been announced the winner from his constituency, 
along with five other candidates, including another PFPA executive (Gulam-
huseyn Alibeyli) and the editor-in-chief of the Azerbaijan newspaper parlia-
mentary publication, Bahtiyar Sadigov. Altogether, the CEC and the high 
court invalidated the results of ten constituencies. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court only confirmed the official re-
sults of the parliamentary elections. It was made early, although representa-
tives of the monitoring Committee PACE, Gross and Herkel planned their 
visit before the decision day. It was not a coincidence that the Constitutional 
Court’s session hurriedly took place before their arrival. In this regard, the 
statement of the US State Department looked as though it was hasty support 
for the Azerbaijani government. Only one of the nine districts revealed by 
the USAID-sponsored exit poll as likely to be fraudulent coincided with 
those in which the authorities chose to punish their representatives for elec-
tion law violations. Nevertheless, this move caused an immediate appraisal 
from the US State Department and some other international organisations. 
For local civil society actors, the move was seen as lip service of the authori-
ties in reaction to criticism, and a way of initiating yet another crackdown on 
the opposition. Civil actors argued that there was no need to cancel the poll-
ing results in the districts and precincts where all that was needed was a re-
count.  
The Constitutional Court decision took away the last hope of both Azer-
baijani society and of Western diplomats, who had tried to convince the op-
position that they should wait for the Constitutional Court decision in order 
for justice to be restored concerning election frauds. The European diplomats 
had expected that a greater number of complaints would be reviewed and 
solved positively.  
Other Reactions  
 
In the opinion of civil society and the opposition (which was shared by the 
representatives of the Council of Europe), the authorities deliberately tar-
geted and cancelled the results in those districts and precincts where, accord-
ing to the acquired protocols, opposition candidates had a clear victory. 
Similarly, the local heads of executive power were punished where they had 
failed to provide a smooth win for the desired authority candidate. The real 
reason for the punishment was widely interpreted as the executives’ ‘botched 
job’ in promoting the ‘right candidates’, rather than for violations of the law 
through interference in the election process. Another argument, disproving 
the genuine intentions of the authorities, was that no punishment was applied 
in many other cases of violations: in particular, at the numerous military 
polling stations that had been established on the territory of military units, in 
violation of the election law. The military units were used extensively as part 
of the manipulation in all previous elections, and ‘helped’ to win the elec-
tions by many ‘appointed’ candidates. 
The encouraging approval of the official post-election reaction to the 
criticism of elections by some international actors, except for the representa-
tives of the monitoring committee of PACE, affected the behaviour of the 
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ruling elite. The government welcomed the US Embassy statement. Ali 
Hasanov, head of the presidential administration’s political department, said 
that the government of Azerbaijan was satisfied with the US’ ‘constructive 
evaluation’ of the parliamentary election results. ‘We [the government] con-
sider the US Embassy statement (to be) a positive assessment of the parlia-
mentary elections’, Hasanov told APA news agency on 3 December. Even 
after the results of the exit poll had been disclosed, showing major irregulari-
ties in certain districts, the newly ‘elected’ parliamentarians were not dis-
couraged. In December, in an interview with the ANS TV channel, former 
head of the foreign relations committee, Samed Seidov (who had been re-
elected, according to the exit poll, in fraudulent circumstances) assured the 
audience that no serious sanctions were awaiting Azerbaijan at the January 
PACE session. To support his ideas, he used Turkey as an example, stating 
that, despite the military coups, that country had managed to join the Council 
of Europe just few decades later. 
The effect of the ‘priority of stability’ agenda on the policies which for-
eign states had with Azerbaijan (including Russia’s uncritical support for the 
incumbent regime) was demonstrated at one of the post-election rallies of 
opposition. Despite all previous international appeals to the government that 
it should respect the freedom of assembly, the authorities responded with an 
excessive use of force at a peaceful rally of the opposition on 26 November. 
This resulted in dozens of people being wounded – among them, women, 
and children and old people. Prior to the planned end of the rally, and with-
out warning, the government employed internal troops, along with its special 
riot police, using batons, dogs, tear gas, and water cannons against the pro-
testers.  
 
The Opposition  
 
The opposition welcomed the IEOM and OSCE/ODIHR conclusion regard-
ing the parliamentary elections. However, despite the harsh language, West-
ern actors seemed keen to avoid the revolutionary scenario, and for this rea-
son the Baku-based foreign diplomats initiated a dialogue between the oppo-
sition and authorities behind closed doors. In the evening of 6 November, the 
head of the election headquarters of the Azadlyg bloc, Panah Huseyn, an-
nounced that, over the country, 21,000 violations had been observed, and 
recommended that the results in the majority of districts should be invali-
dated.12.Human rights activists and members of Azadlyg called for the crea-
tion of a national resistance movement.  
Assessing the results of the parliamentary election, the leader of the 
Musavat Party, Isa Gambar, said that the electors had voted for changes in 
the republic, but that the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democ-
racy was impossible without the support of the world community. In an in-
terview with local media, he praised the international assessments immedi-
ately after the elections, like those made by the OSCE/ODIHR, the USA and 
Norway. He noted that the authorities had become more skilful in hiring 
                                                     
12  Bakinskiye Vedomosti, 12 November 05 
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people from abroad to observe and legitimise elections, but the OSCE re-
mained the most important body in terms of election assessment, so the re-
sults of an exit poll were not of particular importance.13   
The position of the USA, which was seen as crucial to the outcome of the 
struggle of the democratic and non-democratic forces in other former Soviet 
states (as was expressed in a series of statements), came as a disappointment, 
in particular regarding the reaction to the decision of the Constitutional 
Court on 1 December. The US Embassy statement, issued on 2 December , 
congratulated the Constitutional Court for the cancelling the election results 
in the ten constituencies, and expressed optimism about working with the 
newly elected members of parliament. It urged the government ‘to press 
ahead with the prosecution of those who were engaged in fraud’, and called 
on police to ‘respect the rights of peaceful, free assembly’. The statement 
also reminded the authorities about the need to hold fresh elections in the ten 
constituencies, in accordance with international standards.  
The Need for Answers  
 
In a statement issue on 3 December, leaders of Azadlyg and the opposition 
(the Liberal and National Independence Parties) expressed their ‘surprise and 
regret concerning the hasty welcoming statement by the USA about the Con-
stitutional Court’s decision’ and called it a ‘double standards approach’ as 
compared to the elections in Georgia and Ukraine. ‘We regret that the US 
President and State Department did not fulfil their pre-election declarations, 
and dealt a heavy blow to the democratic process in Azerbaijan.’  
The opposition leaders contacted the US Embassy for an explanation of 
the statement. On 7 December, Ambassador Reno Harnish met with PFPA 
Chairman Ali Kerimli, Musavat Party Chairman Isa Gambar, Democratic 
Party of Azerbaijan First Deputy Chairman Sardar Jalaloglu and Liberal 
Party Chairperson Lala Shovket. According to some sources, Reno Harnish 
tried to convince the opposition to agree to enter the parliament. 
The media devoted extensive space to the discussion surrounding Dan 
Fried’s statement at the American Enterprise Institute after this decision. Mr 
Fried had stated that (as was conveyed through a local newspaper) ‘(the) 
elections in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were not free and fair, but neither 
were they totally devoid of seriousness. There is a big difference between 
imperfect elections and a parody of elections.’ He also stressed that both 
election exit polls gave the full impression of the nature and scale of the 
elections. Dan Fried conveyed the message that, besides moral transparency, 
tactical realism should be taken into account. He said that this would allow 
for the gradual and consistent achievement of the US objectives, and for co-
operation with the states which make a move in the right direction.14 This 
was a confusing statement which contradicted the previous US statements 
regarding the elections. All this was perceived with irony among the opposi-
tion and civil society.  
 
                                                     
13  Realniy Azerbaijan, 11 November 05 
14  Paytaxt Sabah, no.63, 17 December 2005, p. 9 ‘The US “non-serious” approach to the 
elections’ 
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Contributions from the Opposition’s Media Community  
 
The newspapers of the leading opposition discussed US foreign policy and 
the US role in the election. Local analysts questioned whether the Pentagon 
decision to set aside USD 300 million towards the promotion of its interna-
tional image would help to reach the overall objective. This was applied to 
the case of Azerbaijan, where the first blow to the US image took place after 
2003 presidential election. During the past decade, the democratic camp in 
Azerbaijan had established friendly relations with America. However, the 
USA began closing its eyes to the suppression of democracy in 2003. This 
caused disappointment among the population, who felt that ten years of 
hopes had been crushed. This damaged not only the USA, but also its sup-
porters. The next betrayal took place in 2005. During, and in particular after, 
the election, the ‘US manipulative approach, and most terribly, welcoming 
support of the fraudulent actions of the government, was met with indigna-
tion in society’. This was especially shocking, the author stressed, following 
the statements from Washington, which declared that, ‘We will give freedom 
to those who want it’. In the journalist’s opinion, it was hard to believe that 
the US image would improve in Azerbaijan in the near future, even if mil-
lions of dollars were being spent on that purpose. As long as Ilham Aliev 
remained in power, the USA would always be perceived as his supporter. 
Deputy chief of the Musavat Party, Sulhaddin Akber, said that the US at-
titude to democracy and democratic values in the Karabagh conflict, and the 
907 amendment, had been crucial in these relations. The 907 amendment is 
an amendment to the Freedom Support Act, adopted by the US Congress in 
1992, prohibiting any aid to the Azerbaijani government because of its con-
flict with Armenia The fact that Washington did not support the democratic 
forces or the democratic processes in the elections deepened the negative 
image of the USA in the country. This was especially the case during the last 
parliamentary elections, when the USA did not stand by the people’s striving 
for freedom, and there was an inconsistency in the statements made at a high 
level. This created some serious questions. He also stressed that it meant a 
big blow to the democratic forces in Azerbaijan. ‘The US tried to affect our 
authorities in meetings behind closed doors, but it did not work. Thus, in this 
competition, Russia won’ (Yeni Musavat, no.323, 18 December 05, p.6. 
‘America’s fault: by whom and how big?).  
Rauf Arifoglu, editor of Yeni Musavat, bluntly stated that the USA bears 
special responsibility for the defeat of the democracy in Azerbaijan. ‘We 
were expecting serious steps from the USA. However, the USA took oppo-
site stance: it gave priority to its oil and other interests. This action will have 
a high price for both the USA and democracy in Azerbaijan.’ The editor re-
minded his readers of the significant US contribution in maintaining the 
Aliev dynasty. He suggested that this was due to a religious factor: that the 
USA has different attitudes to democracy in Christian and in Muslim states. 
‘It is clear that the USA considers us as being alien and does not include us 
in the world community of democrats’. He also stressed that hopes of the US 
influence could even be found in Baku villages, which are considered to be 
the most conservative area, with a significant religious influence. If the USA 
could help to prevent falsification of elections, it would increase its reputa-
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tion in other Muslim countries. But now such a hope is over. The conclusion 
is that, ‘if one wants to win or get support of the USA, one should be strong. 
And one needs to work permanently inside the country, regardless of the 
position of the USA, because this is a necessary element of winner’. 15 
To the public, the effect of the OSCE preliminary statement was signifi-
cant. The newspaper Bakinskiye Vedomosti wrote that, after the OSCE 
statement (which it called the ‘slap in the face’ of the authorities), the gov-
ernment had to cancel results in several CECs; it did this in the in 31st , for 
instance, where Ali Kerimli had been announced a winner. 
There was an obvious discrepancy between how the foreign and local ob-
servers perceived the election, the latter being more negative than the for-
mer. The government cancelled, and reviewed, its results in only a very lim-
ited number of districts. This contrasted with the results of the observation 
missions of the local organisations, and even the OSCE, which noted a 
greater number of violations (43%), far from the numbers given by opposi-
tion. This made the opposition resort to rallies as a means of pressure on the 
government. After the opposition bloc Azadlyg appealed to the people to 
come out on 9 November, the government took measures to block the meet-
ing. Entrance from the regions to Baku was closed. Security in government 
buildings was strengthened with armoured vehicles and troops. By order of 
the Office of the President office (as conveyed by the rector), students and 
teachers in the Baku State University, as well as budgetary organisations, 
and state infrastructure, were warned not to attend the meetings.  
Not unlike the official media, the opposition newspapers referred to the 
OSCE statement as a means of justifying and legitimising the opposition’s 
claims that the elections were unfair. They did this by referring to a pub-
lished OSCE statement under the title, ‘The opposition has a right and the 
grounds to protest the elections’ or ‘OSCE did not recognise the legitimacy 
of the falsified elections’.16 
Possibly the most gloomy conclusion was given in Baki Xeber: ‘The 
leadership proved that it cannot change. There are two ways ahead: either 
shut our eyes to the elimination of the state, or to stand up for the struggle. 
Who can believe that Rasul Guliev, Isa Gambar, or Ali Kerimli, lost the 
elections? They would beat Ilham Aliev ten times over in a fair competition. 
Apparently the West understands all that its position, regarding the elections, 
will show its sincerity regarding democracy.’ 
Another newspaper, Azadlyg, wrote extensively about the international 
assessment, their perception and the effect on the government (on 8 Novem-
ber 05, p.10). According to this article, the assessment of the elections by the 
IEOM was adequate, and was a serious blow to the image of Azerbaijan in 
Europe and its prospects of integration; ‘(A) precise assessment was given in 
the Azerbaijani elections. They did not respond to the European standards. 
The feudal thinking of the Azerbaijan government prevents it from entering 
the European gates.’ The newspaper also discussed the minor effect that the 
assessment and exit poll had on official policies, asserting that, over time, 
instead of improving practice of elections, the government had been perfect-
ing its falsification skills. It also stressed the dangerous trend of growing 
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16  Baki Xeber, 8 November 05, p.4 
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bureaucratic indifference to the image of Azerbaijan that was being formed 
in the West. 
The West: Friend or Foe?  
 
The statements by the representatives of the monitoring committee PACE, 
Gross and Herkel, acquired even greater importance in society after the dis-
appointment caused by the USA’s expression of its satisfaction with the de-
cision of the Constitutional Court. The newspapers quoted their assessments, 
as well as the possibility of having a discussion of the issue of the Azerbai-
jan delegation’s mandate at PACE. 
This came as an indication of the West’s insistence regarding its declared 
values – particularly important because of the softness and inconsistency of 
elections assessment in Azerbaijan. This has characterised the overall post-
Soviet policy, and position of, the European states and the USA. It has 
tended to create the following impression, as stated by one of the opposition 
leaders in an ANS TV interview on 16 December 2005: ‘We finally under-
stood that the Western policies were blocking democracy development in 
Azerbaijan’. There has been the growing impression that the perceived 
change in the US policy (on the parliamentary elections) could have negative 
long-term consequences for American influence in Azerbaijan. ‘People will 
simply stop trusting their assurances about their [US] solidarity with those 
who are fighting for freedom’, wrote Zerkalo’s Rauf Mirgadirov on 6 De-
cember. According to many opposition activists and political analysts, along 
with local liberals, the West has also lost in these elections 
 
6. Conclusions 
Perceiving Different Viewpoints  
 
The opinions delivered by the Russian, Iranian, CIS and Turkish observation 
missions regarding the conduct of the parliamentary elections were per-
ceived as giving political support for the government. This went along with 
the expectations of society. Since 2003, the people of Azerbaijan have ob-
served open support for the government from the side of all the regional ac-
tors, so they were not surprised by these conclusions. The conclusions made 
by the states and organisations have not been perceived by society as being 
credible, and thus have not had independent political significance.  
In contrast, the opinion of the observing missions of the USA and Europe 
were taken seriously by all actors (the government, opposition, civil society), 
for the reasons mentioned in the introduction.  
The public perception was that the government had made a deal with the 
regional actors, including Turkey and Georgia, while Europe and the USA 
had managed to combine their principles and interests in their assessment of 
the elections.  
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US and European Responses Analysed  
 
Compared to the presidential elections, when Richard Armitage congratu-
lated Ilham Aliev with the victory via a telephone call even before the offi-
cial results were announced, with the parliamentary elections the US position 
was more balanced. Washington’s official position in the Azerbaijani elec-
tions was crucial, but inconsistent. While it had been sending encouraging 
signals throughout the pre-election year, the substance of its assessment 
changed significantly after the decision of the Constitutional Court. The new 
standpoint contradicted its earlier opinions. It was obvious that, because of 
the multiple agendas and diverse interests, the USA and Europe had limited 
levers of influence on the Azerbaijani government, for fear of losing out in 
dialogue in other important areas like security and energy. Given the an-
nounced intent of the Azeri government to conduct an honest election this 
time round, the opportunity of providing the election with credibility was 
presumably a factor in the funding of the USAID poll.  
Within the European camp, conclusions also differed. The most consis-
tent were given by OSCE/ODIHR and PACE, while visibly softer views 
were given by the EU and the NATO PA. However, because of Europe’s 
institutional ties with Azerbaijan, and various sanctions at its disposal, 
Europe has greater levers of influence in the country’s democratisation proc-
ess. It is also clear that the major regional powers do not want to spoil rela-
tions with the Azerbaijani government, due to the current high level of eco-
nomic, energy, and security co-operation – so most of them have accepted 
the election results.  
Exit Polls 
 
As has been explained, Azerbaijani legislation does not contain provisions 
for the conduct of exit polls. This resulted in the respective margins of error 
and statistical discrepancy. The legislative basis for conducting the exit poll 
was given in the Presidential decree on 11 May. The exit polls were of lim-
ited significance and seemed to serve as tool to confirm the legitimacy of the 
election results. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, where the exit polls had 
showed the winner to be the opposition candidates, and thus undermined the 
legitimacy the incumbent regime, in Azerbaijan all three exit polls indicated 
only a limited number of cases of obvious fraud, publicly confirming the 
overall legitimacy of the election results. Shortcomings in the work of the 
exit poll companies in these elections prevented the practice from serving as 
a credible instrument of election assessment. The exit polls did not substan-
tially increase the transparency of the process, as they managed only to ad-
dress violations that took place on Election Day itself. Instead, it served 
more as a tool to legitimise the status quo. There was no transparency in the 
choice of a local partner, or the choice of the districts, so all districts with 
opposition activists were excluded. Moreover, and the results of the exit 
polls were not made public until after a period of delay, and later than publi-
cation of the official results.  
There were also discrepancies in both the observations of the local ob-
servers and the polls conducted before the elections. Some showed the oppo-
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sition bloc leading the race. It is clear that an exit poll which had government 
financing (whether local or foreign) would not be free from the influence of 
a particular state’s agenda and interests. This was the case with all three exit 
polls, one of which was supported by the US government, and the two others 
presumably supported by the Azerbaijani government. The US-sponsored 
exit poll had a limited effect or influence on the government, which, in its 
reaction to the international criticism, did not take into account, for instance, 
of specific constituencies that had been marked by the USAID poll as 
fraudulent. Instead, it targeted those where the opposition had a clear vic-
tory, by cancelling the results instead of ordering a recount.  
 
Explaining the Behaviour of the Ruling Regime  
 
The behaviour of the ruling regime can be explained by a few factors. Mem-
bers of the regime perceive the democracy agenda as less important in their 
relations than other agendas like security, conflict resolution or energy.  
 
Reactions toward the USA  
 
The US assessment of election, as an independent actor from the Interna-
tional Election Observation Mission, was perceived as rather supportive of 
the incumbent regime. The fact that, in an attempt to address the shortcom-
ings of the elections (because of the strict assessment by the IEOM) the gov-
ernment did not take into account the results of the exit polls of the observers 
(or rather, took them into account only formally), showed that it was confi-
dent of Western support in any case. This confidence was also based on the 
recognition that the Azerbaijan leadership is valuable for Russia, who 
worked closely with the government throughout the election period. In addi-
tion, the divergence of interests found in Ukraine and Georgia concerning 
support for the political forces between Russia and the USA (and Europe) 
did not exist in Azerbaijan. This was because the government was a strategic 
partner of the USA through its anti-terrorist coalition and its being a reliable 
energy source, and had been working together with Western mediators in 
conflict resolution. However, the more consistent position of such European 
institutions as the Council of Europe, as compared to the US official position 
in the Azerbaijani elections, gave a positive image of Europe as a more 
genuine supporter of the declared principles and values. The sustainability of 
this positive image of the CoE will depend upon the how consistent its reac-
tion to the Azerbaijani elections remains.  
A Final Note on International Assessments  
 
The post-election situation in Azerbaijan demonstrated the effect which the 
international assessments and differing state positions had on developments. 
It is highly probable that, if the ruling elite had been the least bit hesitant in 
its use of force against the demonstrators, the numbers of participants would 
have swelled, taking into account the scale of dissatisfied population, and the 
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scenario would have been quite different. The international conclusions send 
important signals to society, empowering certain trends and influencing 
power centres. If the Azerbaijani government had to face tough sanctions 
from the side of international community, it would restrict its practice of re-
sorting to the use of force against opposition rallies. In the case of Azerbai-
jan, the real interests of some critical actors, including the USA, Russia, and 
to some degree, Europe, did affect the nature of the signals that they were 
sending to the leadership of country regarding democracy. 
Society was disappointed by the West’s inconsistency in its promotion 
and support of democratic values, while the Council of Europe, and certain 
individual countries, such as Norway, remained the last hope for the Azer-
baijani liberals. The deepest scepticism and disappointment was caused by 
the position of the USA, and this may act to undermine its influence in the 
country. The international assessments of the elections were perceived as 
more objective as compared to the previous years, but still did not reach the 
level of local expectations, particularly in comparison with the position taken 
by the West in states like Georgia and Ukraine. The gap between the as-
sessment by local and some foreign observers, if continued, might also lead 
to the alienation of society from those states. Most importantly, observers 
noted a trend in public perceptions: the people feel that there is a consensus, 
or conspiracy, between the local ruling elite and the Western actors, in imi-
tating rather than actually promoting democratisation. 
The consistent position of the Council of Europe as to Azerbaijani elec-
tions may not only be of crucial importance to democratisation, it will also 
inevitably affect Europe itself. Conversely, if there is inconsistency in 
Europe’s stand regarding its core values, and if it avoids taking action over 
non-implementation of obligations, this will degrade the quality of European 
standards and weaken Europe’s position in Azerbaijan as well as in the re-
gion more generally.  
 

FRAMEWORKS FOR ELECTION 
OBSERVATION IN AZERBAIJAN: 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS, BUT 
LITTLE IMPACT? 
Ulvi Amirbekov 
1. Introduction 
 
Key Developments  
 
In Soviet Azerbaijan, as in all countries with a totalitarian regime, the im-
plementation of public observation during the election period was practically 
an impossible exercise because the conduct of the election itself was not 
based on democratic principles. Even though some regulations in the legisla-
tion were seen as guaranteeing the right to observe the elections, in practice 
the implementation of these regulations always failed and they carried a de-
clarative character only. As in the entire Soviet empire, the election process 
was under the full control of a single party. Elections were held without al-
ternatives and the results were usually falsified according to the demands of 
the time. 
This article outlines key legal developments in the sphere of election law 
and portrays the evolution of election observation in Azerbaijan since 1991. 
It is argued that the importance of election observation in Azerbaijan has 
grown, but is still facing serious constraints. 
 
The Recent Historical Context 
 
According to most domestic and international observers,17 the 1992 presi-
dential elections that brought Abulfaz Elchibey into power in Azerbaijan 
were reasonably free and fair. However, no elections held since then have 
                                                     
17  Evison, Joanna. Elections Azerbaijani Presidential Elections: A Presidential Choice in 
Azerbaijan, at: www.democracy-az.net/elections by: 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAAZERB/341.htm 
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met either of these criteria. From the time President Heidar Aliev came to 
power, all elections have seen high levels of fraud and manipulation aimed at 
engineering a suitable outcome. They have received harsh criticism from the 
international community and domestic opposition alike,18 and have failed to 
provide a level playing field for all the political forces in the country. Due to 
widespread fraud during the elections, the political parties in the country 
have failed to recognise each other’s interests. Instead, they have focused on 
antagonism and mutual insults, leading to a high level of distrust and politi-
cal polarisation on both sides. 
And yet, Azerbaijan’s electoral system can be said to be a stable one: all 
elections of the past thirteen years have been conducted on time, without 
delays or postponements. Prior to 1993, the electoral system had operated on 
a rather chaotic basis, with presidential elections in 1991, 1992 and 1993 as 
well. However, since 1993, parliamentary, municipal, and presidential elec-
tions have taken place on a regular basis, as stipulated in the Constitution. 
Both the public and the political parties know when to expect the next elec-
tions, and this allows them to be better prepared.  
 
New Election Laws  
 
Initial Post-Independence Additions 
 
After gaining independence, Azerbaijan declared its firm commitment to 
democratic principles, and took its first steps on the way to establishing a 
democratic, constitutional state, governed by the will of the people and the 
rule of law. Early in this process, Azerbaijan undertook a fundamental 
change aimed at the democratisation of society: the introduction of the legis-
lation necessary to establish a democratic election system. The parliament 
passed laws on presidential (in 1998), parliamentary (in 1995), and munici-
pal elections (in 1999), as well as a law on the work of the Central Election 
Commission. In this sense, the electoral system was always operating on a 
solid legislative basis. However, these laws have been the subject of heated 
debates, as they are riddled with gaps and contradictions and have created 
obstacles to the participation of political parties in elections. One issue ac-
tively debated during these years was the status and role of domestic and 
international observers in the election process.  
 
The Development of the Status of Election Monitors 
 
The status of election observers was relatively broadly classified in the Law 
on Elections (as adopted by the Milli Majlis [Parliament] on 12 August 
1995). For the first time this issue was given proper attention; and, in com-
parison with other election laws, this resulted in a more systematic approach 
towards observation. Unfortunately, this law, like its predecessor, was un-
                                                     
18  See OSCE/ODIHR election reports on Azerbaijan at: http://www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/14352.html 
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able to fully address the issue and ensure that the participation of observers 
in elections followed international standards and best practices. For example, 
the law did not consider the possibility of a non-partisan organisation con-
ducting election observation in the territory of the whole country. According 
to the legal requirements, monitoring on such a scale was possible only for 
the political parties represented in the elections. Not surprisingly, the conclu-
sions and the observations of these institutions always had a one-sided char-
acter. The 1995 parliamentary elections clearly showed this: election obser-
vation reports produced by the political parties contesting in the race contra-
dicted each other.  
After the parliamentary elections, a top issue of debate was election ob-
servation, with a more inclusive approach towards institutions responsible 
for observation, and the participation of independent and non-partisan bodies 
in this process. As a result of the public debates and of pressure from the 
international community, this issue found legal expression in legislation 
adopted after the elections. In the Law on the Elections of the President of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1998,19 election observation issues were ap-
proached in a broader and more democratic manner. Further improvement 
came with the presidential decrees and in the regulations adopted by the 
CEC in connection with the implementation of the law. In this law, and in 
corresponding orders and regulations, the circle of observers was more 
broadly defined than in the previous law. According to these acts, not only 
persons participating in elections, but also public organisations, trade unions 
and political parties not represented in the current elections were granted the 
right to observe elections. A basis was also provided for independent organi-
sations to conduct election monitoring in the territory of the whole country. 
Furthermore, the rights and duties of observers were broadly described in 
these acts.  
The Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Municipal Elections, adopted on 
2 July 1999, further improved the status of observers in the electoral process, 
and provided a real legal basis for the active participation of observers in 
elections. In comparison with the previous laws, the new provisions placed 
an obligation on every single observer appointed by any domestic organisa-
tion and intending to observe elections to obtain CEC accreditation.  
 
2. Elaboration of the Unified Election Code  
 
External Political Conditions 
Council of Europe Membership 
 
On 17 January 2001, Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe (CoE). Most 
Azerbaijanis were very supportive of the decision to join this pan-European 
institution, which they felt would support their newly independent state in 
developing its own democratic institutions. Indeed, in order to become a 
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member of the Council of Europe, many standards must be met, and it was 
hoped that these would facilitate Azerbaijan’s path to democracy. The Coun-
cil of Europe provides a certain amount of leverage in order to help, encour-
age and scrutinise the process, particularly in matters dealing with the execu-
tive, legislative and judiciary systems, including the protection of human 
rights and the freedom of the media, of religion, of minority peoples and 
languages and of political prisoners.  
Since accession, all election-related issues have proven to be the defining 
issues in relations between Azerbaijan and the CoE. Azerbaijan undertook an 
obligation to adopt a unified election code at least six months prior to the 
next election (the October 2003 presidential elections). In 2002, under pres-
sure from the Council of Europe, the Office of the President finally started 
work on a draft of the code, which would serve as a unified document for the 
country’s entire electoral system and would aim to eradicate contradictions 
and gaps among various laws related to elections.  
 
The New Election Law: A Key Domestic Issue 
 
For these reasons, in 2002–2003, the process of elaborating a new electoral 
law became a major domestic political topic. This project was ascribed great 
importance by all parties because it would establish the ground rules for the 
presidential elections in 2003 and the crucial parliamentary elections in 
2005. From the viewpoint of the international community (specifically, the 
OSCE and the CoE), the aim of this electoral-law project was to create a 
foundation which would allow the next elections to meet democratic stan-
dards and ensure that the election results were accepted by the majority of 
the participants.20 
The new election code was designed to comply with international stan-
dards and the recommendations issued by the OSCE/Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) based on its experience in interna-
tional election monitoring. Experts from ODIHR and the Venice Commis-
sion of the Council of Europe have, since the summer of 2002, been working 
closely with the Azerbaijani presidential administration responsible for the 
preparation of this law. The drafts by this administration are put under con-
tinuous review and are discussed at meetings of experts. 
The intention of the new electoral law was also to accommodate the in-
terests of the various political parties, enabling participants in the coming 
elections at least to agree on the ground rules, and create a minimal measure 
of reciprocal trust. Without this, democratic elections cannot be held, even 
with the best of electoral laws. 
 
                                                     
20  Ambassador Peter Burkhard, Head of the OSCE Office in Baku, interview in Yeni 
Musavat newspaper, 16 November 2002. Also Opinion No. 222 (2000) Azerbaijan’s applica-
tion for membership of the Council of Europe 
(http://assembly.CE.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta00/eopi222.htm) 
Frameworks for Election Observation in Azerbaijan 49 
Internal Discussion 
Round Table Meetings  
 
A public consultation process was deemed necessary to complement the ex-
pert meetings. While it is the sovereign right of a state to reform its election 
system, fundamental legislative changes should be based on a broad political 
consensus, in order to ensure the widest public confidence in the reform 
process and its outcome. As an initial step, in October 2002, the director of 
the OSCE/ODIHR arranged for a round table meeting to be conducted with 
President Heidar Aliev in December of that year. Other round table meetings 
were planned for early 2003.  
The initial round table meeting, held on 17 and 18 December 2002 was, 
however, only a limited success, owing to the boycott by important opposi-
tion parties. These parties demanded that formal negotiations be held in-
stead, and that the results of such negotiations should be binding, with the 
appointment of an arbitration commission. All the same, this event was the 
reason why the draft law, which had hitherto been confidential, was made 
public in late November. This led to intensive discussions within interested 
circles of NGOs and opposition parties. Within the latter group, a compre-
hensive commentary was elaborated, with detailed opinions on specific pro-
visions of the draft law. The central focus during these discussions was on 
the election commission, a theme that dominated to the exclusion of virtually 
all other topics.21 
Following the round table meeting, international organisations working in 
Baku concentrated on encouraging the leading members of the major politi-
cal parties to reconcile their interests, with the aim of incorporating the re-
sults of this into the draft law. After some apparent initial successes involv-
ing agreements on format and procedures, the undertaking experienced a 
setback, when the opposition parties laid down new conditions which proved 
irreconcilable with the agreed principles. The enterprise failed completely 
when the party representatives invited to a meeting to resolve the situation 
did not show up, although they had originally agreed to attend. 
 
Limited Exchange of Ideas 
 
In March 2003, with some seven months left until the next elections, the in-
ternational community managed to arrange for the senior civil servant in 
charge of the draft law (within the Office of the President), who is also the 
author of the law, to meet with the opposition’s leading election expert, for 
                                                     
21  Elections in Azerbaijan are administered by a three-tiered system of election commis-
sions, headed by the 15-member Central Election Commission. There are 125 constitu-
ency election commissions and 5,137 polling station election commissions. The commis-
sions play a crucial role in the conduct of elections, and their impartiality is of a para-
mount importance for the conduct of free and fair elections. Since Azerbaijan’s independ-
ence, the composition of the election commissions always favoured the incumbent au-
thorities and undermined confidence in the independence of the election administration; 
pro-government parties have a majority in all election commissions, sufficient to make all 
decisions. Moreover, the chairpersons of all election commissions are nominated by the 
parliamentary majority.  
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an initial exchange of ideas on some of its central points. This became possi-
ble after the opposition’s election experts said they would agree to a meeting 
of this kind, in order to discuss the provisions of the draft law, without pri-
oritising any specific issues. 
At this first meeting, both sides agreed on a roadmap for further discus-
sions on the draft law. However, only one other meeting was held. This was 
due to the fact that the opposition expert’s mandate was restricted, by the 
opposition parties, to what was considered to be the most crucial aspect of 
electoral reform: the establishment of the election commission. On hearing 
this, the government representative declared that, under these changed condi-
tions, further discussion would be pointless. 
 
Proposing International Organisation Involvement 
 
The last hope of fulfilling, by way of an agreement between key political 
forces, the criterion set by the ODIHR and Council of Europe experts – that 
the election commission, and thus the electoral process, not be under the in-
fluence or control of a single political power – seemed to be in jeopardy. The 
international experts made it clear that neither the government’s draft nor the 
opposition’s counterproposal was acceptable from this point of view. Within 
the international community in Baku, opinion was growing that the interna-
tional experts should draft a proposal themselves, which could then be de-
veloped further by experts working jointly from the ODIHR and the CoE. 
This proposal was subsequently accepted by the government and then for-
warded to the appropriate parliamentary committee.  
 
The Draft Law 
 
In the meantime, the legislature had held a first reading and debate of the 
draft law. In the debate on the second reading, on 7 May 2003, members of 
the governing party were highly critical of the proposed changes and the in-
ternational organisations involved. The draft was sent back to the committee 
for further discussion, which presented the changes to the plenum in a modi-
fied form. On 27 May 2003, this version was finally adopted by parliament. 
At the time, the view was that the new Code appeared to meet international 
standards in most respects, but that further amendment was required in order 
to meet some substantial shortcomings.22  
 
                                                     
22  Joint Final Assessment of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, by 
OSCE/ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law. Venice 
Commission, Council of Europe. http://venice.CE.int/docs/2003/CDL(2003)054-e.asp  
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3. Domestic Election Observers and Current Law: Notable 
Changes 
 
Initial Observations 
A Generally Satisfactory Outcome 
 
The rules and practices concerning election observation are crucial for the 
success of elections, particularly if, as in the case of Azerbaijan, the question 
of election commissions has not been solved on a consensual basis. The in-
ternational experts assessing the Code concluded in their final statement that 
‘the rules concerning election observation are generally satisfactory.’ The 
rules over who may act as a domestic observer are set out in the text and ap-
pear to be broad (articles 40.6–40.7). The Code clearly stipulates the wide-
ranging rights of candidates, party agents and their representatives, together 
with journalists and observers, to attend electoral commission meetings, ac-
cess election documents, obtain copies of decisions, and observe the voting 
and counting process (Article 40). They are also allowed to observe the work 
of election commissions on Election Day and to include their observations in 
the commissions’ protocols. They can also observe the transfer of election 
documents from the constituency election commissions to the CEC. The 
Code also foresees the right of NGOs to accredit observers (article 40.5). 
 
A Notable Limitation 
 
Despite this, until October 2005, public associations, including those receiv-
ing foreign state funding, were prevented from observing the electoral proc-
ess. This prohibition was not a part of the electoral code itself, but of the 
‘Law on Public Unions and Foundations’. This law, passed in 2000, gave 
only local NGOs that received less than 30% of their funding from foreign 
entities the right to monitor elections. In practice, this disqualified an over-
whelming majority of Azerbaijani NGOs, given the low levels of domestic 
funding available to them. This legal provision seriously impeded the work 
of local election observation up to 2005, as NGOs were unable to mobilise 
larger observation groups, train them and co-ordinate their activities. Indi-
rectly, this provision also made individual observers more susceptible to in-
timidation, since they lacked the protection of a larger organisation. This law 
also affected the financial transparency of the NGOs, since it discouraged 
them from disclosing the money which they had received from international 
donors (in order to preserve their ability to field observer teams). Since the 
introduction of the Election Code, right up until the recent parliamentary 
elections, local NGOs mitigated the impact of this restriction by registering 
their members as individual monitors, a right granted under the Law.  
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Legal Alterations 
 
The international community, as well as domestic NGOs, repeatedly voiced 
serious concerns over this shortcoming, as it breaches relevant provisions of 
the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, relating to civil organisations. In 
their final assessment of the Election Code, the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice 
Commission of the CoE stated: ‘despite the fact that the prohibition of for-
eign funding of local NGOs does not seem to violate the Constitution of 
Azerbaijan, the objections against such a rule stem from the opinion that 
comprehensive observation by domestic and international observers pro-
motes transparency and increases public confidence in the electoral process.’ 
23 
This discriminatory provision was abolished in 2005, only two weeks 
prior to the 6 November parliamentary elections. On 25 October, President 
Aliev issued an executive order that called on the parliament and the Central 
Election Commission to introduce a series of measures that would help to 
prevent multiple voting, remove restrictions on election observers, establish 
complaints procedures, and enhance accountability for electoral violations.  
 
Work In Progress? 
 
On 28 October, in response to this presidential order, the parliament lifted 
the ban that had prevented foreign-funded NGOs from acting as observers in 
the elections. However, the late introduction of the order made it impossible 
for domestic observation groups to benefit, as there was no time left to at-
tract the funds needed in order to organise a comprehensive domestic elec-
tion observation effort. It will not be possible to assess the changes that this 
legal modification will bring to domestic observation groups until the by-
elections scheduled for 13 May 2006.  
 
4. NGOs and Current Law Practice  
 
The Current Situation 
Significant Hurdles 
 
The government of Azerbaijan severely restricts the activities of NGOs. The 
right to the freedom of association is guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (from 1995). While the European Convention on 
Human Rights recognises the right of the people to form associations with 
                                                     
23  Joint Final Assessment of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, by 
OSCE/ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law. Venice 
Commission, Council of Europe. http://venice.CE.int/docs/2003/CDL(2003)054-e.asp 
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no special requirements for formalisation (registration) of such association, 
domestic legislation – the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On the Regis-
tration of Legal Entities and State Register of Legal Entities – stipulates that 
non-governmental organisations must have state-registered status in order to 
operate. The Ministry of Justice is authorised as the state agency tasked with 
registering public associations. 
In Azerbaijan, NGOs are poorly recognised by governmental officials. As 
a result, most of them have difficulties in obtaining the required registration 
status with the Ministry of Justice. In the past three to four years, hundreds 
of NGO applications for registration, lodged with the Ministry, have either 
remained unanswered, or have been rejected. The lack of registered status 
significantly restricts NGOs from functioning properly, and also restricts 
donors from providing unregistered NGOs with financial support. While 
Azerbaijani legislation establishes clear and exhaustive requirements for set-
ting up a public organisation, officials of the Ministry of Justice usually re-
ject the registration of NGOs on groundless basis, or through misinterpreta-
tion of the laws.24  
 
Growing Activity 
 
All the same, NGOs in Azerbaijan are very active in organising non-partisan 
election observation and voter education activities. With every new election, 
the organisational, observation capacity and professional skills of these do-
mestic groups have been growing.  
The presidential elections in 2003 substantially increased the level of 
NGO activity in the political sphere. Despite numerous complaints about the 
difficulties associated with registration, large numbers of domestic observ-
ers, from political parties and NGOs as well as individuals, were accredited. 
On Election Day, over 40,000 domestic observers were deployed around the 
country.  
Several groups united under the umbrella agency, ‘For the Sake of Fair 
Elections’, and organised a unified election-monitoring campaign throughout 
the country. Also the Election Monitoring Centre, made up of 12 NGOs, 
conducted election monitoring. Additionally, it produced campaign-oriented 
television programmes aimed at educating voters on voter registration and 
encouraging election participation. The Women’s Rights Protection Centre 
conducted training of observers in several regions. Another alliance of 
NGOs, ‘SOS-03’, also conducted various activities aimed at increasing voter 
turnout.  
 
                                                     
24  Report on the registration procedure of NGOs in Azerbaijan, OSCE Office in Baku at: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/ob/2005/05/14151_en.pdf Problems of NGO registration 
in Azerbaijan at: http://www.osce.org/documents/ob/2003/08/558_en.pdf 
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Historical Problems 
 
Recurrent Issues 
 
During the 2004 municipal elections, domestic NGOs also managed to de-
ploy thousands of observers, despite the existing legal restrictions. In 2005, 
several NGOs, including the Election Monitoring Centre, For the Sake of 
Civil Society, and the Co-ordinating Advisory Council for Free and Fair 
Elections, deployed large numbers of short-term observers on Election Day. 
However, assessing the activities of these groups, it seems clear that NGOs 
involved in election observation in Azerbaijan have, over the years, faced the 
same kinds of problems. These are presented below. 
Local executive authorities and police often interfere with the activities of 
the observers before, during and after Election Day. In rural areas, observers 
who witness violations such as ballot stuffing are pressured by the represen-
tatives of the local executives not to report them.  
Very often observers are denied access to polling stations, or are expelled 
from them. Observers are required to sit far away from voting or counting 
and thus are prevented from observing these processes effectively. Further-
more, they are unable to collect tabulation protocols. 
Most importantly, no effective sanctions are imposed on representatives 
of local executive authorities who, in violation of the law, have interfered in 
the election process. This diminishes confidence in the rule of law and opens 
the way for further violations.  
 
All these problems result from: 
 
• first and foremost, the lack of political will, on behalf of the 
Azerbaijani authorities, to hold free and fair elections 
• the composition of election commissions, which favours those 
currently in office (in many cases, election commissions act to-
gether with the representatives of local authorities in violating the 
rights of domestic observers) 
• the inability of most observation groups to act in an impartial, 
unbiased and professional manner 
• arbitrary application of the Election Law and almost total impu-
nity of those responsible for violations of the Law  
• lack of knowledge on the provisions of the Election Code among 
commission members  
• lack of understanding and knowledge, on the part of observers, of 
their rights, duties and responsibilities.  
 
Puppet NGOs 
 
The work of NGOs in the electoral process is further complicated by the fact 
that political groups have established ‘puppet NGOs’ to promote their own 
agendas. The existence of such groups, which claim the same status as non-
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partisan NGOs, makes it difficult for NGOs to mount election observation 
efforts which the people can trust, and tarnishes their accomplishments.  
 
Internal Bickering 
 
Another challenging internal obstacle that faces most NGOs is their inability 
to articulate a clear message and work together to promote that message. 
They tend to criticise government plans rather than formulate independent 
solutions to the problems facing Azerbaijan, and they lack crucial skills like 
coalition-building. Too often, their messages are driven by the personal in-
terests of strong personalities, which can in turn contribute to fragmentation 
of the mission.  
 
Lack of Public Support 
 
The most significant obstacle to the activities of NGOs in Azerbaijan is the 
lack of public trust and popular support. Recent polls (SRC, Public Opinion 
Survey, ‘Lessons learned from the Parliamentary Elections’, 2005) show that 
the vast majority of the population (87%) does not believe that reports or 
recommendations submitted shortly after the election make any difference. 
Usually, these reports are reported only summarily in the media, at home and 
abroad. Occasionally the government acts on some of the less important ob-
servations and recommendations. More serious recommendations, i.e. those 
that could truly improve the overall situation of the conduct of the elections, 
are usually put aside, as there is no established practice for officials to take 
note of such reports and recommendations. There are the rare cases where 
the reports of Election Observation Missions have made a dramatic differ-
ence, such as in Ukraine or in Georgia – but those are the exceptions. The 
more general rule, especially in Azerbaijan, is that the reports are simply 
shelved, thus diminishing the impact of the observation efforts of domestic 
and international groups.  
 
5. Election Observation in Azerbaijan:  
What More Could Be Done?  
 
First Suggestion: Further Legislative Changes 
 
There are still some gaps in domestic election legislation that need to be ad-
dressed. For instance, the Election Code should specify that observers have a 
role, and a right of access, in electoral commissions, starting after polling 
day and continuing until all the electoral tasks are completed. This would 
increase the transparency of the activities of the commissions, especially the 
CEC, in the crucial days before the announcement of the final results. The 
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Election Code should also be amended to provide for a simple procedure (at 
PEC level) for the registration of individual observers.  
 
Second Suggestion: Improvements within Domestic Observation Groups 
Focusing on a Long-Term Study 
 
The integrity and success of the observation process depends upon the pro-
fessionalism and independence of the observer missions. Domestic groups 
should pay more attention to the training of personnel to be deployed at poll-
ing stations on Election Day. They should also avoid the practice of drawing 
conclusions only from observations made on Election Day itself, and should 
instead focus on long-term observation efforts, not least on what happens 
after the elections are over.  
 
Raising Public Awareness 
 
Domestic observation groups should also actively promote their work 
through the media and raise public awareness on the importance of their ac-
tivities. It is essential that the domestic groups make every effort possible to 
ensure that they conduct their activities in an impartial manner. Local NGOs 
should restore the confidence of the public by concise, factual and independ-
ent reporting of what has been observed.  
Domestic groups should look into ways of encouraging greater public at-
tention to the reports of Election Observer Missions, and find a way to in-
crease public participation in encouraging the authorities to act on the rec-
ommendations of an observation mission. Independent NGOs involved in 
election observation should try to establish coalitions, so as to be able to 
work as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
At the end of the day, will all this help? If the process of improving the Elec-
toral Code continues in Azerbaijan, will the new amendments introduced to 
the Election Law make any change in practice? Will the change in tactics 
applied in the work of domestic observation groups lead to positive devel-
opments?  
It is true that the sovereign governments are under no effective obligation 
to act on recommendations by domestic or even international observers. 
There are many examples where Azerbaijani authorities have implemented 
several minor or technical recommendations for electoral reform, but held 
back on the most important suggestions. There are also examples where laws 
have been changed by the legislature, but not implemented in practice: this 
creates an illusion of reform, but no real change. In reality, in Azerbaijan, it 
is the scrupulous implementation of both the spirit and the letter of the law 
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that will serve as a key test of the political will to conduct democratic elec-
tions. It is possible to have an imperfect election law, and yet have elections 
that are fair and free – and visa versa.  
The country’s ‘democratic development’ is one of the main commitments 
Azerbaijan made to the OSCE and to the Council of Europe. Azerbaijani 
officials often talk about ‘stability and development’. It is clear what they 
mean by ‘stability’, but it is more difficult to grasp what they mean by ‘de-
velopment’. If all they are talking about is economic development, then this 
is too narrow a definition – and, additionally, it is a mistaken one. 
The key issues are these: to what extent does the will of the people form 
the basis of power and how much is it taken into account in decision-
making? To what extent does the existing situation allow the votes whose 
opinion differs from that of the majority make an impact on the political 
processes?  
If the development of Azerbaijan is to be sustainable, it will have to pro-
mote the implementation of a fundamental democratic principle: that politi-
cal decisions and laws should be prepared and enacted by means of a trans-
parent process which takes account of the broadest possible spectrum of in-
terests. The leaders of the country (not only those in power, but also in the 
opposition) must always be committed to the democratic process and the 
building of democratic institutions, and respect human rights in all aspects. 
Civil society must be increasingly involved, and a firm commitment to de-
mocratic reforms should be in place. The promotion of these principles, as 
well as greater transparency and participation, will be of decisive importance 
in ensuring the sustainability of Azerbaijan’s transformation into a genuinely 
democratic state. 

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 
AZERBAIJAN:  
DEMOCRATIC EXPECTATIONS VERSUS 
IMITATED REALITIES 
Zafar Guliev 
1.Introduction 
 
Promising Conditions 
 
On the eve of the 2005 Azerbaijani parliamentary elections, there were cer-
tain grounds for careful optimism. These grounds had been created by the 
direction in which the development of certain political processes in the world 
was taking, both in the post-Soviet area and in Azerbaijani society. The 
situation helped to re-animate the faith in the possibility of an evolutionary, 
or revolutionary, advancement of the country towards democracy.  
 
Inaugural Address of President Bush 
 
In his January 2005 inaugural address, US President G.W. Bush declared 
that support for democracy would henceforth be the main priority. Further-
more, US foreign policy, as well as the official line from Washington, would 
always be side by side with those who were fighting for freedom. Former US 
policy towards developing countries had been founded on the formula of 
‘first stability, then democracy’. However, several months after the Bush 
inaugural speech, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, specified a 
‘new course’ for the White House. She publicly announced that the former 
US policy was erroneous and that, from then on, the Bush Administration 
would support stability only on the basis of democracy.  
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Further Confirmation 
 
In the spring of 2005, while speaking in public in Tbilisi, the US President 
once again confirmed the priority and importance of democracy in this ‘new 
course’, and declared an intention to actively support the struggle for free-
dom of the people of the Southern Caucasus. At the start of the parliamen-
tary election campaign in Azerbaijan, several influential US political figures 
(among them Madeleine Albright, Paul Dobriansky and Senator Richard 
Lugar) made a series of visits to Baku. During these visits, they sought to 
convince the Azerbaijani public that there were no alternatives to democratic 
elections, nor could there even be any possibility of such alternatives. In his 
frequent travels around the country, Rino Harnish, US Ambassador to Azer-
baijan, tried to re-animate the public’s trust in the West and in democracy, as 
this had been strained by the scandalous presidential elections of 2003. Dur-
ing the election campaign, all the Western emissaries actively demonstrated 
the seriousness of their democratic intentions. They were unequivocal about 
the importance of the situation: either there would be fair elections, or there 
would be an ‘orange revolution’. Finally, at a press conference in Baku two 
weeks prior to the elections, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, made 
an open declaration on behalf of the entire US administration: this time, 
Washington would adhere to the principle to the end, and would not sacrifice 
democracy for its own personal oil interests in Azerbaijan.  
 
The Turning Tide 
 
If the West (especially the USA) had in fact remained faithful to this position 
to the end, then the ruling regime would hardly have been able to succeed at 
falsifying the results of the elections with such unceremonious ease. More 
importantly, they would not have been able to legitimise such a scandalous 
victory once again. If the undemocratic and falsified steps of the Aliev re-
gime had run up against the co-ordinated, rigid and principled position of 
democratic forces, both inside the country and abroad, this could have led to 
a different development of the election and post-election situation. But alas! 
The 2005 Azerbaijani parliamentary elections were held in much the 
same way as before: under extremely undemocratic conditions and under the 
habitual ‘total falsification’ regime. Within the context of the inauguration 
promises of G.W. Bush, and taking into account the unparalleled attention 
given to the election process by international organisations, a rightful, more 
equitable and more adequate response by the West would have been to ac-
knowledge the scale of election fraud, as well as the open sabotage of de-
mocracy norms by the ruling Azerbaijan regime.  
Despite the moderate nature and reserve of their assessments, in their pre-
liminary report, OSCE observers nevertheless had to recognise the fact of 
the undemocratic nature of the elections, and the lack of consistency with 
international standards. Europe’s position proved more adequate and princi-
pled, whereas the White House administration once again sacrificed democ-
racy for the sake of geopolitical, oil and other pragmatic interests. Initially 
the USA, in a reserved manner, supported the OSCE. Later, however, it re-
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verted to hypocrisy, announcing a plat du jour formula, about ‘following the 
path of Azerbaijan towards democracy’.  
 
Other Relevant Limitations 
 
Of course, the possibilities of the world democratic community are not 
unlimited. At this present time, the structures of the Council of Europe and 
the USA do not possess sufficiently reliable legal levers to enable a direct, 
preventive impact on an authoritarian regime, i.e. one which could force 
such a regime into observing the norms of elective democracy. Nor do they 
have at their disposal effective, peaceful sanctions against regimes that 
demonstratively violate democratic requirements and intentionally sabotage 
the recommendations of the West. But what the issue involves is not so 
much the range of possibilities and the effectiveness of sanctions, as the con-
sistency, adequacy, and level of principle of the Western position. For a sig-
nificant section of the Azerbaijani public, it was important that the post-
election assessments made by the West should not deviate from earlier de-
mocratic assertions; Europe and the USA should remain principled to the 
end, and not allow geopolitical, oil and other pragmatic interests triumph 
over the interests of freedom and human rights. The Azerbaijani public were 
right to expect an adequate response from Europe and the USA regarding the 
demonstrative sabotage of democratic norms during the parliamentary elec-
tions. Had the West recurrently participated in the Aliev regime’s game of 
imitating democracy, this would have had extremely negative consequences 
for the development of all political processes in Azerbaijan.  
 
2. The Election Environment 
 
The Azerbaijani parliamentary elections held on 6 November were the third 
set of elections since the country had acquired independence. The first two 
election experiences (for the legislative body of the country in 1995 and 
2000), had occurred during the reign of Heidar Aliev, a politician shaped in 
the bosom of the totalitarian Soviet practice, and well-versed in imitation, 
including the imitation of the election process. Both experiences proved to 
be far not only from international standards, but also from basic require-
ments of common sense. These initial elections were held under a regime of 
total falsification, typical of the formation of parliaments during Soviet 
times, based on the system of using ‘rosters’. The 2005 elections were not to 
be an exception, even though they were held under somewhat different po-
litical conditions, with the enhanced pressure of the international community 
and against the backdrop of the growth of revolutionary expectations in soci-
ety. Furthermore, society was under the ‘patronage’ of the formally new 
(neo-monarchist) system of power in the country. Despite these innovations, 
and contrary to the expectations of many, the election process from the be-
ginning to the end followed the time-tested Aliev regime scheme of imita-
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tion. Once again, it ended with the formation of the legislative body of the 
country on the basis of the ‘roster’.  
 
Previous Parliamentary Elections 
 
In order to determine the statistical characteristics of the most recent elec-
tions, and take into account the new factors, it is appropriate to compare 
briefly the current situation with the previous parliamentary elections. 
 
The Parliamentary Elections of 1995 
 
These were conducted on the basis of a mixed system of 100 majority man-
dates and 24 proportional mandates. Out of twelve parties that submitted 
documents, only eight were allowed to take part in the elections based on the 
proportional system. The camp of the democratic opposition was represented 
by two parties, Popular Front and National Independence, whereas Musavat 
and other opposition parties were not allowed to take part. A total of 1,040 
candidates tried to compete for the 100 majority mandates, but the Central 
Election Commission (CEC) allowed only 387 to participate in the elections. 
Of this number, only 10% were candidates from the opposition parties, while 
the rest, including those formally labelled ‘non-party candidates’, were in 
fact representatives and allies of the ruling power. All the election commis-
sions were under the monopolistic control of the ruling party. The results of 
the elections were totally falsified. The parliament was in fact ‘elected’ on 
the basis of rosters drawn up in the Office of the President. The aggregate of 
the opposition received only ten mandates. The West contented itself with 
reserved criticism, and assessed the elections as a step forward on the way to 
democracy.  
 
The Parliamentary Elections of 2000 
 
These took place under the same mixed system of majority and proportional 
mandates. More than 20 parties attempted to participate in the elections, but 
only 13 managed to submit rosters with signatures to the CEC in time. The 
CEC initially allowed only five parties into the elections (again having ex-
cluded Musavat, the liberal and the democratic parties). Later, on the insis-
tence of the USA and the Council of Europe, all 13 parties joined in the 
struggle for the votes of the electorate. In all, 1,040 majority candidates 
competed for the 100 majority mandates, but the CEC allowed only 409 to 
take part in the elections. As in 1995, most of the majority candidates (for-
mally ‘non-party’ as well as party candidates) were representatives and ad-
herents of the ruling power: around 320 out of 407. The election commis-
sions, under CoE pressure, were initially formed on a pseudo-parity basis 
(1/3 from the ruling party, 1/3 from the parliamentary opposition and 1/3 
from a bloc of the allegedly independent deputies). However, not long before 
the elections, they were revised in a manner that meant an even greater 
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strengthening of the positions of the ruling power. Once again, the elections 
were held under the regime of total falsification, based on the rosters drawn 
up by the ruling power. The scale of the fraud, and the international reso-
nance as a result of this, forced those in power to turn to additional methods 
of imitation: in 11 territorial election committees, the results of the voting 
were annulled; new elections were scheduled – which were then held in the 
same fraudulent manner. The democratic opposition (who actually won a 
widespread victory in the elections, but ended up receiving a mere 15 man-
dates) mutually agreed not to recognise the results of the voting. Part of the 
opposition (Musavat, National Independence and PNFA) remained true to 
this decision and rejected the mandates, while the other part (the Popular 
Front and The Civil Solidarity Parties) reneged, and joined in with the work 
of the parliament. As the result, the democratic opposition camp in the par-
liament was once again represented by ten deputies. And once again, the 
West limited itself to a plat du jour criticism, addressed to the ruling power 
of Azerbaijan, and pronounced the elections to be the next step on the way 
towards democracy. It was on the basis of the results of these elections that 
Azerbaijan was accepted as a member of the Council of Europe in January 
2001.  
 
The 2005 Parliamentary Elections  
 
For the first time, elections were held based purely on a majority system, in 
125 single-mandate territorial election commissions. The CEC registered 
practically all candidates, and the final figure was record-high: over 2,060 
competitors (although this was reduced to 1,544 by the time of the elections, 
due to voluntary or forced rejection of candidates’ nominations, or disquali-
fication by the courts). The main political force went to the elections with 
single rosters: this included the ruling party ‘New Azerbaijan’ (Jeny Azer-
baijan) and the leading opposition bloc ‘Азадлыг’ (‘Azadlyg’, including 
Musavat, the New Front and the democratic parties). A total of over 430 
candidates competed on behalf of the ruling party. Altogether, around two 
thirds of the registered candidates were open or discreet adherents of the rul-
ing elite. The remaining third part were, in approximately equal proportion, 
representatives of the opposition and of independent competitors.  
All election commissions were headed by representatives of the ruling 
party (who also clearly predominated in the commissions in terms of num-
bers of members). During these elections, finger marking and exit polls were 
used for the first time. During the elections, 1,586 international and 57,000 
local observers were involved. Once again, however, the elections were held 
under extremely undemocratic conditions and the results were totally falsi-
fied – indeed, evidence of this was provided by the OSCE reports and the 
reports of many influential international organisations. Under pressure from 
the West, and within the framework of their own election-imitation scenario, 
the ruling powers annulled the results of the elections in ten constituencies 
and called new elections. In addition, the results of voting in two constituen-
cies were corrected. According to public opinion polls and the assessments 
of many experts, the democratic opposition had in fact won at least half of 
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the seats in parliament. Based on even the distorted data of the exit polls 
(due to the atmosphere of total falsification), the democratic opposition was 
to get around 30% of the seats in parliament (some 40 mandates).Alongside 
this, the official results of the elections (without taking the ten constituencies 
into account) were as follows: 56 mandates to the ruling party; 5 to pro-
governmental parties; 6 to representatives of moderate or ‘pocket’ opposi-
tion; and 41 to the so-called ‘independent’ candidates, who were in reality 
active allies of those in power. The genuine opposition received a paltry 
seven mandates in the parliament – fewer than in the previous elections. The 
united forces of the opposition, and those sympathising with them, repre-
sented over 500 candidates. They refused to recognise the results of the elec-
tions and held a series of peaceful protest actions involving many thousands 
of people. The last of these peaceful actions, on 26 November, was brutally 
suppressed by police forces. After the Constitutional Court had approved the 
elections, the opposition declined the option of participating in the re-
elections in the ten constituencies, and rejected the chance to be involved in 
the work of the illegitimate parliament. Thus, the new parliament is unlikely 
to have any representation of the real opposition. Preliminary Western as-
sessments of the election results were ambivalent. The European structures 
recognised that the elections did not match international standards, and at the 
January Session of PACE they threatened the Azerbaijani government with 
sanctions. The USA had previously held the European position, but now hur-
riedly announced its recognition of the new Azerbaijani parliament, in which 
real opposition would not be represented. Once again, Washington’s position 
made a mockery of the words ‘the next step on the way towards democracy’.  
 
3. Imitating Democracy 
 
The current election process took place in an atmosphere that felt the firm 
pressure of international organisations. Additionally, in the background, 
were the increased revolutionary expectations in society. Furthermore, there 
were various undoubted innovations (finger marking, exit poll, an unprece-
dented number of candidates and observers, etc). All the same, the attitude 
towards the elections, and the model of behaviour of the ruling regime, did 
not change in the least. The imitation strategy, repeatedly and successfully 
tested by Heidar Aliev, was realised in its full scope by Ilham Aliev, who 
followed on from Geidov’s deeds, during the most recent election campaign. 
Let us see how this unsophisticated strategy works:  
 
Creating a Good First Impression 
 
Long before the start of the election campaign, the President and his team 
agree to almost all the wishes of the West, and give assurances that they will 
create the necessary conditions for holding open and fair elections. In the 
early stages, the ruling regime does not question its obligations toward ob-
serving general democracy standards. For some time, the ruling power puts 
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aside its standard arguments – that the elections are ‘our internal business’, 
that the West is not our commander, and that ‘other (methods of) democ-
racy’ corresponds more to our mentality, etc. At this initial stage, Ilham 
Aliev publicly demonstrates, towards the world community, a clear predis-
position towards ‘Western democracy’ (as his father had done in former 
years), showing that he is fully prepared to project this onto the Azerbaijani 
elections. His methods of democratic imitation are indicative: the ‘prisoners 
of October’ are released; amnesty granted to many political prisoners; the 
protracted moratorium on meetings is withdrawn; and additionally his decree 
of 11 May promises fair and equitable elections.  
 
Dropping the Mask 
 
However, as soon as the official discussion phase of the election legislation 
and the final formulation of the legal elections basis begin (in the parlia-
ment), the behaviour of the ruling powers changes. At this point, the Presi-
dent retreats into the shadows, and arrangements for his scenario are imple-
mented, publicly and actively, by a team consisting of the president’s office, 
the ruling party, and the administration of the parliament. At this second (le-
gal) stage, it is as if the ruling powers suffer from amnesia; they forget about 
all their democratic promises and even become somewhat aggressive to-
wards the West. The propaganda of other theses are utilised instead: the sov-
ereignty of the country and its independence from the dictatorship of the 
West, the specific mentality of the people, their specific attitude towards 
democracy, etc. If, in the first stage, all these arguments were intentionally 
put aside, then in the second stage they become the basis for ‘legalising’ the 
elections, providing the enemy with the widest opportunities of falsifying the 
results. At the very last moment, the President enters the stage and appeals to 
‘our values’ (independence, mentality, the people, etc) and the requirements 
of the public. He then approves the decision of the ‘sovereign’ parliament 
and begins the election campaign. 
 
Propaganda 
 
During the third phase, the election campaign, the President once again 
withdraws, while the ruling regime openly demonstrates reactionary behav-
iour, ignoring even its own legal base of the elections. At this decisive stage, 
the ruling regime makes active use of its administrative and financial re-
sources, its propagandistic information, as well as its ‘black PR’ and outspo-
ken repressions against the opposition. This creates the necessary basis for 
successful falsification of the election results. As a rule, at the final stage of 
this phase, prolonged and behind-the scenes bargaining takes place among 
the main participants in the election process (the West, the ruling power and, 
in part, the opposition). The West, whose expectations have been deceived, 
publicly demonstrates its irritation with the uncompromising and undemo-
cratic behaviour of the ruling power. Furthermore, it is insistent in its rec-
ommendation that at least some legal and procedural amendments should be 
Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan 66 
introduced into the election process. The opposition, vexed at this course of 
events, expresses its disappointment and anger with threats of meetings, 
revolution, and election boycott. At this point, the ruling power, having 
scared everyone with its reactionary behaviour, deliberately delays the bar-
gaining and desperately defends the conquered legal thresholds, while trying 
to ‘pay (it all) off’ with small concessions. Negotiations are generally con-
cluded in the following manner: on the day before the elections, the ruling 
power, in a particularly democracy-imitative manner, agrees to some of the 
recommendations of the West, slightly lessening its reactionary pressure on 
the opposition – all the while managing to maintain general control over the 
election process. This takes place in the form of giving the appearance of 
being ‘the saviour of the people’. This means that, once again, the President 
enters centre stage, utters beautiful words, reprimands a handful of officials, 
calms down the world and the domestic community, and uses methods of 
imitation (for instance, his directives at the operational meeting on 25 Octo-
ber gave the promise of fair elections). This phase is always concluded in the 
same way, by the total falsification of the voters’ will, and the formation of 
the legislative body of the country based on the roster. Heidar Aliev acted in 
the same manner during the parliamentary elections in 1995 and in 2000.  
 
Election Falsification 
 
Then, during the last, post-election stage, the aim of legitimising the fraudu-
lent elections begins. Once again, the President comes onstage, anticipating 
the official results, declares that the elections were generally fair, and that 
the party he heads deserves to win the victory… adding that, of course, there 
were some occasional violations, which will immediately be dealt with and 
the guilty punished. Next, within the framework of the imitation scenario, 
and working in co-ordination with the Office of the President, the CEC an-
nuls the results of the elections in several constituencies – as a rule, those 
where the representatives of the opposition happened to have won. The 
prosecutor’s office finds several scapegoats, while the Constitutional Court 
approves the results of the elections in such form as initially envisaged by 
the authorities.  
At this stage, the ruling powers brutally quash all protest actions, trying 
with all means at their disposal to force the opposition and society to resign 
themselves to the ‘results’ of the elections. In respect of the West, those in 
power demonstrate the behaviour that was characteristic of the initial stage 
of the election campaign: patiently listening to criticism, recognising certain 
weaknesses, promising to improve in the future and to take all the wishes 
into account. The West, as a rule, is satisfied with these imitation methods 
and with the words ‘the Aliev regime’, and practically wraps up its active 
mission on democratisation in Azerbaijan, until the next elections are due. 
This then is the schematic model of imitation of all elections in Azerbaijan.  
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4. 2005: Parallels with Previous Elections 
 
Parallels with the previous parliamentary elections are also seen in the con-
text of the model of the reactionary actions of the ruling regime: the same 
repressive methods, based on propaganda. In the course of the election cam-
paign the customary scenario of the ‘threat of a coup d’etat’ is brought up; a 
nationwide defamation campaign against the opposition starts; measures are 
undertaken to heighten police preparedness. There are mass arrests, as well 
as searches, court hearings, cleansing, and so on.  
 
The 1995 Parliamentary Elections 
 
The situation was the same in 1995. The ruling power discovered a series of 
‘plots’ and thus withdrew several parties from the contest (the Musavat, Is-
lamic, Labour and Communist Parties); held a show trial involving journal-
ists from the satirical newspaper Cheshme; organised a series of searches of 
mass media editorial offices; arrested some prominent politicians; and ac-
tively carried out a propaganda campaign of ‘witch hunting’.  
 
The 2000 Parliamentary Elections 
 
A similar scenario was repeated in the parliamentary elections of 2000. In 
August, the head of the Julfinsky branch of the Musavat Party was arrested, 
accused of hijacking a passenger plane. Several days later, the chief editor of 
the popular opposition newspaper Jeny Musavat, Rauf Arifogly, was arrested 
as well. Those arrested, as well as the Musavat Party and the entire democ-
ratic community were accused of involvement in developing a political act 
of terrorism, and in plans to destabilise the situation and overthrow the ruling 
power. The apparatus of the ruling power immediately turned its propaganda 
machine up into full capacity. It attempted a long shot – to divert attention 
from elections, to label Musavata a terrorist organisation, and to gain the 
tacit approval of the West and the public so that it could adopt strict meas-
ures against the opposition. Immediately after the elections, the ruling pow-
ers brutally suppressed the social disturbances in Shecky, having identified 
them as an attempt by the opposition to stage a coup d’etat. 
 
The Recent Parliamentary Elections 
 
The ruling power went even further in the recent elections. Initially, a special 
operation was carried out against Ruslan Bashiri, the leader of a youth or-
ganisation. It was presented as though the youth organisation had been pre-
paring a coup d’etat, and then accompanied this with an unruly campaign 
around the ‘national persecution’ of the opposition (focusing primarily on 
the persecution of People’s Front and its leader). Later on, a political show 
was staged around the return of ex-Speaker Rasul Guliev: this was skilfully 
transformed into the ‘disclosure’ of yet another coup d’etat, allegedly 
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planned by some powerful domestic oligarchs together with the opposition. 
This repressive propagandist show, marked by mass dismissals and arrests 
on behalf of the ruling party, was stopped for some time. But it could have 
been revived again at any moment, had either of the following situations oc-
curred: there was a need to eliminate disagreeable persons in the ruling team, 
or there was a need to threaten and punish the democratic opposition if it 
could not be tamed to accept the results of the elections.  
No significant innovations (that is, positive innovations) could be ob-
served in the election strategy or the model of behaviour of the Aliev regime. 
The same practice of imitation, the same reactionary attitude, the same falsi-
fication and undemocratic tricks, and the same methods of controlling of the 
election campaign were practised. And it is not clear on what basis the 
Western politicians placed their careful optimism as to the possibility of an 
evolutionary self-renewal of the Aliev regime. Is it, indeed, the sad experi-
ence of all previous years, with insufficient confirmation of the Aliev re-
gime’s right to rule? Or are the new falsifications necessary, in order to fin-
ish off society’s confidence in democracy for once and for all?  
 
5. Examining the New Optimism 
 
On the eve of the parliamentary elections, there was a certain basis for cau-
tious optimism. But this was in no way connected with the possibility of the 
current system of power undergoing democratic self-improvement, nor was 
it pre-conditioned by the ‘good will’ and the head of the state’s instructions 
of imitation. And it did not result from the development of the Aliev sce-
nario within the election situation. The basis of this optimism was something 
different. The external and internal political background of the current elec-
tions had changed: indeed, the direction of the processes of development in 
the world had changed. Along with this, the priorities of many of the main 
participants in the post-Soviet space had also, to a certain extent, changed in 
terms of their positions, intentions and priorities – this includes the West, the 
opposition, or the electorate. 
 
Attitudes 
Pre-Election Position of the West 
 
As elections approached, the West actively demonstrated an objective inter-
est in qualitative change, in the liberalisation of the system of power in 
Azerbaijan, and in the continuation of the democratic rebuilding in the post-
Soviet realm that had begun with Georgia and Ukraine. Both the USA and 
the CoE declared that they had revised some of their former priorities, and 
openly tried to brainwash the public of Azerbaijan into believing that they no 
longer intended to sacrifice democracy in the name of geopolitics, stability, 
and oil interests. If the West (especially the USA) had remained faithful to 
this position to the end, then this time it would have been difficult for the 
Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan 69 
ruling regime to implement their scenario of total election falsification and, 
moreover, win and then approve, this scandalous victory. If the undemo-
cratic and fraudulent steps of the Aliev regime had continuously encountered 
a co-ordinated, stern and principled response of the West, this could have 
acted as a catalyst for other, more encouraging and more promising variants 
of both the election and post-election development in Azerbaijan.  
 
Inspiring Examples 
 
Inspired by the verbal support of the West, and the success of the democratic 
forces in Georgia and Ukraine, the democratic opposition (initially, the bloc 
‘Azadlyg’) focused on achieving a victory in the parliamentary elections. 
They were not going to content with getting a handful of mandates, because 
these would be based on the results of the ruling regime’s falsified show, as 
they had been before. Throughout the election campaign, the opposition ac-
tively exaggerated its level of preparation for a ‘velvet revolution’ variant of 
the elections (i.e. with a democratic takeover). In a situation of total election 
fraud, the opposition intended to continue its struggle, counting on the sup-
port both inside the country and abroad. Given the scarcity of propagandists, 
as well as the limited financial, organisational and other resources of the op-
position, then, if order to have any chances of success, this programme 
would need the active support of democracy from the West as well as from 
Azerbaijani society. 
 
Passiveness of the Electorate 
 
To a certain extent, the active pro-democratic rhetoric of the West, and the 
determination of the opposition, also revived the confidence of Azerbaijani 
society in the election process. However, this confidence did not manifest 
itself in active involvement in the political processes. The main mass of the 
electorate, although dissuaded by the viewpoints of the Aliev system, and 
craving quick democratic innovations, nevertheless steered clear of active 
participation in either the election or the post-election battles.  
This passiveness on the part of society can be explained not so much by 
an indifference towards political issues, as by the presence of real doubts 
about the level of preparation, and ability, of the West and opposition to act 
firmly in favour of democracy. There was fear that the former post-election 
events would be repeated, whereby the ruling regime, having approved the 
falsified results of the elections, immediately started the prolonged process 
of ‘creeping’ in repressions, not only again the opposition itself, but also 
against those who had supported the opposition during the campaign. If the 
consistent and principled actions of the West and the opposition (on blocking 
the falsification or revolutionarily revising the unfair results of the elections) 
were undertaken at a high standard, and could inspire many citizens with 
confidence in the struggle for democracy, then the ruling regime, apparently, 
would have to target other members of society. 
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The Outcome 
 
Unfortunately, the realities of the election process proved that even this cau-
tious optimism was unfounded. The democratic opposition placed excessive 
reliance on the support of the West, and obediently followed its recommen-
dations, frequently discarding both the requirements of the specific political 
situation at hand and the actual objectives of its active work with the elector-
ate. In turn, the West had excessive hopes for the democratic promises of 
President Ilham Aliev, and was held captive by his myth of the possibility of 
a liberal transformation (or self-renovation) of power, the result of which 
would have to be cleaner and more open elections.  
The West, actively pushing the Azerbaijani neo-monarchy along the path 
towards the evolutionary advancement of democracy, used the opposition, 
and the threat of the ‘orange revolution’, in the same manner as the ruling 
power – in order to exert pressure. In the end, the Western-initiated ‘orange 
threat’ (which many people sincerely believed in and were involved in to-
gether with the democratic opposition) proved to be simply a means of exert-
ing pressure on those in power, to force them to undertake certain reform 
steps. In a sense, the West was trying to give the Azerbaijani rulers the fol-
lowing idea: either there would be an evolutionary movement towards de-
mocracy, or there would be a revolutionary compulsion towards it.  
However, in response to all these admonitions and threats, the ruling re-
gime, on the advice of influential Kremlin emissaries and political technolo-
gists, deliberately secured a plan of a preventive counter-revolution, and 
successfully implemented it during election process. As a result, neither the 
evolutionary hopes of the West nor the revolutionary expectations of the op-
position came true. Under the disguise of a ‘dangerous revolutionary sce-
nario’, the Aliev regime calmly falsified the results of the elections and 
formed a totally obedient parliament, as quickly as possible, while – as usual 
– ignoring the democratic expectations of its own people and of the interna-
tional community.  
 
6. The Post-Election Period 
 
Constitutional Court Decision 
 
On 2 December 2005, by a decision of the Constitutional Court, the parlia-
mentary elections acquired legal status: 115 candidates received deputy 
mandates, while the destiny of 10 of the seats would be decided in re-
elections, likely to be held without the participation of the real opposition. 
Thus ended an important stage in the post-Heidarian history of Azerbaijan; 
the neo-monarchic power elected (or, more accurately, appointed) the par-
liament in a manner that suited itself. Based on the results of the falsified 
elections, and obedient to the wishes of the president, a single-party parlia-
ment was formed, in which the real opposition of the country was not repre-
sented.  
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What this did was to doom the ruling regime to a confrontation with its 
own people and the international democratic community (this is already be-
ing observed), and also to a dangerous puppet dependence on the external 
forces of Moscow and Washington. Such a parliament cannot become a 
guarantor of long-term stability, nor can it be a catalyst for dynamic devel-
opment in the country. It does not bring the promise of positive perspectives 
for society. 
 
The USA and the CoE 
 
The most unexpected surprise of the post-election period was the gradual 
degradation of the outwardly seamless and co-ordinated former position of 
the USA and the CoE as to the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. Cur-
rently a clear discrepancy between their pre- and post-election positions can 
be observed: the USA, which had initially encouraged the ruling regime with 
a ‘stick’, shifted to the position of encouraging it with ‘carrots’ alone. It ap-
pears as though the Council of Europe remains faithful to its democratic re-
quirements, and demonstrates the threat of a ‘stick in the form of sanctions’. 
If the attitudes of the USA and CoE towards the administration of Azerbai-
jan are the result of a spontaneous (as apposed to a co-ordinated) response to 
the election and post-election processes, then this creates good opportunities 
for the authorities of Azerbaijan to manoeuvre between America and Europe, 
and the possibility of continuing the drift towards Moscow.  
What seems more likely is that is a case of carefully co-ordinated post-
election behaviour of the USA and CoE, aimed at halting the escalation of 
anti-Western moods in Azerbaijani society, and preventing a pro-Kremlin 
drift on the part of official Baku (with the purpose of blocking the possibility 
of a ‘re-Sovietisation’ and ‘Uzbekistanisation’ course for Azerbaijan). When 
we look at the situation in terms of this option, we can discern a well 
thought-out and co-ordinated policy in respect of Azerbaijan, whereby 
Europe ‘works’ with the opposition, while the USA works primarily with the 
ruling power, in hopes of preventing a situation where both groups retreat 
from the pro-Western and pro-democratic course. The co-ordinated ‘stick 
and carrot’ policy implemented by the USA and CoE can strengthen the 
promotion of a pro-US drift in Azerbaijan, while also keeping alive the 
hopes and options of the real opposition’s struggle for democracy. By this, 
the USA and CoE hope that, through joint efforts and without serious sanc-
tions, the country can revert to its former geopolitical course – a course that, 
despite well-tested democratic processes, will retain the leverage needed to 
maintain their impact on both the ruling power and opposition, as well as on 
the course of the development of events in Azerbaijan, keeping them firmly 
in the hands of the West.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Forming the Boundaries 
 
The recent elections in Azerbaijan have clearly shaped the development of a 
confrontation line between internal (those in power and the opposition) and 
external (the West and Russia) political forces. This confrontational nature 
was present, not only throughout the election process, but also in the assess-
ments of the results and in the responses to the development of post-election 
trends. The ruling power holds that the elections were conducted in full 
compliance with international standards, that the requirements of democracy 
were met, and that the elections were an expression of the will of the Azer-
baijani people. The opposition asserts that the elections were totally falsified 
by the power structures, that the results must be annulled, and that new elec-
tions must be held. The course of elections and their results were assessed by 
international observers in the same contradictory way. In their preliminary 
assessments, European organisations have stuck to the opinion that the elec-
tions did not meet European standards, while the Russian and many CIS ob-
servers have talked about the absence of any violations during the election 
process, and fully approved the position of the Azerbaijani authorities. The 
impetuous and wavering evolution of the US position is interesting: initially, 
Washington supported the critical assessments of the OSCE, then recognised 
the de facto legitimacy of the newly elected parliament and united with the 
opinion of Moscow and Tehran.  
This roughly repeats the familiar situation which took place during the 
October 2003 presidential elections, with the confrontation between the in-
ternal and external positions. But the 2005 situation also has distinctive fea-
tures, due to the nature of the neo-monarchy and the logical development of 
the situation. For the first time, the elections were held under the shadow of 
the ‘orange revolution’ threat, and were demonstratively falsified for West-
ern eyes, through the use of a counter-revolutionary scenario and with the 
active participation of Kremlin emissaries. The struggle during the parlia-
mentary elections – concerning the results, and in respect of the political per-
spectives surrounding Azerbaijan – has been on the highest geopolitical 
level. Most recently, the tone in this struggle has been set by the Kremlin: 
this fully suits the neo-Soviet aspirations of the Azerbaijani power, while the 
West remains in a state of total diplomatic defence.  
 
Relations between Russia and the West 
 
It is notable that the current Russia–West confrontation regarding the nature 
and results of the election game in Azerbaijan has a background in their 
competitive joint participation in the formation of the neo-monarchy tradi-
tion in 2003. Their increased interest in the recent parliamentary elections 
can be explained by the fact that both Moscow and Washington were in-
volved in securing the transfer of power from father (Heidar Aliev) to son 
(Ilham Aliev); naturally, they now feel responsible for the collisions within 
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the neo-monarchy and are competing with each other for the right to control 
the ‘successor’. In the 2003 presidential elections, a radical (neo-monarchic) 
power transformation took place in the system as such. This pre-determined 
the development of viewpoints on the political processes in the country, in-
cluding the correction of its strategic course and the scenario for holding 
election games. With Ilham Aliev coming to power, the former system, 
which had a more active pro-Western drift as well as a more consistent imi-
tation of democracy, gave way to ‘the model of a competitive geopolitical 
partnership’ between the USA and Russia. This created a pendulum-like mo-
tion of Azerbaijan towards the North and towards the West – although, more 
frequently than not, the country swayed towards the North.  
However, the logical development of events, especially the strengthening 
of the neo-Soviet and pro-Moscow tendencies of the Azerbaijani political 
course (by the Azerbaijani neo-monarchy) soon forced the White House to 
take more active and critical measures of influence on official Baku. This 
can be seen from the fact that, ever since coming into power, Ilham Aliev 
has yet to be officially invited to Washington. It is likely that the secret US 
blessing of the 2003 election falsification was made under the condition that 
Ilham Aliev undertook special obligations, which he then conveniently for-
got and started actively working on his friendship with the Kremlin. Increas-
ingly, Washington found such behaviour irritating. On the eve of the 2005 
parliamentary elections, the White House began actively using cases of free-
dom, democracy and even of orange revolution as a means of putting pres-
sure on official Baku, in order to bring the ‘lost sheep’ of the Azerbaijani 
neo-monarchy back onto its former pro-Western, pro-US course.  
The parliamentary elections revealed the US–Russian disagreement re-
garding both the nature of the development of geopolitical processes Azer-
baijan, and the issue of imposing on the country. The struggle focused on the 
country’s geopolitical future, as well as its political developmental model. 
The course of the election process and the results of the elections are evi-
dence that, when it comes to the question of the ‘pull of the geopolitical 
rope’ between Washington and Moscow, the initiative still belongs to the 
later.  
 
Sanctions 
 
Immediately after the Azerbaijani Constitutional Court had approved the 
fraudulent election results, the US Embassy hurriedly gave its agreement 
with the decision and wished the new parliament success. However, the 
opinion of the official circles in the Council of Europe remained critical, as 
before. Within the context of strict declarations made by members of the 
PACE Monitoring Committee, Leo Platvoet, Andreas Gross and Andres 
Herkel, complications can be expected in interrelations between official 
Baku and the Council of Europe, and even the possibility that certain sanc-
tions might be applied towards Azerbaijan. This would indeed seem to be the 
most serious ‘image problem’ and the main headache for the Azerbaijani 
ruling power, who have ‘successfully’ overcome the other external barriers 
they faced on the path to legitimisation of the parliament.  
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The ruling regime of Azerbaijan is scared, not by sanctions, but by the 
unpredictable influence of the Council of Europe – on the future course of 
the political processes in the country, and on its development – and also of 
the possibility of a ‘domino effect’ that might provoke new punitive meas-
ures. Today, the structures of the Council of Europe, and even the powerful 
USA, do not have at their disposal effective, peaceful sanctions against au-
thoritarian regimes which demonstratively violate democratic demands and 
have no intention of respecting the recommendations of the West. The po-
litical and legal sanctions that are available in their arsenal, used sporadi-
cally, contribute to the isolation of such regimes from international commu-
nity. This in turn only enhances the enforcement of the neo-totalitarian, neo-
Soviet, tyrannical tendencies in these countries. In the end, such sanctions 
can relieve the authoritarian regimes of the burden of the responsibility for 
fulfilling international norms, thereby making the goal of imitating ‘democ-
ratic conduct’ unnecessary and in reality creating reactionary phenomena. 
The sanctions predominantly affect not the reactionary regimes themselves, 
but the people of these countries.  
The cases of Belarus and Uzbekistan provide hard confirmation that such 
sanctions allow authoritarian regimes to extract maximum positive dividends 
for themselves. We may assume that new leadership of Azerbaijan will view 
the possible sanctions of the West not as real and dangerous threats, but as a 
discomforting and yet useful good that in effect furthers the goals of neo-
Soviet power. The present leadership of Azerbaijan, in its own pro-Russian 
drift and neo-Soviet goals, has travelled too far for Western sanctions to 
scare it much or provide a corrective influence on its political course. How-
ever, in the end, this may prove to be the biggest and most dangerous blun-
der of all.  
 
USA and Europe: Polarised Perspectives 
 
Whether or not this is the case, the potential collisions in the political situa-
tion in Azerbaijan will depend not only on the developmental process inside 
the country, but on the reaction of the West to the clearly undemocratic 
Azerbaijani power – prior to and during the parliamentary elections. At pre-
sent, the co-ordinated or un-co-ordinated polarisation of opinion between the 
USA and Europe is being felt. The position of the former was expressed in 
its embassy press release: ‘The USA intends to co-operate closely with the 
newly elected Parliament of Azerbaijan.’ Many voices can be heard in this 
statement: the independents, the opposition, and the ruling party. The Euro-
pean position was once again expressed by the members of the PACE Moni-
toring Committee: ‘We believe that such a parliament cannot be considered 
to be an authentic representative body. What is a parliament without an op-
position? The political situation in Azerbaijan raises deep concern. If this 
condition remains, then the population will lose all trust in democratic insti-
tutes.’ Furthermore, European parliamentarians expressed surprise over the 
position of Washington: ‘The current position of the United States means 
Bush’s refusal to stand by his own statements made during his inauguration. 
He once declared that democracy and human rights were to be his priorities, 
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but he applies two-faced standards to their meaning. We hope that Europe 
will stand by these principles.’ 
In reality, democratic society in Azerbaijan can rely only on the fact that 
Europe will be more principled in this regard, and will not let geopolitical, 
oil, and other pragmatic interests triumph over the interests of freedom, de-
mocracy, and human rights. If, once again, the response to the Aliev re-
gime’s imitation of democracy is yet another imitation of democratic support 
(by the official West), this may have highly negative consequences for the 
development of democratic processes in Azerbaijan. On the one hand, this 
may free the hands of the corrupted neo-Soviet power regime, providing it 
with an impulse to continue on the harsh authoritarian course aimed at crush-
ing freedom and democracy even more. On the other hand, this may mean 
the end of the democratic and pro-Western expectations of society, impelling 
many citizens to reconcile before reaction – or, alternatively, impelling them 
to seek support in other directions or in other forms of struggle. Such per-
spectives are not in the interest of Azerbaijani democratic society, nor are 
they likely to correspond with the interests of the international democratic 
society. 

THE 2005 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS:  
A MIRROR OF POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
IN AZERBAIJAN 
Zardusht Alizade 
1. Introduction: Election Process in Azerbaijan  
 
On 6 November 2005 events took place in Azerbaijan that the government 
called the ‘elections’ to the parliament (the National Assembly). The opposi-
tion, seeing these elections as a farce and an act of violence against the will 
of the electorate, sought to express its protest through the courts and through 
mass rallies. The courts dismissed all these civil suits, and the police used 
violence to break up the rallies. All attempts to question the results of the 
elections (in the streets and squares, as had taken place in Georgia, Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan) were nipped in the bud by the regime. The Aliev clan and 
the ruling political class retained control over the powerless parliament.  
Both the ruling party and the opposition were preparing for a political 
battle: not just for the parliament, but just as much for overall power. No one 
concealed the fact that what was at stake was all power in the country – in-
cluding presidential power. In the print media and in speeches by opposition 
leaders, parallels were drawn with the situation in Georgia, where elections 
had resulted in the removal of President Edward Shevardnadze.  
The ruling party had begun to mobilise all its administrative resource for 
the parliamentary elections long before 2005, in order to prepare for the elec-
tions (or, as the opposition press called it, the ‘special police operation’).  
 
The Controlled Election Process 
Central Election Commission (CEC)  
 
In Azerbaijan, the ruling party has full control over the country’s election 
system. The CEC consisted of 15 members: five elected by the party with 
the parliamentary majority, Jeny Azerbaijan (the pocket party of the Aliev 
family); five elected as a result of the voting by the so-called independent 
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deputies of the National Assembly (who were, in reality, part of the ruling 
power); and five elected by the parties of the parliamentary opposition. Of 
the latter five, (members considered to be the defenders of interests of oppo-
sition), three were representatives of the parties of the National Independ-
ence, the People’s Front. The Democratic Party had signed the final minutes 
of the totally fraudulent presidential elections in 2003; it is for this reason 
that they were considered, within the opposition environment, to be ‘people 
bribed by power’. Only two members of the CEC – the representatives of 
Musavat and Civil Solidarity – tried to call on the CEC, as the highest elec-
tion body, to observe the law during the organisation of the elections, but 
this had no effect. 
 
Territorial Election Commissions and Voter Statistics 
 
The territorial election commissions were formed on the basis of the same 
principles as the polling station commissions. Each of the 5,127 polling sta-
tion commissions established during parliamentary elections of 2005 con-
sisted of six members: a total of 30,762 people. The country was divided into 
125 constituencies with an average population of approximately 40,000 vot-
ers.  
 
CEC Activity 
 
During the first years of independence, the CEC decided to organise elec-
tions in the 122nd Stepankertski constituency of Nagorny Karabah. This terri-
tory has a majority Armenian population and is in fact under the control of 
the army of the Republic of Armenia and of the armed forces of the unrec-
ognised Republic of Nagorny Karabah. The democratic republic of Azerbai-
jan welcomed this CEC step as a sign of its preparedness to take part in rec-
onciliation and dialogue. However, the awkward way in which this decision 
was announced reduced its positive potential to near zero. During the elec-
tions in this constituency, only 9,000 Azerbaijani citizens participated; they 
had suffered during the ethnic cleansing that took place Stepanokert in Sep-
tember 1988. The Armenian population did not express any view on the de-
cision of the Azerbaijani CEC. Furthermore, the separatist regime of the Na-
gorny Karabah publicly rejected the possibility of any participation by the 
Armenian population in the elections, which concerned a deputy to the par-
liament of Azerbaijan.  
 
Election Commissions: A Compromised Position 
 
Altogether, 31,912 Azerbaijani citizens were members of the commissions at 
various levels. They were, for the most part, employees from the budgetary 
sphere, teachers, doctors, and clerical and ordinary workers. These members 
were materially dependant (because they receive public sector salaries) on 
the authorities and did not have the slightest protection from the arbitrary 
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rule of the executive power, whether in the courts, or in the corrupt ‘yellow’ 
trade unions. Naturally, this army of over 30,000 people was operated by the 
heads of the various district executive powers, and through the enforcement 
structures (the Ministry of Interior Affairs and National Security), whose 
employees were always involved in the elections – which, in turn, had the 
aim of protecting the Aliev family.  
Although the Election Code prohibits executive level and enforcement 
structure staff from taking part in the activities of Election Commissions, 
this legal prohibition has always been violated in practice. All complaints 
made by the opposition (and independent) candidates of legal violations are 
ignored by the ruling power.  
 
Additional Pressure from the President 
 
The late President, Heidar Aliev, encouraged the violation of election laws 
by commission members, and ensured their impunity. After each election 
(accompanied by mass legal violations), he would issue a decree on am-
nesty; this would neatly include the articles of the laws that stipulated the 
administrative and criminal violations of the election laws. In this way, Hei-
dar Aliev would ensure that the members of the election commissions and 
the staff of the executive power bodies clearly understood that nothing could 
threaten them for violating the laws, as long as they remained faithful to him. 
His son, Ilham Aliev, went even farther: after the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions, those heads of the Territorial Election Commissions who had not been 
able to falsify the elections, and who produced the final minutes to the oppo-
sition candidates effectively affirming their victory, were made ‘criminally 
responsible’. 
 
The Opposition: Growing Support  
Following the Ukrainian Example 
 
The opposition thoroughly studied the experience of the ‘orange’ revolutions 
in Georgia and Ukraine. Additionally, it established co-operation with youth 
organisations in those countries, as these had played an important role in the 
victory of the opposition. The US-based National Democracy Institute (NDI) 
(which works closely together with the national-democratic wing of the op-
position) financed a tour for a large group of Azerbaijani democratic move-
ment activists to attend the Ukrainian elections in 2004. Courses were organ-
ised for them there, during which they studied the election laws of Ukraine, 
as well as other specifics of the Ukrainian election process. This team (which 
observed the elections in Eastern Ukraine, and which later submitted valu-
able reports regarding violations of laws during voting), gained considerable 
practical experience of election monitoring, which they then shared with ac-
tivists from the ‘Azadlyg’ (‘Freedom’) bloc.  
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Other Helping Hands 
 
Apart from this, the NGO Centre for the Monitoring of Elections (supported 
by the NDI) was preparing to monitor the elections. The authorities of Azer-
baijan would not allow the NDI itself to monitor the elections during the 
Presidential Elections of 2003, nor in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections.  
The Soros Foundation also announced a tender for NGOs, aimed at edu-
cating the electorate as to their rights and responsibilities. Such Western-
source funds for voter education and the provision of civil society control 
over the elections were generally scarce. They were met with hostility from 
authorities in Azerbaijan; the government mass media began spreading a 
thesis, in the spirit of the Soviet ‘agitprop’ (agitation and propaganda), on 
the ‘intrigues of the West against the independence of Azerbaijan’. 
 
The State against Society  
 
In other recent elections in Azerbaijan, the political opposition parties and 
NGOs undertook active measures only in the last stages of the election proc-
ess – and ended up with timing problems. This time, civil society, including 
parties and NGOs, started preparations for the elections somewhat earlier. 
Nevertheless, many analysts predicted that the Georgian and the Ukrainian 
election scenarios would not be repeated in Azerbaijan. They believe that the 
situation in Azerbaijan was radically different from that in Georgia and 
Ukraine. There was in fact a central difference between Azerbaijani domes-
tic policy and the policies of the ‘coloured revolutions’ countries: in those 
countries, the split had occurred within the ruling political class (i.e. confron-
tation between various groups in the parliament and in the government), 
whereas in Azerbaijan, the battle was between ‘shacks and palaces’, between 
the streets and the offices of power. In Azerbaijan, the ruling political class 
met Election Day as a united team, having already rid themselves of those 
who were ready to desert to the camp of the opposition. For this reason, the 
struggle on Election Day was based on the traditional scheme of ‘the gov-
ernment against the people’ and ‘the government against society’. The result 
was equally traditional: the government won, society lost. 
 
2. Election Process in Azerbaijan  
 
CIS Countries and Democracy: General Attitudes 
 
In all Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, the ruling el-
ites, to a greater or lesser degree, have a hostile attitude towards democracy 
and its institutes – and towards free, transparent and fair elections in particu-
lar. Of all former Soviet republics, only the elections in Estonia, Lithuania 
and Latvia correspond to European standards  
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‘Guided Democracy’ 
 
In the CIS countries, the powerful elite can be replaced only through revolu-
tionary violence, and this can occur only when an adequate force is posi-
tioned against the political structure. This means the force of the crowds in 
the streets. The presidents in these countries dominate all branches of power. 
To prevent loss of power during elections, they mobilise all the state’s re-
sources against the people, whilst systematically weakening the opposition 
in the inter-election period by cutting it off from financial, administrative 
and information resources. The state is waging a war against civil society, 
hypocritically disguising its actions under the vague term of ‘guided democ-
racy’. 
 
Taking the Lion’s Share 
 
The main reason for such hostility and irreconcilability between the govern-
ment and the people lies in the nature of the attitude of officialdom towards 
property. The ruling Azerbaijan bourgeoisie is not a trade and manufacturing 
bourgeoisie, but an officialdom bourgeoisie, a class of governmental bureau-
crats. Their source and means of income rest in their position in the govern-
mental apparatus. The pyramidal governmental machine of independent 
Azerbaijan is ideally structured to allow the appropriation of the lion’s share 
of budget and oil revenues by a small elite group – primarily the family of 
President Aliev, his relatives, friends, fellows, ministers, deputies and top 
official in the regions. 
 
Protecting Personal Economic Interests: Mechanisms of State Control 
 
A system of ‘collective cover-ups’ connects all members of the ruling elite: 
they use all the means of the repressive governmental machine to protection 
their own economic interests, and this in a very cohesive manner. Any at-
tempt by the people to apply to the courts, prosecutors’ offices, or other gov-
ernmental entities are met by the mocking words of officials: ‘Go, complain 
to anyone you want!’ In fact there is no independent and fair court in Azer-
baijan. Despite all the efforts of the OSCE and the CoE, the authorities have 
‘reformed’ the country’s judiciary system so that all judges have become 
directly and heavily dependent on the executive power, and must work under 
its dictates.  
Even though there are formally ‘private and independent’ TV channels, 
television is fully under control of the relevant unit of the Office of the 
President. Most of the press has been bribed. Opposition newspapers have a 
measly circulation and eke out a miserable existence because the authorities 
have prohibited businesses from placing advertisements in these newspapers. 
Any businessman who is close to the opposition is put under pressure from 
the government’s controlling bodies. For this reason, opposition parties and 
candidates are able to mobilise only meagre funds for elections, unlike the 
funding available to the government parties. The ruling powers are waging 
Elections as Mirror of Politics 82 
all-out warfare against civil society. They discredit and bribe NGOs through 
the use of skilful pressure – blackmailing them and threatening to prohibit 
their activities (similar to what has happened in Russia, Belarus and Uzbeki-
stan), and getting international funds to reduce their financial support to re-
bellious NGOs.  
All information about the real owners of private companies (incomes, 
profits, financial flows, contracts and credits) is held as the strictest of state 
secrets. The State Statistical Committee publishes distorted, manipulated 
information. Over half of the country’s economy is kept in the shadow. 
Budget funds, credits, and grants are siphoned off by top officials. Any at-
tempts by civil society at achieving greater transparency are firmly quelled. 
 
Protection of Personal Economic Interests and the Elections  
 
The nature of the public relations described above, whereby power is used as 
a means of privatising the lion’s share of public revenues, is the reason why 
the ruling class cannot allow fair and equitable elections to be carried out in 
compliance with the Copenhagen principles. Democratic elections would 
inevitably bring the opposition to power, as shown every time there has been 
an expert assessment of the elections. But expert assessments are not official 
juridical documents, with the validity for confirming the results of the vot-
ing. Such documents are routinely falsified by the ruling power, in its own 
favour.  
 
Temperament of the Ruling Class 
 
From the moment Heidar Aliev came to power in Azerbaijan in 1969, the 
process for selecting the ruling elite started to be based on negative charac-
teristics. The main asset of those striving for prosperity in the state became 
their ability to adapt to the whims of the heads, rather than their devotion to 
laws and morals. Giving priority to local interests, nepotism, corruption, and 
collective cover-ups became the law of the life of the elite.  
 
Criminal Tendencies 
 
After the return of Heidar Aliev to power in 1993, the ‘criminalisation of 
those in power’ (including murders on orders from higher up) and strict 
property stratification were added to this list. In 1994, Afiyaddin Jalilov, 
deputy-Speaker of the parliament, and Shamsi Ragimov, head of the special 
department on security issues under the President, were killed, as were M.P. 
Ali Antsuhskiy in 1996, and Ziya Buniatov, Vice-President on ruling parties, 
M.P., hero of the Soviet Union and academician) in 1997. Responsibility for 
these murders was cast on the Prime Minister (then out of favour), the for-
eign intelligence services and the Islamists. However, opinion within society 
holds that the hidden interests of inter-power groups lie behind these mur-
ders and coup d’etat performances. The rapid enrichment of members of the 
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ruling family and the equally swift impoverishment of much of the popula-
tion became so obvious that it was noted by Rasim Gasanov, Director of the 
Centre of Economic Reforms under the Ministry of Economic Development, 
in his fundamental research. Gasanov points out: ‘In 1990, 5% of the popula-
tion with the highest incomes were receiving 6.2% of the total revenue. In 
1993, this figure increased to 22.8%, and in 1997 to 61.5%.’25 Those dis-
loyal to the President were forced out of the ruling elite. All the Special Ser-
vices focused on undertaking subversive activities, directed against the op-
position and civil society. Disloyalty to the suzerain, rather than the embez-
zlement of public funds, became a crime. The President started to encourage 
corruption and simultaneously began to compile compromising material on 
officials. Soon there were no untainted and independent members left in the 
elite. The nature of power became criminal, and to join the circles of power 
began to mean to become a criminal, or at least become reconciled to crime. 
 
Heidar Aliev 
 
Heidar Aliev, KGB General, member of Politburo of the CPSU CC, and a 
politician, had been brought up within the totalitarian school of the CPSU 
and KGB. He was one of the later leaders of the Soviet regime, for whom the 
highest award was recognition as a team-mate ‘politician of Lenin’s type’. 
He accurately reconstructed the Soviet system of power in independent 
Azerbaijan. Under the guise of being the President of Azerbaijan, he became 
the uncontrolled ‘General Secretary of the CPSU CC’. He entrusted the Of-
fice of the President with the functions of CPSU CC, curtailing the authority 
of the Cabinet of Ministers even more than had been with case the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR. He also accorded only nominal rights to the Su-
preme Council of the ‘National Assembly’.  
 
Power and the People 
 
Such power, naturally, must structure its relations with the people. This was 
done in the same manner as the relationship of a rapist with his victim. The 
foundation of the power became corruption for the elite, violence and deceit 
for the people, and demagogy for the international community. 
 
3. The Nature of the Opposition 
 
History 
The Popular Front of Azerbaijan  
 
                                                     
25  Gasanoc, R.T. Conceptual frameworks of market model of socio-economic development 
of the Azerbaijan Republic (in the Azerbaijan language) Baku. Elm. 1998. 
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The main leaders and activists of the opposition parties in Azerbaijan are, by 
origin, from the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, a party coloured by its compo-
sition as a people’s movement. During the decline of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, all communists were called ‘democrats’; fascist-minded 
nationalists and the mob, craving for power, with only the slightest notion of 
democracy, were also considered anti-communists and democrats. The 
Popular Front, which took power in May 1992 and ruled for one year only, 
represented a classic example of ochlocracy, without the slightest democratic 
governance skills. This became the main reason for their power loss. Twelve 
years of being in the opposition resulted in the movement splitting into sev-
eral mutually hostile parties.  
 
The Opposition and the Ruling Power  
 
Relations between the national-democratic opposition and those in power 
were (and still are) of a clandestine nature, with the tribal Nahichevan-
Armenistan wing of the ruling political class and the ostentatious, irreconcil-
able front designed for the naive masses. During the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, this became apparent in a peculiar way. The tribal union had al-
ready come into power in 1993, practically monopolising control over the 
country’s financial, economic, administrative and information resources. 
Thereupon the national democrats allied with those in the clan who craved a 
power take-over from the ruling Aliev family. This is the reason behind the 
union of the two national-democratic parties (the Popular Front and the 
Musavat with the Democratic Party). The leader of this union, Rasul Guliev, 
had been the main financier of the Heidar Aliev campaign for power, as well 
as Speaker of the parliament under Aliev between 1993 and 1996. 
 
Internal Rivalry 
 
The spirit of rivalry prevailed against the spirit of co-operation, within the 
Azadlyg bloc and between the two opposition blocs (Azadlyg and the 
‘YES’-’New Policy’ union). When, on the eve of elections, the YES bloc 
proposed to the Azadlyg bloc that they might sub-divide constituencies in 
order to avoid rivalry between their candidates, the national-democrats re-
sponded that they could let them have only two constituencies. YES could 
not accept such a proposal, so nothing came of the agreement. The candi-
dates of two oppositional blocs had to compete against each other in many 
constituencies.  
 
‘YES’ is the bloc in which many former leaders of the country united, in-
cluding: 
 
• Ayaz Mutalibov, President of Azerbaijan 1990–1992; 
• Yagub Mamedov, former chairperson of the parliament and act-
ing President of the Republic in 1992; 
• Rahim Huseynov, Prime Minister 1992–1993; 
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• Ali Masimov, acting Prime Minister in 1993; 
• Vahid Ahmedov, former Vice Prime Minister; 
• Etibar Mamedov, former presidential candidate in 1998; 
• Eldar Namazov, former assistant to the President.  
 
 
Issues Impeding the Establishment of a Democratic Coalition 
Dominant Points of View 
 
Discussion of the co-ordination efforts by various opposition parties on es-
tablishing a broad democratic coalition during elections has generally been 
limited by the framework created by two points of view widespread in the 
public conscience of Azerbaijan.  
The one is based on a romantic, community perception that sees the peo-
ple as a whole, and proposes uniting all opposition forces for the sake of ‘the 
sacred all-national objectives’ (fair elections, liberation of occupied lands, 
overthrow of the traitorous power, etc). This point of view fails to grasp the 
real difference of interests between the various groups in population, and the 
impossibility of organising these political forces, with their varying levels of 
strength and influence, in the absence of efficient democratic mechanisms 
and skills.  
The second point of view highlights the availability of structurally and 
functionally capable parties with ambitious leaders. It holds that society 
should unite around these parties and, if a situation occurs whereby a signifi-
cant part of the anti-government population does not accept or even rejects 
them, this should be ignored. Proponents of this view point out that, prior to 
every election, there are heated debates around the ideas, forms, and goals of 
such a coalition, yet this never ends in the establishment of a truly wide bloc. 
Moreover, the leaders of the ‘democratic’ camp are authoritarian to the same 
degree: they are closed to society and avoid transparency in the same manner 
as the officials do. Any negotiations between the leaders of the parties begin 
with the signing of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ on the non-disclosure of the 
details of the negotiations. However, because journalists have long since lost 
their piety to leaders of the opposition, all these negotiations are commented 
on. In the mass media, the commentary is done in an ironic manner and al-
ways includes some comical details, as well as providing evidence of the 
lack of foresight and greediness of these leaders. Mehriban Vezir (journalist, 
member of the Administration of the Party of the Popular Front (the classics) 
and MP candidate), who won a convincing election victory but who was not 
allowed into the parliament due to falsification of the voting results by the 
Territorial Election Commission, wrote about general atmosphere in the op-
position and the reasons why attempts to unite its various detachments had 
failed.26  
 
                                                     
26  Vezir, M. ‘Dangerous, unhappy, sad Azerbaijan’ (in Azeri language), from the newspaper 
Baku Xeber, 30 December 2005. 
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Other Careless Practices 
 
The carelessness of the leaders of the ‘Azadlyg’ bloc meant that several 
well-known opposition activists were not entered on the single list of candi-
dates co-ordinated by three parties. They were nominated as independent 
deputies and had to compete for the vote of the protesting electorate with 
less-known candidates of the bloc. As a result, the opposition lost in these 
constituencies. For example, in the centre of Baku (where most voters were 
non-manual workers, teachers and doctors), instead of supporting Rasim 
Musabekov (a well-known political scientist and member of the Musavat 
administration), the Azadlyg bloc supported a little-known provincial, 
Zamina Dunyamaliyeva, from the Democratic Party. Rashid Gadzhly, a fa-
mous lawyer and candidate of the ‘YES’ bloc, was also running in that con-
stituency. As a result, having divided the votes of the protesting electorate, 
they took third, fourth and fifth place. 
 
The Opposition: a General Note 
 
On the whole, the history of the national-democratic opposition, as well as 
its character and the conduct of its leaders, has not led towards co-operation 
and reconciliation. The benchmarks of the political struggle of the national 
democrats include highlighting banned methods, bloody collisions, riots, and 
overthrowing those political leaders who actually rejected the repression and 
started working together with them. This is one reason why power always 
applies illegal methods in order to suppress this. 
 
4. The People 
 
Not only in Azerbaijan, but also in Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other 
CIS countries, a core part of the population is indifferent to politics and pre-
fers the sidelines. It becomes possible to radicalise population only when 
there is a split within the ruling political class. Additionally, in order for this 
radicalisation to occur, one must significantly target (and thus support) the 
financial, administrative and information resources of the opposition. In the 
2003 Azerbaijan presidential elections this did not happen, and the popula-
tion quietly accepted the fact that the election had been so roughly falsified. 
They did not support the acts of protest by national-democrats.  
The poorest section of the population is scattered in the villages of the 
provinces and is not capable of self-organisation. In towns, the few operating 
enterprises (with their large worker collectives) pay their employees com-
paratively high salaries, which generates political indifference amongst the 
workers. Small retailers and day labourers are tied to their work places be-
cause of the necessity of earning a daily living, and cannot participate in pro-
test actions. With rare exceptions, meetings of opposition have been attended 
by members of the parties, the unemployed, and clerks, who suffer most of 
all from the injustice of the State 
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5. The Election Process in Action 
 
Long before the parliamentary elections, people had realised that these elec-
tions would be held in compliance with the regulations of the Election Code. 
It was also known that the Aliev family party, Jeni Azerbaijan, would secure 
the majority of places in all levels of the election commissions.  
 
The Opposition and Election Code Amendments: Failed Attempt  
 
At the beginning of 2005, the opposition started campaigning for the intro-
duction of Election Code amendments that would secure it equal standing 
within the election commissions. The campaign was held in both the press 
and amongst the population, as well as within the leading Western interna-
tional organisations in Baku. The OSCE and EC supported the requirements 
of the opposition. Negotiations were also held between the representatives of 
these organisations and the ruling party. However, President Ilham Aliev put 
an end to these attempts to achieve equality in the election commissions, 
reminding people that the opposition had used parity in 2000 in order to 
sabotage the work of the CEC (he neglected to mention that the reason for 
this ‘sabotage’ was that the ruling party had intended to ignore the opinion of 
the opposition so as to retain control over the CEC). Thereafter, the opposi-
tion presented this equality requirement as one of its main demands. Despite 
this, the absence of a threat of election boycott (from the opposition) gave 
the ruling party full confidence that its unwillingness to seek a compromise 
would, in the end, be accepted both domestically and abroad. The section of 
the Election Code covering the composition of commissions was not 
amended. Some amendments were introduced into other articles, but these 
were insignificant for the elections. 
 
The Opposition: Preventing Falsification  
 
On the whole, the opposition was getting prepared not so much for the elec-
tions, but for preventing any falsification of the results. At the 2003 presi-
dential elections, the CEC had removed 30% of the votes from the main op-
position candidate and endorsed them to Ilham Aliev.27 Actions protesting 
were brutally suppressed. An unofficial moratorium on meetings was intro-
duced for a period of almost a year and a half. For these reasons, the opposi-
tion and civil society were getting prepared to rebuff and struggle. They 
conducted enhanced training of observers and members of the opposition in 
the commissions, teaching them to draw up acts, and providing studies of the 
experience of previous elections in Azerbaijan and in Ukraine in 2004. 
 
 
 
                                                     
27  From the newspaper Azadlyg, 10 and 11 November 2005.  
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Reports of the Co-ordinating Advisory Council (CAC) 
 
In the 2003 presidential and 2004 municipal elections, civil society was 
united within the framework of the Co-ordinating Advisory Council (CAC), 
which included over 40 NGOs. Based on the results of the elections, uniform 
co-ordinated reports were prepared. International organisations referred to 
these during their assessment of the elections in Azerbaijan.  
 
The Reports 
 
The CAC reports clearly showed that the election victory was with the oppo-
sition. They also noted how the ruling party had used all means to obstruct 
the process of obtaining reliable data, with extensive use of violence, intimi-
dation and unfair shuffling. Due to the absence of reliable data, supported by 
un-shuffled documents, the CAC alleged that the elections data which had 
been received did not confirm the victory of the ruling power candidates. 
However, for the same reason, the data were also insufficient for confirming 
the victory of the opposition. 
 
Subsequent Reactions 
 
This objective position caused discontent among both the ruling powers and 
the opposition. The former were angry that their illegal activities were being 
recorded at many polling stations and constituencies, and were brought to 
the attention of public opinion within the country and abroad, while the op-
position was receiving unconditional loyalty from the NGOs, seeing itself as 
a symbol of democracy. For this reason, perhaps, some ten NGOs who were 
close to the national democrats had withdrawn from CAC on the eve of the 
election process, and announced the establishment of a new coalition –
‘Golden Autumn’. This coalition soon splintered, but its campaign on the 
defamation of civil society, within the pages of governmental press and tele-
vision, was actively carried out.  
The opposition tried to introduce democratic rules for the selection of 
candidates in the single list, although this did not take place everywhere. 
However, as the results demonstrated, the opposition did not succeed in 
learning democratic norms. Furthermore, with regard to bright names, the 
rosters of the opposition were generally poor. Likewise for the rosters of the 
ruling power, which contained the administration of the party ‘Jeni Azerbai-
jan’ (which had received their mandates as a result of the scandalous falsifi-
cation of the parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2000), and along with this 
were several new faces, whose names had been mentioned by the press in 
connection with misappropriation of loans and monopolisation of various 
spheres of the economy. There were perhaps ten educated and intelligent 
people who could be considered to be the exceptions; they had been included 
in the list in the hope that they might become representatives in European 
structures.  
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Party Roster and Other Tactics 
Self-nomination 
 
It was known in advance that a certain part of this roster would be sacrificed, 
by the ruling power itself, in order to create a semblance of democracy. 
Aside from those included on the party roster, hundreds of members of the 
ruling party were self-nominated: this was presented as a victory for democ-
racy. However, an analysis of the situation in the constituencies, along with 
the cancellation of the requirement of a quorum, showed that, by doing this, 
the party Jeni Azerbaijan tried to apply some new techniques. Knowing that 
the forces of the ruling power and of the opposition were approximately 
equal, the party did not oppose the self-nomination by hundreds of its mem-
bers, counting on the fact that they would not be able to attract undecided 
voters. The average Azerbaijani voter has a strongly developed sense of pri-
ority to local interests, as well as nepotism and a client-focused attitude. In 
order to prevent an opposition candidate from winning over undecided vot-
ers, the ruling party decided to disintegrate and group around its own numer-
ous candidates, each of whom could gain up to 100 votes from relatives, 
neighbours and friends.  
 
Annulled Registrations 
 
This expectation, however, proved wrong. Confidential elections polling 
showed that, in a sizeable number of constituencies, candidates for the ruling 
power were losing badly to the opposition and needed the maximum mobili-
sation of all their resources. Those in power then started to twist the arms of 
their own allies so as to have only one ruling power representative left on the 
list. Seeking to clear the election field for their own candidates, the ruling 
power also dared to annul the registration of several opposition and inde-
pendent candidates. On the eve of the elections, the total number of registra-
tions annulled by the CEC and in the courts was a full 351. The greatly 
praised figure of 2,062 candidates, which was held to demonstrate the ‘blos-
soming of democracy’ in the country, fell to 1,711. Some candidates (mem-
bers of the ruling party lodged within the number of ‘unofficial’ and inde-
pendent ones) lost around 1 million dollars each at the initial stage of the 
election campaign, before they were forced to retract their candidatures due 
to threats. 
 
General Statistics 
 
A record number of candidates to a single seat became a distinctive feature 
of the parliamentary elections of 2005. The lowest number of candidates was 
registered in Saatly constituency, where the 80-year-old brother of the late 
President Heidar Aliev was running (the scientist Jalal Aliev). Annangi Gad-
jibeli, a member of the People’s Front Party and a lawyer, had the courage to 
challenge the uncle of the current President for the third time. Naturally, the 
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president’s uncle won. A large number of candidates (36 in fact) were regis-
tered in Binagady constituency of Baku city, where Sardar Jalaloglu, general 
secretary of the Democratic Party, was running. By Election Day, only 21 
candidates were left, over whom Jalaloglu won: however the CEC refused to 
approve his victory and annulled the election results in this constituency. 
 
6. Candidate Registration 
 
Traditional Impediments  
 
The initial period from 5 July to final registration was characterised by vari-
ous impediments created by those in power to obstruct independent and op-
positional candidates.  
 
Targeting the Islamic Parties 
 
They were particularly zealous in respect of the Muslims and the Democratic 
Party. Although they did not have the official status of mullah, several 
prominent Muslim scholars were not allowed to register, with reference to 
the rule that a servant of a religious cult cannot be engaged in politics.  
Initially, the leader of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, Hajiaga Nuriev, 
was registered. Then, having learned of the wide support that Nuriev enjoyed 
in his constituency, the CEC allowed a petition on the annulment of his reg-
istration, submitted by a CEC member from the Musavat Party. In this way, 
the member was trying to pave the way for the editor-in-chief of the news-
paper Jeni Musavat, Rauf Arifoglu. Despite numerous appeals by the Mus-
lim leader and by courts of various instances, the decision to annul his regis-
tration remained left in force. After the elections, Nuriev filed a court case 
against the CEC member in question for damaging his reputation, but no 
court decision would be able to make an impact on the approved results of 
the elections. 
Rasul Guliev 
 
A somewhat strange registration came from the out-of-favour ex-Speaker 
Rasul Guliev, who had immigrated to the USA. The Territorial Election 
Commission refused to issue lists for the collection of signatures by persons 
empowered to act for him, on the grounds that he did not have an ID as a 
citizen of Azerbaijan, and also because he bore responsibility to a foreign 
government, as a taxpayer to the US budget. Activists of Azerbaijan’s De-
mocratic Party began to panic, having telephoned their leader in the USA to 
inform him of the failure. Rasul Guliev calmed them down and promised 
that he would push certain levers, and that it would work; just a day later, a 
phone call was made from the Territorial Election Commission to the De-
mocratic Party, asking them to come and pick lists for the collection of the 
Elections as Mirror of Politics 91 
signatures. In only two days the necessary number of signatures had been 
collected and submitted to the Territorial Election Commission. All the 
same, the registration experienced new delays. When all the terms as defined 
by legislation had expired, members of the Democratic Party once again 
called made a call to the USA and informed Rasul Guliev about the new im-
pediment. The leader of Democrats pressed the necessary buttons: one day 
later, the activists of the Democratic Party were invited to the Territorial 
Election Commission, where they delivered a document certifying that Rasul 
Guliev was registered as a candidate in the forthcoming elections. 
 
Removing the Impediments 
 
After some time, an order was issued by the CEC, and all the impediments 
placed in the way of the candidates’ registration were removed. As a result, 
during the second stage of the pre-election campaign, 2,062 candidates 
joined in the competition for 125 mandates. Later, however, 351 of these 
withdrew, either voluntarily or by force, leaving only 1,711 candidates in the 
end. 
 
7. The Pre-Election Campaign Stage 
 
Election Campaign Tactics  
‘Charitable Activity’ 
 
By law, the formal election campaign is to start 60 days prior to the elections 
– in this case, 7 September. However, both the ruling power and the opposi-
tion began campaigning long before this date. Rich candidates started broad 
charitable activity, as well as construction and improvement work. Naturally, 
nobody called these activities ‘the election campaign’. Money was distrib-
uted to poor families, refugees, pensioners, orphans and orphanages. Schools 
were rehabilitated, roads and yards asphalted, transformers installed, cables 
and pipes laid. Magnificent weddings and free meals were organised. Reli-
gious holidays were celebrated. In honour of the Commemoration Day of the 
Shiite Martyr, ruling-power candidates as well as atheists and embezzlers of 
public funds were found organising sumptuous free meals, to which hun-
dreds of voters came. 
 
Protest Meetings 
 
The opposition could not afford to be so lavish, and focused instead on pro-
test meetings. The main demand at meetings during the spring/summer of 
2005 was assuring parity in the election commissions. However, both the 
opposition and the representatives of international organisations came to re-
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alise that those in power would not agree to amend the Election Code to 
guarantee parity in the formation of commissions. Meetings became increas-
ingly radicalised, with impassioned speeches on the necessity of dismissing 
‘the corrupt, thieves, law violators, and betrayers of the people’s interests’. It 
was clear that the speakers were referring to all the elite in power, but most 
of all to the executive power.  
 
The Return of the President 
 
In late August, having registered as candidates, ex-President Ayaz Mutalli-
bov, and ex-Speaker Rasul Guliev announced that they were preparing to 
return to Azerbaijan to take part in the direct conduct of their election cam-
paigns.  
The response of the authorities came with lightning speed; upon the pres-
entation of the general prosecutor’s office, the courts of Azerbaijan annulled 
the status of immunity to which all election candidates were entitled by law. 
Both the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ramil Usubov, and the General Prose-
cutor, Zakir Garalov, vowed to arrest Ayaz Mulallibov and Rasul Guliev as 
soon as they set foot on Azerbajani soil. In response, the national-democratic 
opposition relocated its meetings to the central squares of the capital. 
 
The National Democratic Meeting Movement 
Short-Lived Meetings in Azadlyg Square 
 
The National Democrat Meeting Movement, begun during the 1988–1991 
period of USSR disintegration, having started in the central Azadlyg (‘Free-
dom’) Square in Baku) was growing like an avalanche and absorbing all the 
protesting population. Earlier, it had been responsible for overthrowing the 
leaders of the country – Abdul-Rakman Vezirov in 1990 and Ayaz Mutalli-
bov in 1992. Heidar Aliev, who had actively assisted members of ‘The 
Front’, took into account the danger of the meetings in Azadlyg Square. By 
assigning to the main square the legal status of a place reserved for official 
governmental events, he provided formal grounds for the head of the execu-
tive power of Baku to refuse to requests from the opposition to hold meet-
ings there. Other central squares of Baku were also closed, under the pretext 
of ‘intensive traffic flows’ and ‘possible disturbance for those living in the 
neighbouring houses’. 
 
Finding an Alternative Venue 
 
For meetings, the opposition power allocated a small square in front of the 
former movie theatre ‘Gelebe’, or ‘Victory’ (where the State Movie Fund is 
currently located), on a permanent basis. This square can accommodate no 
more than five thousand people. When the crowd fills in the neighbouring 
streets, the number of people can increase by four times this number. In this 
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square, the opposition held several meetings, with the number of participants 
continuously growing. The leaders announced that the meeting of 9 October 
would take place in the centre of the city, in the square near the railway sta-
tion. 
The authorities took this decision as signalling the start of an ‘orange 
revolution’. Permission for holding a meeting in the centre of the city on 9 
October was not issued, under a skimpy pretext. The Azadlyg bloc then de-
cided to hold the meeting anyway, and called on its allies for support. 
 
Violent Repression 
 
Several thousand people dared to attend that forbidden meeting. Besides the 
police forces, the ruling power brought in fighters from private armies, 
bodyguards, and the security forces of private companies. On 9 October 
these forces not only tried to break up the meeting, but did their best to bru-
tally beat the demonstrators. They beat them with rubber batons, wooden 
sticks and even brass knuckles.28 The meeting was dispersed and the people 
were beaten, maimed and frightened. 
The broken rally on 9 October and the terror and violence shown by the 
ruling power against the demonstrators became a turning point in the 2005 
election campaign. It showed there would be no opportunity for the opposi-
tion to prevent the authorities from carrying out the elections based on their 
scenario. From Rasul Guliev came an announcement of his return to Baku on 
17 October. On 17 October those in power unexpectedly blocked two roads 
leading to the airport and preventively arrested several hundred activists of 
the Democratic Party. Leaders of the Azadlyg bloc did not even try to break 
through, to get to the airport in order to meet their ally.  
 
The Detention of Rasul Guliev 
 
The private plane on which Rasul Guliev flew from London to Baku was not 
allowed to land, and Guliev was forced to turn back. He then boarded a 
plane at the airport of Simferopol in Ukraine, but was detained at the request 
of Azerbaijan, and handed over to Interpol. However, several days later he 
was released because Azerbaijan did not present the court with the evidence 
and documents of his crime necessary for his extradition. Released from de-
tention, Guliev then flew to Kiev, from Kiev to London, and then to the 
USA. Though he promised to return, nobody took this seriously. 
Being arrested is not advantageous for anybody, nor is having the court 
against you. Naturally, as a former companion-in-arms of Heidar Aliev, Ra-
sul Guliev knew best of all the true value of the Azerbaijani court. This is 
why he had every reason to assume that having the court against him would 
be a mere show of reprisals of the Aliev family against a competitor claim-
ing oil profits. On the other hand, an arrest would not have been in the inter-
est of the Aliev family, nor would it be in their interest to turn the court 
against him – because, as a well-informed person, Guliev could disclose 
                                                     
28  Azadlyg, 10 and 11 November 2005.  
Elections as Mirror of Politics 94 
many incriminating secrets of the political and financial affairs of the ruling 
family during the court hearing. 
 
Other Notable Arrests 
 
After the incident involving Rasul Guliev, the ruling power carried out ar-
rests among his brothers-in-arms (both supposed and real ones), including: 
 
• Ministers of Health and Economic Development, Ali Insanov and 
Farhad Aliev; 
• Chairperson of the state company ‘Azrchemia’, Fikret Sadyhov; 
• Managing head of the presidential administration, Akif Murad-
verdiev; 
• Ex-President of the Academy of Sciences, Eldar Salayev;  
• and several other top-level officials.  
 
TV broadcasts were made showing the glamorous palaces of the minis-
ters, of the tens of kilogrammes of gold and precious stones, as well as the 
millions of dollars and euros. A campaign began against a group of ‘rebels 
who were preparing a coup d’etat’, backed by the threat of future arrests and 
presented as a pledge from those in power, to carry out wide-scale arrests 
among the leaders of the opposition. As a result, the leaders toned down their 
radicalism. 
 
Re-Establishing the Opposition 
 
After the events leading to the failure of the Azadlyg bloc, the leaders of the 
bloc announced on 17 October that they had relocated the centre of the po-
litical struggle into the territories. By that time, the correlation of forces was 
already known, and the ruling power began urgently annulling the registra-
tion of opposition activists within the second tier, as these could win over 
candidates from the ruling power. The Balaken independent candidate, 
Khalilov Khalid , was forced to withdraw his own candidature, and an oppo-
sition member, Gunduzov Osman, withdrew his own candidature for CEC 
elections, without providing any reason. The election field was prepared for 
the ‘convincing’ victory of the candidate of the ruling power, Rabiyat Asla-
nova. 
The leader of the Azadlyg bloc began travelling throughout the country, 
organising meetings. In many places the ruling power created illegitimate 
impediments and, in those places where meetings were permitted, they were 
not able to make a significant impact on the course of events. 
 
TV Campaigns 
 
A more effective method was TV campaigning. Candidates from the regis-
tered political parties and blocs, who nominated candidates in over half of 
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the constituencies, were provided with free time on the air, whereas inde-
pendent candidates had to pay for broadcasting time themselves. Representa-
tives of the Azadlyg bloc sharply and violently criticised this policy. In their 
address to the ruling power in general, and to its selected candidates, the ti-
rades noticeably activated the protesting electorate, which was one reason 
why the electorate consolidated around the ‘orange’ candidates.  
 
Expenditure 
 
During the 2005 elections, civil society was not able to fulfil the legal re-
quirements on transparency of its expenditures during the election campaign. 
The state allocated approximately USD 220 to each candidate. By law, the 
upper ceiling for election campaign expenditures was set to USD 86,000. 
Some opposition and independent candidates spent far more than the amount 
allocated by the state. However, most candidates from the ruling power spent 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and some even spent millions. The unequal 
financial conditions and the illegitimate expenditures were the subject of 
many complaints on behalf of the ‘poor’ candidates to the CEC. In general, 
the CEC did not respond to these complaints, although exceptions were 
made in several cases when this would be to the advantage of the ruling 
power. 
 
8. Voting 
 
Voter Turn-out 
 
It was a cold day on 7 November. Voter turn-out was low, and there was no 
incentive for the ruling power to exaggerate the figures too highly across the 
country. It was announced officially that 46.4% of voters took part in the 
elections. The opposition did not call this figure into question, even though, 
in some constituencies (particularly in the provinces), there was a mass prac-
tice of throwing ballots into the boxes in favour of the candidates of the rul-
ing powers, which had a serious impact on the results. The quorum require-
ment was annulled by law, exit poll were carried out, and this time those in 
power did not oblige the local election commissions by artificially raising 
turn-out figures within the data of the territorial election commissions. 
 
Utilising the Army and Other Institutions 
 
In constituencies where leaders of the Azadlyg bloc were running, the ruling 
powers applied some well-tried tricks: soldiers and officers of the national 
army (stationed in the territory of the 36 Khatai), along with the 4th territorial 
election committee, all voted for the candidate of the ruling powers, Samed 
Seidov, competitor of Rasul Guliev,. Although Guliev was leading in all the 
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territorial election commissions where civilians voted, the CEC annulled the 
results of several territorial election committees where he had a significant 
advantage. Samed Seidov won, with the votes of the soldiers and inmates of 
the women’s penitentiary. 
Against the Musavat leader Isa Gambar, those in power nominated a po-
lice officer, even though this practice is formally prohibited. Adil Aliev, 
brother of the head of the senior police department of Baku, Lieutenant-
General Maharram Aliev, mobilised thousands of policemen and security 
staff, openly distributing money to voters, and ‘won’ over one of the most 
famous politicians in the country.29 The many complaints by Isa Gambar’s 
team on the obvious legal violations were ignored. As with other ‘undesir-
able’ winners, the CEC had a simple solution: the results of the elections 
were annulled, either in general in the territory, or in selected polling sta-
tions, thus determining the results of the whole territorial election commis-
sion.  
 
Falsification of Results 
 
The active opposition (Sardar Jalaloglu, Rovshan Veliev, Flora Kerimova 
and Arif Gadjyly), who had the final minutes of the territorial election com-
missions in their hands, were deprived of the victory by a decision of the 
CEC. Moreover, the heads of the executive power in Sumgait, Sabirabad and 
Zakataly (where Flora Kerimova, Panah Huseynov, and Arif Gadjyly had 
won clear victories) were dismissed from their positions for not being able to 
falsify the elections adequately. Rasul Guliev and Eldar Namazov were de-
prived of the victory through annulment of the results at several polling sta-
tions, and also due to the fact that the ruling power recorded 100% voter 
turn-out among the military and convicts. In the 29th Sabael constituency of 
Baku, the candidate for the Azadlyg bloc, Gasan Kerimov, won in all 29 
polling stations where the residents of this constituency voted. In three poll-
ing stations, votes were cast by convicts of Bailovo prison in Baku, as well 
as a military hospital and a military detachment. A 26-year-old activist of the 
ruling party, Fuad Muradov, ‘won’ with an absolute result, and the CEC 
promptly issued a mandate for this young person to become a deputy. 
 
The Reaction of the Opposition 
 
After the results of the voting were announced, the opposition once again 
started to convene protest meetings. A gathering on 26 November was dis-
persed with exceptional brutality, and people were seriously wounded. After 
this, the opposition tried once again to organise a meeting in the centre of the 
city, but also this meeting was broken up. The constitutional court, having 
considered the CEC Minutes, annulled the results of the elections in six con-
stituencies (in addition to the CEC ones), and approved the final results of 
the elections.  
                                                     
29  Yeni Musavat and Gundelic Azerbaijan. 7 November 2005, with reference to information 
from Turan New Agency. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan resulted in yet another vic-
tory of the state over society. In general, the democratic countries and or-
ganisations of the West recognised the results of the elections, though seri-
ous comments were voiced concerning the legal violations. As always, Rus-
sia, Iran and Turkey gave a positive assessment of the ‘democratic’ nature of 
the elections. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
continued its assessment work on the results of the elections: their final ver-
dict will be issued after 13 May, when re-elections will be conducted in 10 
constituencies. 
Ten candidates from the opposition were elected into the parliament – ten 
whom those in power deemed to be conservative and ‘constructive’. Those 
considered to be ‘destructive’ were not allowed into the parliament, despite 
the verdict from the electorate. Fifteen women were elected, which is two 
more than in the previous composition. From the ruling party Yeni Azerbai-
jan, 57 deputies were elected; four were elected from the opposition party 
Musavat. Since the elected ‘independent’ deputies can also be expected to 
support those in power, we may conclude that the performance, under the 
name of ‘elections’, was engineered to give the appearance of democracy, 
and to enable the ruling Aliev family to retain an absolute control over all 
institutions of state power. 
Complaints were filed with the CEC by 82 candidates. CAC observers 
succeeded in getting 736 copies of minutes and the registration of 1,945 acts 
of election violations. The CAC has documentary confirmation of the victory 
of 25 candidates from the opposition and independents. However, few of 
these individuals will apply to the European Court of Human Rights. The 
citizens’ belief in objectivity, and the efficacy of Western democracy, has 
been weakened. 
For the first time since 1991, the national democratic press openly ac-
cused the USA of betraying the ideals of democracy, following double stan-
dards and collusion with the corrupt Aliev regime. Until November 2005, the 
norm for this press had been criticism of Russia and Iran, while the USA was 
criticised only by the Islamic press. Apparently the leaders of the national 
democrats had realised the futility of their hopes of gaining the powerful 
support of Washington. It allowed its own, rather controlled newspapers to 
divert public discontent away from themselves and onto the US ambassador, 
the US State Department, and President G.W. Bush.  
The voting bloc ‘YES’ quickly disintegrated after the elections. Of all its 
candidates, only Eldar Namazov has continued the political struggle for get-
ting the election results revised; he intends to challenge the decision of the 
constituency commission in the European Court. The Social-Democratic 
party intends to participate in the re-elections. The Azadlyg bloc is being 
torn apart by internal factions: the issue of whether to participate in the re-
peat elections in the ten constituencies on 13 May 2006 split the bloc. 
Musavat, which already has six deputies in the parliament, decided to par-
ticipate, while the People’s Front Party (PFP) and the Democratic Party, who 
gained no deputies in the elections, insist on a boycott. Such a difference of 
opinion is evidence of the Musavat understanding of the inevitability of the 
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evolutionary development of the country, and the benefit of participating in 
the legitimate structures of the state. The position of the PFP, and of the 
Democratic Party, tells us about the determination to continue to make an 
attempt at an ‘orange revolution’. 
Once again, those in power have tried to cleanse the opposition field. The 
four Constitutional Courts annulled the decision of the CEC (on the approval 
of the mandates of two deputies from the PEP, Ali Kerimov and Gulan-
gusein Alibeily) and left this party outside the parliament. After this, the 
deputy Sabir Rustanhanly (chair of the Civil Solidarity Party), apparently 
acting upon the instruction of the authorities to nominate the candidature of 
Enver Aliev as a representative of his own party to the CEC, repeatedly ran, 
in order to gain admission to this body. Enver Aliev stated that this was done 
in order to seek revenge for his having refused to sign the final minutes of 
the CEC. However, Vidadi Mahmudlu, Musavat representative in the CEC, 
did sign the final minutes of the falsified elections, thereby unleashing a 
storm of criticism against himself. Journalists of the opposition press started 
to discuss the size of the bribes he had received from the ruling power for the 
party shuffling. 
The split in the National Independence party can be attributed to the re-
sults of the elections. The ‘leader’ of the party, Etibar Mamedov, started a 
struggle to the death with the chairperson of the Ali Aliev party. This chair-
person tied NIPA to the Azadlyg bloc, where the age-old competitor of Eti-
bar Mamedov, Isa Gambar, runs the show. It resulted in the decision to con-
vene two congresses of the same party – repeating the situation of five years 
earlier with the PFP, when the party split into ‘reformers’ and ‘classics’. 
Also the Democratic Party could not avoid a split. A scandal flared up be-
tween the general secretary, Sardar Jalaloglu, and Aidyn Guliev, editor-in-
chief of Baki Xeber (which is sponsored by the chairperson of the party, Ra-
sul Guliev).  
Dismay and embarrassment now reign in post-election Azerbaijan. How-
ever, braver and stronger-sounding voices calling for the establishment of a 
new political force may assess the status of society more soberly and deeply. 
It is to be hoped that they will be able to carry out a more rational and suc-
cessful policy, putting an end to the systematic crisis into which the Aliev 
family has plunged the country. There is not much time left until 2008, when 
the next presidential elections are to be held.  
 
 
 
THE POST-ELECTION SITUATION: WHO 
RULES AZERBAIJAN? 
Rustam Seyidov 
1. Introduction 
 
The Past and the Present 
 
At first glance, there are no significant changes in Azerbaijan: the same 
group of people are in power. They were brought into the country’s leader-
ship by Heidar Aliev, the deceased president. Yet, even though Heidar 
Aliev’s son took over from his father to become President (and, as he him-
self claims, in essence continues the policies of his father), we can note sev-
eral changes. These changes are not related to policy directions, or to the 
social and economic measures taken, but are – significantly – found in the 
area involving the reallocation of authority.  
Let us begin with a brief, retrospective look at the years which led to the 
existing situation. Without considering recent history, it is difficult to under-
stand the current situation.  
 
2. The State System under Heidar Aliev 
Ideology 
 
In 1993, after numerous dramatic events, Heidar Aliev, a KGB general and 
former member of the CPSU Politburo, became the President of Azerbaijan. 
He was a man with great intellectual potential, will, experience and firmness 
of purpose, and he started to build a system of power in the way he best un-
derstood. Along with all his undoubted personal merits, there was one more 
quality at the core of his ideology, and with this he led the country to its cur-
rent status: in fact, Heidar Aliev hated Azerbaijanis, and viewed Azerbaijan 
through the prism of this hatred.  
This can explain why, for many years, Azerbaijan ranked among the five 
most corrupt countries in the world. Why the Karabakh problem has not 
taken even a single step towards resolution since the ceasefire in 1994. Why 
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health care, education, social protection, as well as other sectors, are in a 
catastrophic state, despite the country’s huge oil and other natural resources. 
 
Close Personal Ties 
 
A key factor in the power system built by Heidar Aliev was the selection of 
managers based on close-knit local and family ties. This system of state-
machinery building was certainly not original: it was based on the example 
of such African states as Nigeria, Senegal and Mali. Most state officials – 
from the prime minister and the head of the president’s administration, to the 
police chiefs in remote areas of the country – come from either the 
Nakhichevan enclave within Azerbaijan or from Armenia, where, until the 
recent notorious events, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis lived. Many 
of the president’s relatives have obtained positions of responsibility and 
deputy mandates.30 Furthermore, other officials often act in the same man-
ner. Present-day Azerbaijan is managed by a ‘family-parochial clan’, or the 
FPC for short.  
 
Preservation of Power 
 
The ruling power had reached a modus vivendi, and it did everything possi-
ble to preserve it. During the first phase of his rule, Heidar Aliev physically 
and/or politically exterminated all bright political opponents who might act 
as if they had power, or who disagreed with his actions. These included 
Suret Guseinov, Ali Antsukhskyi, Gadji Vagif, Afiyatdin Jalilov, Rasul 
Guliev and others. Perhaps oddly, this list did not include leaders of the na-
tional and democratic opposition, given the entirely irreconcilable struggle 
between this section of the opposition and the ruling party, but this will be 
discussed later.  
All key posts in the state were allocated to rather faceless individuals 
from the FPC system, notable for their personal loyalty to the president. The 
people were managed under a system of permitted and privately encouraged 
corruption; and through these people, the state was in turn managed (for ex-
ample, by paying extremely low wages to the staff of the budgetary organi-
sations and structures). According to some former members of the deceased 
president’s team, discrediting information was collected on all the ministers, 
and this was also practised down the vertical line of command. Very quickly 
this became the norm for the functioning of all state organisations and large 
businesses, which were headed by large state figures and members of the 
                                                     
30  The brother of the former President (and thus the uncle of the current president), Jalal 
Aliev, became a deputy for the third time in a row. Likewise, Vasif Talybov, the head of 
Nakhychvan Autonomous Republic and the husband of Heidar Aliev’s niece, was elected 
for the third time. Within 8 years, Beilyar Eyubov, who is married to another one of Hei-
dar Aliev’s nieces, who was previously a fire brigade foreman, became lieutenant-general, 
the chief of personal security and a very richt and influential person. The wife of Ilham 
Aliev, Mekhriban Alieva, became an MP. The uncle of the first lady is Azerbaijan ambas-
sador to the USA, and another uncle was appointed Minister of Health to replace the re-
cently arrested Ali Insanov. These are just the top state posts: the same thing occurs in 
business, entire sectors and spheres of which are controlled by members of the president’s 
family. 
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FPC. It became clear that if a large share of the corrupt money and various 
bribes were transferred to the higher levels of power, the law would be deaf 
and blind to it. Corruption, and hence, the presence of discrediting informa-
tion, was a major lever of the FPC management system. This vertical line 
was headed by the President himself, who was widely acknowledged as a 
person with a multi-billion fortune. Under such conditions, it was only natu-
ral that the ruling FPC became a solid organisation, absolutely obedient to 
the iron will of its founder and leader. Due to the absence of real opposition, 
the system worked smoothly – at least until Heidar Aliev’s serious illness 
and death. 
 
3. Transfer of Power to the Son 
 
During the period involving Heidar Aliev’s health problems, his trips to the 
USA for treatment, and then his coronary operation, society sustained ru-
mours about the possibility of the elderly President transferring power to his 
son. However, it seems that, in reality, Heidar Aliev did not even think of 
transferring power to his son; he clearly realised his son’s capabilities – i.e. 
that his son had an aversion to politics. Furthermore, he recognised the wolf-
like nature of the FPC members who were managing Azerbaijan. However, 
with the onset of his illness, he may have been the one heating up these ru-
mours; certain amendments had even been introduced to the Constitution, 
whereby the person who replaced the President was to be the prime minister 
(but not the Speaker of the Parliament). Since the prime minister was a 
rather faceless person, this was accepted by society. More importantly, it 
was taken by the Establishment as a clear sign that the president’s son, Ilham 
Aliev, would become prime minister in the near future. All these measures 
had been taken by the President in order to calm down FPC members, to re-
assure them that ‘even if the father passes away, the son will arrive and noth-
ing will have changed in the state machine’. However, in reality, throughout 
all years of Heidar Aliev’s rule, his son had occupied the post of the Vice-
President of the state oil company, turning up at his office only intermit-
tently. This is no secret in the city, as everyone can witness at what time the 
motorcade of the president’s son (now the president) leaves for his office 
and the roads are blocked for this procession. Even after the amendments to 
the Constitution, when the whole society expected Ilham Aliev to be ap-
pointed prime minister, this did not happen. This appointment would have 
been a clear sign that Heidar Aliev wished to see his son in his post; however 
important his son’s position in the oil company might be, the post of the 
prime minister is one a very different scale of power and responsibility. Un-
doubtedly, Heidar Aliev understood this, and had he really wished to see his 
son as president, he would have appointed Ilham Aliev as prime minister 
under him, to acquire the experience necessary to be able to manage the 
country. 
Supposedly, the President did eventually sign the decree which appointed 
Ilham Aliev as prime minister. However, the point at which this is theoreti-
cally said to have occurred fully contradicts common sense, i.e. at a time just 
before his death, when he was already in a clinic in Turkey, and when all 
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Azerbaijan was sure that even if he was not about to die, he was certainly 
unconscious and incapable of acting sensibly. It seems that this decree had 
been inspired by the top of the FPC, with the collusion of the international 
public. The FPC needed Ilham Aliev to support them and prevent the possi-
bility of a loss of power and money in circumstances of significant political 
changes in the country. It is evident that Ilham Aliev, who is well-known in 
many casinos around the world, faced such ultimatums more than once, and 
that he could not reject them. He agreed to become prime minister, with the 
clear understanding that this would inevitably lead to his appointment as 
President in the near future.  
 
4. The 2003 Presidential Elections  
 
Ilham Aliev: the New President 
 
The ‘presidential elections’ in 2003 could have had no other outcome than 
the announcement of Ilham Aliev as president. After the death of Heidar 
Aliev, there were great hopes for serious changes (if not reforms), aimed at 
the laws which regulated life in society. However, more reflective observers 
realised that these hopes would never come true. Firstly, there was (and still 
is) no real opposition to the FPC rule. In addition came another serious fac-
tor which had helped the FPC to push Ilham Aliev into the presidency: the 
position of the Western community. Azerbaijani society firmly believes that 
Heidar Aliev died in Turkey, and that his body was taken to the USA and 
was kept there for some months. Whether or not this is true, there is no doubt 
that the fatally ill President was incapable of acting, in Turkey or in the 
USA. He never made any statements on TV or radio, or gave telephone in-
terviews. This seems odd, as Heidar Aliev knew well the potential influence 
of television on the formation of the public opinion. Prior to his illness, he 
had used it skilfully, sometimes even excessively: not a single day passed 
without his lengthy speeches on TV.  
 
The Position of the West 
 
This state of affairs was a clear indication that the USA (and, eventually, the 
whole Western community) was in fact satisfied with FPC rule. It is impos-
sible to prove that the FPC received real political support from the West (by 
that time, the ruling elite did not need money), but the collusion, indifference 
and passive support to the FPC was clearly understood by the most powerful 
players. The FPC practically decided that it had been given carte blanche for 
total falsification of the elections and shameless violation of the laws. The 
presidential elections ended in bloodshed: hundreds of protestors wounded 
and at least one demonstrator officially recognised as having been killed by 
the police (although human rights organisations stated that the figure was far 
higher). Western interest in the ruling clan was confirmed by numerous 
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statements of various international bodies, declaring the elections ‘one more 
step on the path to democracy’. No less numerous were the congratulations 
to ‘newly elected’ President Ilham Aliev from the heads of the states and 
governments of Western countries.  
The situation during this presidential election, as during all the previous 
ones and the recent parliamentary elections as well, could have been com-
pletely different. The attitude of the world to events in Azerbaijan could 
have been different too, had it not been for Heidar Aliev’s main achievement 
– that of safeguarding power in hands of the FPC. 
 
5. The Opposition 
 
The Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) 
 
In recent decades, the first political opposition party in Azerbaijan was the 
Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA). Its establishment and development is 
directly connected with the beginning of the Karabakh conflict. At that time, 
in 1988, Azerbaijan was still within the Soviet Union. Having started as a 
democratic organisation, the PFA quickly took on a national, democratic, 
and often populist and pan-Turkic nature. PFA chairman was former dissi-
dent Abulfaz Alchibey, who publicly declared his unlimited respect and ad-
miration for Heidar Aliev. After only one year in power (June 1992–June 
1993), Abulfaz Elchibey and his supporters came to grief and demonstrated 
their complete feebleness in managing the state. They started to call for Hei-
dar Aliev (then in Nakhichevan) to take over power. After repeated requests, 
and after an aircraft had been dispatched to Nakhichevan, Heidar Aliev came 
to Baku. On the same day, President Abulfaz Aliev fled to his native village 
(also in Nakhichevan). The PFA gave birth to two more parties with a na-
tional-democratic orientation, Musavat and the Party of National Independ-
ence of Azerbaijan. 
As of today, the largest and most structured oppositional parties in Azerbai-
jan, with branches throughout the country, are Musavat (led by Isa Gambar); 
the Popular Front of Azerbaijan party (led by Ali Kerimli); and the Democ-
ratic Party of Azerbaijan (led by Rasul Guliev). The Party of National Inde-
pendence has lost its influence. 
 
The Contradictory Nature of the ‘Opposition’ 
 
Analysing the activities of the first two parties while Heidar Aliev and then 
his son were in power, we see that at all the key moments of development 
and potential change, the leaders of these parties adopted decisions which 
finally proved favourable for the ruling FPC. Many examples confirm this 
statement, but, since this article concerns a different subject, let us look at 
only one here – an instance that contributed to the weakening and split of the 
opposition. In 2000, prior to the parliamentary elections, the opposition 
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keenly discussed the possibility of conducting elections with the help of the 
United Nations. Of course, the UN could have done so only with govern-
ment approval, but the very fact of a unified opposition turning to the UN 
could have had a strong political influence on the pre-election situation, and 
indeed on the elections as well. Representatives of the opposition were dis-
patched to the USA, to deliver a letter signed by the leaders of all the major 
parties, as well as those of numerous ‘virtual’ [one-man] parties. When the 
envoys arrived at UN headquarters and proudly handed their letter to a high-
level official, he reached for another letter on his table: this bore the signa-
tures of the same people, signed one day later, and declared that the Azerbai-
jan opposition did not consider it necessary for the parliamentary elections to 
be conducted with the help of the UN.31 
This example is only one of the many which prove that the opposition in 
Azerbaijan does not correspond to its purpose, but has a very important and 
serious mission defined for it by Heidar Aliev. This includes channelling 
moods of protest; expressing economic, social and political demands in a 
marginal form, which in turn causes rejection by much of society; and, fi-
nally, dissipating the desire for the reforms during futile meetings which are 
suppressed with awesome brutality from time to time. 
For this reason, confidence in these parties is steadily decreasing, while, 
on the other hand, another part of society has placed its hopes in these par-
ties. The latter group uses the following reasoning: there is no other opposi-
tion, so the present opposition, although very bad, is still better than those in 
power today. 
All elections in recent years have been repeated with a frightening consis-
tency. It would seem that this is a vicious circle, with no end. Who can fight 
the regime, and how can they fight it, if the political opposition is secretly 
co-operates with and getting financial support from those against whom it is 
supposed to be struggling? However, we may note one interesting phenome-
non which could change the state of affairs radically – the case of Rasul 
Guliev. 
 
Rasul Guliev 
A Genuine Threat 
 
Rasul Guliev, an ex-Speaker of the parliament and previously close party 
associate, has become a very dangerous competitor to the Aliev clan within 
the FPC in the struggle for power. Considerable activity has focused on try-
ing to enable his return to Baku. From the period beginning with Heidar 
Aliev coming to power, to Rasul Guliev’s forced retirement from the post of 
parliamentary Speaker and ensuing emigration to the West in 1996, Rasul 
Guliev became the most powerful man, after Heidar Aliev, in the ruling 
FPC. This also refers to his financial opportunities and to his weight in the 
                                                     
31  This story is related in full in “Real Azerbaijan” (Realniy Azerbaijan) № 5, 13 May 2005 
(the article by Z. Alizade, ‘A Request to the UN’, can be found at: www.realazer.com).  
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ruling power elite. Like most members of the FPC, Rasul Guliev is a native 
of Nakhichevan.  
 
A Disgraced but Inseparable Agent 
 
On 23 April, 2005, the magazine Khesabat published a list of the 30 richest 
people in Azerbaijan. Here we mention only the first ten, with their posi-
tions: 
 
• Kamaladdin Heidarov, chairman of the State Customs Commit-
tee;  
• Jamal Aliev, Deputy (and the President’s uncle);  
• Ramil Usubov, Minister of the Interior;  
• Ali Insanov, Minister of Health (arrested on 18 October 2005; the 
first lady’s uncle was appointed to this post);  
• Paolo Parviz, Turkish businessman; 
• Beilyar Ajubov, head of presidential security;  
• Heidar Babaev, chairman of the State Commission on Securities 
(and current Minister of Economic Development, replacing 
Farhad Aliev, who has been arrested); 
• Ziya Mamedov, Minister of Transport;  
• Misir Mardanov, Minister of Education; 
• Elman Rustamov, chairman of the board of the National Bank.  
 
Of these ten, Paolo Parviz does not occupy a public post. Only Ramil 
Usubov, Ziya Mamedov and Paolo Parviz (who is Turkish) do not come 
from Nakhichevan or Armenia; and almost the same proportion are represen-
tatives of the natives of one particular area –a characteristic not only of the 
remaining twenty people, but of the whole system of power, from the top of 
the vertical chain of command, down to the bottom. Those few ministers 
from other regions try to copy the general method of recruitment of staff and 
trustees. For instance, in the area surrounding Ramil Usubovwho is a native 
of Karabakh, his landsmen prevail. The Minister of Defence appointed a 30-
year old colonel, his close relative, as a corps commandant, at a time when 
the Azerbaijani army consisted of only three corps. This is a strong system 
of false and obstinate paternalism, whereby power and money are received 
from higher officers due to their connections and/or parochial relationships 
(rather than based on knowledge and competence): the rules of solidarity and 
cohesion are supreme, rather than the law. This system is one reason why 
Rasul Guliev was seen as an inseparable ingredient, despite being a dis-
graced member of the FPC.  
 
The Return of Rasul Guliev 
A Change of Circumstance 
 
When Heidar Aliev was alive and healthy, numerous promises were made 
concerning Rasul Guliev’s return to Azerbaijan. These were not taken seri-
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ously by society or within the FPC itself. However, since the death of Heidar 
Aliev, the situation changed for the worse, and with a weak new President, 
Ilham Aliev, these statements began to be taken more seriously.  
Initially, statements about the return of Rasul Guliev were made, once 
more, prior to the presidential elections. However, these were not a all realis-
tic, not least because Guliev was not yet in the plans of the USA concerning 
Azerbaijan. Yet with the arrival of 2005, once again statements appeared 
concerning the forthcoming return of Rasul Guliev to his motherland. More-
over, unlike all previous parliamentary and presidential elections, this time 
his candidacy for parliament was officially approved by the Central Election 
Commission. The return of Rasul Guliev had become quite a realistic propo-
sition. Within society and the ruling elite, there was a clear understanding 
that this would mean an inevitable withdrawal (whether this be slow, or even 
delayed) of the current team from power. This is not anticipated for reason 
of his public support, but is rather because he was one of those who ruled the 
country together with the FPC. It must be remembered that the radical politi-
cal changes in Ukraine and Georgia were possible only when the heads of 
the opposition were also part of the commanding elite. The Kuchma regime 
in Ukraine, and the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia, had been causing hos-
tility, or possibly even hatred, within the people for a long period. However, 
the regime changed only after the split occurred within the ruling group. 
Heidar Aliev fully controlled his team and prevented any attempts for inde-
pendence by any member of the FPC. We cannot say the same about Ilham 
Aliev, who has appeared rather indifferent to his presidential duties.  
There appeared to be some disorder, and fight for influence, among the 
various high-level officials of the FPC (each of whom has unlimited finan-
cial opportunities). One outcome of such disorder was the retirement of 
Namik Abbasov, Minister of National Security Throughout his life, Namik 
Abbasov served in the security bodies of the Soviet Union. Prior to his being 
offered the post of Deputy Minister of National Security in Baku, by Abulfaz 
Elchibey, he had served as Deputy Head of the Murmansk Department of the 
KGB of the USSR. He became a minister during the period when Heidar 
Aliev came to power, and was one of the closest and most faithful workers 
of the president. He was later dismissed, and Eldar Mahmudov, Colonel of 
Militia, has since replaced him. However, during his term in office, the level 
of corruption within the ministry became comparable with that of the police 
– one of the most corrupt state power structures in the entire system. 
 
Preparing for Battle 
 
Nevertheless, Rasul Guliev’s possible return threatened the ruling clan so 
much that, on the day of his announced arrival, Baku was reminiscent of a 
city under siege. Thousands of policemen and soldiers of the internal troops 
were wearing battle attire and were accompanied by dogs. They blocked the 
airport and its connecting roads. Guliev was prevented from arriving in 
Baku, and within a day several ministers and other high-ranking officials 
were arrested. 
Why did the possibility of Rasul Guliev’s return become so realistic in 
these elections, when it had been so unrealistic in the parliamentary elections 
Who Rules Azerbaijan 107 
of 2000, and the presidential elections of 2003? In telephone conversations 
with functionaries in his party, Guliev kept making assurances that he would 
be registered, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan would re-
solve the documentation problems, and that he would come to Baku for cer-
tain. For this reason, it is assumed that, in respect of his arrival, strong pres-
sure was exerted on the authorities of Azerbaijan. This assumption is sup-
ported by the fact that it was during the pre-election period when an agree-
ment was reached over the construction two US radar stations: one on the 
border with Iran, and another on the border with Russia.32 Was this the cost 
for prohibiting the return of Guliev?  
 
Arrests 
 
All the arrested individuals were found guilty of attempting to start a revolu-
tion and of having secret relations with Rasul Guliev. Considering the disor-
der in the ruling team, such an explanation sounds rather logical: even when 
Heidar Aliev was alive, a part of the ruling elite tended to side with the for-
mer Speaker of Parliament (sometimes secretly and sometimes openly). For 
instance, after the old President suffered his first stroke in 2000, several 
deputies from the ruling party defiantly quit the party and became members 
of Rasul Guliev’s party. Thus, expectations relating to Guliev’s political re-
animation were always high, both in society and in the ruling FPC itself.  
However, it would be naive to relate the wide wave of arrests of high-
ranking officials to the expected return of Rasul Guliev alone. It may well 
have been simply good power-sharing practice. The fight that occurred be-
tween one of the most powerful individuals, Kamalddin Heidarov (chairman 
of the State Customs Committee) and Farhad Aliev (Minister of Economic 
Development, later arrested), appeared in the opposition press as much as a 
year to a year and half before the election campaign. Dismissals and arrests 
have continued, but are no longer passed off as ‘attempts at revolution’. On 
the other hand, it is also difficult to explain these arrests by the fact that the 
President wishes to renew the team and hold some reforms. It looks more 
like a re-allocation of the powerful authorities within the FPC. The results of 
elections, at any level, in ‘Aliev’ Azerbaijan may be considered as an ap-
pointment and an expression of confidence by the FPC, and vice versa. Con-
versely, when an individual is prohibited from taking up an elected post, this 
is considered to be a demonstration of discontent, at best.   
 
                                                     
32  Information on the construction of radar stations caused interest and was widely discussed 
in the press. The US Embassy in Baku confirmed this information, with reference to the 
Ambassador, while press secretary of the Ministry of Defence Ramiz Melikov refused to 
confirm or deny it. For example, there was an article in the Baku Russian-language news-
paper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, of 30 September 2005, titled ‘Leakage of particular impor-
tance’, written by Elshan Abulfatov. By 8 December, the Russian newspaper Krasnaya 
Zvezda cited Rino Harnish, US Ambassador in Azerbaijan, as saying that the future radar 
stations would be called to oversee the water space of the Caspian Sea. 
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6. The Recent Elections  
 
Current Parliamentary Composition 
 
The average observer may feel some hope when looking through the list. 
Besides the ruling party, 13 political parties and blocs are represented in the 
parliament, most of whom declare their opposition. Here we shall not discuss 
the suitability of these circumstances, but will just review some of their re-
sults. From the ruling party, 57 candidates gained seats in the parliament, 
and an additional 40 have positioned themselves as independent deputies. 
There is no doubt about these 40 individuals: all are promoted by the FPC 
and have received their mandates with FPC consent. There are also several 
deputies who, despite declaring their political independence, provide com-
prehensive and consistent support to any action taken by the FPC. Finally, 
there are about 10 deputies who, to varying degrees, may be considered as 
‘representatives of the opposition’, but who, as mentioned, secretly work in 
close co-operation with the FPC. 
 
Points of Interest 
 
It is interesting to note that 53 deputies from the ruling party got into the par-
liament twice, while four former deputies and members of the Higher Politi-
cal Council (of the ruling party) failed to renew their mandates. In the previ-
ous parliament, representatives of the ruling party prevailed. However, in 
practice, ‘independent’ deputies are rather predictable and manageable, so 
the number of deputies nominated by the ruling party can be reduced. Even 
more interestingly, Zelimkhan Yagub, Seid Aran, Sattar Safarov and Zakhid 
Garalov all failed to gain seats. Each of these individuals has close parochial 
relations and an affinity with the ruling elite, and there has been no reason to 
doubt their loyalty. Moreover, Zelimkhan Yagub and Seid Aran provided 
perfect examples for the ideological framework of the ‘Yeni Azerbaijan’ 
party: their faces were constantly visible, on television and in the press, and 
would have been considered very helpful in case of public discontent involv-
ing the FPC. However, whilst most deputies appear in the parliament again 
and again, this quad seems to have lost out in the elections. This case fits the 
hypothesis about the processes of disorder and the reallocation of power in 
the FPC perfectly. 
Also notable is the fact that one of the country’s most famous writers, 
Anar Rzaev, lost out in the ‘elections’. One of the components of Heidar 
Aliev’s policy was ‘feeding’ and providing various privileges to the high 
status intelligentsia, as well as more generally to anyone somehow popular 
in society, such as people from the arts and mass culture – who, in return, 
were expected to remain uncritical of those in power. Rzaev had won a par-
liamentary seat in the last two elections. However, this time he failed, be-
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cause, several years ago, he disagreed with the obstruction of Rasul Guliev 
and left the chamber when this issue was discussed. Although he remained 
silent for the next 10 years, and he occasionally advocated and actively pro-
tected the current regime, this did not help him. The leader of the clan, Hei-
dar Aliev, used to figure issues out in advance and predict the political con-
sequences of his actions. Today, without his leadership, the clan acts 
thoughtlessly and mercilessly.  
 
Overview of the Recent Election Situation 
 
Heidar Aliev accurately felt the need for a balance between the public trends 
and the predatory nature of the FPC. However, this has finally, and unaltera-
bly, been lost. After the FPC had realised that they had managed to prevent 
the return of Rasul Guliev, the worst-case scenario began to unfold. The 
practice of engineering the elections, as well as the forced suppression of 
those who held opposition views (not to be confused with the leaders of the 
pseudo-opposition national-democratic parties), was expanded to such a 
scale that even kind-hearted observers from many international organisations 
found it difficult to call the elections a ‘step towards democracy’. Here we 
should remind the reader of the cruel crackdown on the peaceful meeting of 
26 November. This meeting, which had been authorised by the authorities, 
had protested against the rigged elections. For the first time in recent history, 
women and children were cruelly beaten, and, allegedly, four people were 
killed.33There have been countless times when leaders of the national de-
mocratic opposition have directed protest as well as public hostility against 
the ruling regime, into pointless meetings. These always lead to cruel 
counter-action and thus invalidate society’s hopes of a better future. Several 
hundred people participated in the meeting on 24 December 2005, which 
was declared and authorised by the ruling power. The election results were 
approved by the Constitutional Court and foolishly accepted by the Western 
community. Furthermore, political appearances were made by people who 
appeared in various forms, but yet obviously characterised the nature of 
power. 
 
7. The Silent Speaker and the Criminal Authority 
 
The Silence of the Parliamentary Speaker: Oktai Asadov 
 
Until 1996, the Speaker of the Parliament was Rasul Guliev, who had also 
previously served as director of a huge oil refinery and then deputy prime 
minister of the country. On 16 October, 1996, Heidar Aliev chose to have 
Rasul Guliev replaced by Prof. Murtuz Aleskerov (head chair of state law at 
                                                     
33  This can be read in statements made by the Steering Advisory Council ‘For Free and Fair 
Election’ (uniting more than 40 NGOs), at www.msim.az; in the newspapers Azadlyg 
#259, of 27 November, 2005; Eni Musavat #302, of 27 November 2005; and Real Azer-
baijan #34, of 2 December 2005. 
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Azerbaijan State University). ‘Elected’ to be the Speaker of the new parlia-
mentary assembly, was Oktai Asadov, who had run the country’s water fa-
cilities (he headed the ‘Azersu’ association). Even though he has already 
served two terms in parliament, it is difficult to find much information about 
him. As the press has noted, in a rather mocking manner, for the past 10 
years this man has held the record for being most reticent individual. He has 
neither brought, nor offered, any initiatives. He did not say a single word at 
all, not even when there was a request to switch on air-conditioners because 
of the sweltering heat, or when there was a request to keep the doors closed 
because of the draft. 
The facelessness of the Speaker of the parliament indicates that he must 
be a transient, temporary figure. At present, this suits everybody, as the con-
figuration of the ruling power in the post-election period has not yet been 
completely determined. In general, the appointment of Oktai Asadov means 
that no new person with extensive authority has appeared at the top level of 
the FPC. In the best-case scenario, the prime ministership (currently held by 
Arthur Rasizade, whose existence is frequently forgotten even by political 
scientists and experts) is being readied for him. A more pessimistic forecast 
is that Asadov will simply hold the position until a significantly stronger fig-
ure can be found. 
 
The Criminal Element in the Parliament: Gusein Abdullaev 
 
It is difficult to tell who the most authoritative figure might now be. How-
ever, one of the most interesting and significant results of the latest parlia-
mentary elections was that Gusein Abdullaev (commonly known by the 
nickname ‘Guska’) succeeded in gaining a seat. This in itself indicates that 
the most authoritative figure must currently be found within criminal circles. 
 
The Presence of Armed Groups 
 
After Heidar Aliev came to power, the nickname ‘Guska’ became well 
known within general society. The rallies of 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2005 
were broken up by a number of young people, notable for their exceptional 
cruelty, sparing neither known politicians nor women. Various prominent 
political figures received severe beatings, including Etibar Mamedov, Panah 
Huseynov, Lala Gadjieva and Iliyas Ismailov. Both the police and other 
power structures denied their involvement. Gradually rumours started 
spreading which suggested that the perpetrators belonged to the illegal 
armed groups of some ministers and businessmen.  
 
Gusein Abdullaev’s Armed Group 
 
This author personally conversed with one man who served in Gusein Ab-
dullaev’s group. Furthermore, in 1997, a member of the social-democratic 
party of Azerbaijan informed this writer that, in his region (Nakhichevan), 
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jobless young men are offered the chance to move to Baku, where they get a 
good salary and a car. In return, they must keep an automatic weapon at 
home and, as required, act as protection for the authorities.34 It is widely ac-
knowledged that Gusein Abdullaev maintains an armed group at his own 
expense, numbering somewhere between 500 to 800 men. This has now been 
openly written about in the mass media, and it is highly probable that this 
was done with Abdullaev’s consent. It may be assumed that he is attempting 
to instil fear into people, and thereby strengthen his position. It is clear that 
one has to have the financial sources necessary in order to keep so many 
people, at relatively highly monthly salaries. Abdullaev also has a back-
ground in business. It is difficult to tell on what basis his business prospered, 
but at one of the meetings broadcast on TV, Heidar Aliev cited Gusein Ab-
dullaev as providing an example to his ministers. He may well be a highly 
successful businessman, but the existence of a big group armed with auto-
matic weapons, as well as persistent rumours that he even holds a specific 
rank within gangster circles, suggest rather different reasons for his success 
in business and his strength within the system of state authority. Thus, for 
example, it is known (from informal sources and from information provided 
in some newspapers), that the head of the socio-political department of the 
president’s administration, Ali Gasanov, worked as a weigher (weighing 
scrap metal in order for it to be exported from the country), and the present 
head of the state petroleum company (GNKAR), Rovnag Abdullaev (also the 
deputy of the newly elected parliament), was an assistant in one of Gusein 
Abdullaev’s firms. Presumably, some ministers are also directly linked to 
this man. 
 
Gusein Abdullaev: Sources of Power and Influence 
 
It seems highly likely that all Gusein Abdullaev’s power and influence is the 
result of the protection and support provided by Heidar Aliev. He needed 
such people and groups of tonton-makuts to suppress public discontent. 
Similar groups, with significantly smaller numbers, are kept by high-ranking 
members of the FPC. But Heidar Aliev understood well that, by admitting 
such people into the realm of public policy and allowing them to occupy 
state posts, he could potentially lose control of them, so they were permitted 
to act behind the scenes only. Gusein Abdullaev had never before dared to 
stand for parliament. 
 
                                                     
34  In a country where political journalists are killed, they write very little and with great 
caution. However, it is impossible to hide everything completely. Attempts are even made 
at whitewashing people like Gusein Abdullaev – for example, the newspaper Real Azer-
baijan ran an article about him which went over three issues, Nos. 35, 37 and 38 for 2005 
(these articles can be found at www.realazer.com). 
Who Rules Azerbaijan 112 
8. The Presidency of GNKAR 
 
Rovnag Abdullaev: An Unlikely Candidate 
 
From this point of view, the appointment of Rovnag Abdullaev, an engineer 
(actually a builder by trade), who had worked in the petroleum sector for 
only two years, as President of the GNKAR, seems interesting. Firstly, it is 
difficult to overestimate the importance of this post. The major share of the 
revenue of the country, as well as most ‘corruption money’, is provided by 
GNKAR. Oil, and everything else connected with extraction, processing, and 
infrastructure in the petroleum industry and petroleum mechanical engineer-
ing, is the backbone of the economy and the source of the real money in 
Azerbaijan. For example, almost 60% of the expenditure budget of Azerbai-
jan for 2006 is to be financed by the payment from foreign exchange receipts 
from oil sales.35 It was for this reason that Ilham Aliev was nominated to the 
post of Vice-President of GNKAR.  
 
Appointments under the Rule of Heidar Aliev 
 
During the entire period of Heidar Aliev’s government, the President of 
GNKAR was Natik Aliev, an oil-industry worker and experienced manager. 
Few could have predicted that such a key post would be occupied by a per-
son who, only two years previously, had been the director of an oil refining 
factory and no longer dealt directly with oil. Nevertheless, Natik Aliev was 
dismissed from this position, and appointed as the Minister of Industry and 
Energy – a formal post, without any influence or power opportunities. There 
were also some re-arrangements in the presidential office: let us just say that 
the position as head of one of the key departments of the president’s admini-
stration was occupied by an old buddy of the president.  
The parliamentary elections marked the starting point of the changes in 
the configuration of authority. There have been a lot of changes, and they 
will undoubtedly continue. However, the essential part of the authority will 
not be touched, because that still rests with the FPC. Heidar Aliev, a skilled 
politician and the founder of the pyramid of power, has left this world. Now 
another group of people, formally led by Ilham Aliev, are trying to keep the 
power. Time will show whether they succeed, but today the most powerful 
figures in the power structure are two individuals: Ramiz Mehtiev and Ka-
maladdin Heidarov. 
 
                                                     
35  Zerkolo, 12 January 05 
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9. Ramiz Mehtiev and Kamaladdin Heidarov 
 
The New Driving Force 
 
The general opinion after Heidar Aliev’s death was that the main driving 
force in the pyramid of power was the head of the presidential administration 
(widely known as a ‘power broker’), Ramiz Mehtiev. Also Kamaladdin Hei-
darov started growing stronger during the pre-election period. After Ilham 
Aliev was ‘elected’ president, there were many replacements of heads of 
administrations in various regions. It seems clear that a major part of the 
deputies in the parliament are the protégés of one or the other of these two 
individuals. R. Mehtiev will gain power in fulfilling the overall tasks of gov-
erning the republic, quite often substituting the president. K. Heidarov gains 
his power from the fact that he is not only one of the richest people in Azer-
baijan, but he also controls its main financial flows. It is notable that the 
Minister of Taxes, the chairman of the social protection fund, as well as 
various other high-ranking officials, had all previously served in various 
posts of the Customs Committee. Moreover, society openly discussed how 
much Kamaladdin Heidarov paid for getting his people into various posts, a 
figure which ran into millions of dollars.  
 
The FPC: Stagnation and Degeneration 
 
The parliamentary elections have shown that the FPC is set to continue the 
policy of Heidar Aliev. Yet, now that he is gone, this policy becomes gro-
tesque, with obvious attributes of stagnation and rapid degeneration. Ilham 
Aliev announced a policy of resolutely fighting against corruption, but he 
then appointed Ramiz Mehtiev, one of the founders of the corrupt national 
system, to chair the State Commission on Anti-Corruption. In his turn, Ka-
maladdin Heidarov is also becoming one of the most influential figures, even 
though bribes are already being accepted in his own department. These 
bribes are taken only in the presence of witnesses: this practice is used to 
avoid any doubts about the size of the bribes taken, and is transmitted up-
wards through the vertical system of the officials. What will be the outcome 
of this power degeneration in Azerbaijan? 
 
10. Impact of External Forces: Probable Outcomes 
 
A Determining Factor 
 
The impact of external forces on the country becomes a crucial factor in such 
conditions. Earlier in this article, we discussed the bargaining likely to have 
taken place between the ruling power and the USA, whereby the price of the 
positive reforms (which only R. Guliev could currently fulfil) were two radar 
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stations. However, there is another indicative example. Almost immediately 
after the appointment of Rovnag Abdullaev as GNKAR president, British 
Petroleum announced a sharp increase in oil output expected for 2006. In 
connection with the oil strategy and its impact on the authorities in Azerbai-
jan, we should note that the resignation and arrest of Farhad Aliev were ac-
companied by the arrest of his brother (President of Azpetrol, the largest oil-
trading company in Azerbaijan), as well as the resignation of the President of 
the company Azertrans (included in the Azpetrol holding), which transported 
oil by tankers from Central Asia to terminals in Baku, and then by rail to 
Batumi and further to global markets. In light of these facts, the story sur-
rounding Farhad Aliev and the rearrangements made to the fuel and energy 
arrangements acquire somewhat different meanings.  
 
Forces of Influence in Azerbaijan 
 
We may distinguish among three differently directed forces of influence in 
Azerbaijan: 
 
• First, the USA and, in many respects, the other Western countries. 
The USA and the European countries are anxious about interna-
tional terrorism, as well as about controlling petroleum flows. 
This lead them to give their support to FPC as the party in power. 
This then robs the people and disorganises the country, instead of 
supporting and helping democratic trends in its development.  
• Secondly, Russia, due to the misguided views it holds about its 
greatness and power. Russia wants to keep its influence in Azer-
baijan, and it too finds that the best way to reach this goal is to 
help the ruling FPC.  
• Thirdly, Iran, where the theocrats in power dream of expanding 
their religious beliefs throughout the world. However, Azerbaijan 
is a deeply secular country. It would appear impossible for an Is-
lamic renaissance to occur here, although in recent decades the 
number of believers has increased significantly. 
 
Azerbaijan and Islam 
‘Spiritual Department of the Caucasian Muslims’ 
 
In this connection, we should recall that the policy which the ruling power 
conducts towards religion is similar to the policy it conducts towards the op-
position. During the Soviet era, there emerged a rather strange organisation 
named ‘Spiritual Department of the Caucasian Muslims’ – strange for two 
reasons: 
 
• Firstly, such an organisation cannot exist if one proceeds from 
the norms, canons, instructions and rules of Islam. The communi-
ties of believers were independent and initially the organisation 
had no vertical line of power: consequently, it contradicted Islam.  
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• Secondly, one might think that this organisation existed as one of 
the forms of control over believers carried out by retaliatory bod-
ies of the Soviet Union. However, 15 years have passed since 
Azerbaijan gained its independence, yet this organisation contin-
ues to exist and prosper, together with its permanent leader from 
the Soviet period, Allhshukyur Pashadze, often jokingly (?) re-
ferred to as a KGB colonel. It is difficult to make a judgement 
about this, but he certainly he enjoys the full support of the cir-
cles of power and was even forgiven by them. He has declared 
himself the lifelong leader of his department. 
 
The Youth of Azerbaijan and Islam  
 
There is also is another part of Islam, connected to the fact that there are a 
growing number of young people desperate to find fulfilment in their lives. 
This desperation is caused by many reasons, of varying triviality: university 
fees, general bribery in the education system, the strict social class system. 
These young people turn to religion for support and internal peace of mind. 
Both Iran and various Arab countries are actively working in this direction, 
and are especially active in the southern regions of Azerbaijan. The discon-
tented and anxious lives of young people push them towards actions of pro-
test and it is here, once again, that they are helped by religious organisations 
and mosques of the vahhabit type.  
 
Current Position 
 
For the time being, these organisations are not particularly strong, and thus 
the state generally prefers not to take notice of them. The ruling clan sees 
Allhshukyur Pashadze (who is entrenched in the system of corruption, and 
maintains various relationships within governmental circles) as the most 
convenient tool for governing that most complex of social phenomenon, the 
religious sentiments of people. The power structures are also used to sup-
porting him: in 2004, police forces surrounded the Djuma mosque, whose 
imam of which was Ilgar. Believers were not allowed to enter. The logic of 
the authorities was clear. This mosque had previously attracted many intelli-
gent and cultural people with scientific degrees. Ilgar is himself a graduate in 
philosophy and a highly educated theologian. Understandably, he is not liked 
by the authorities After the presidential elections in 2003, he was also ar-
rested, to be released only several months later. People unified by one idea 
(whether political doctrine or religious belief) are undesirable, and even dan-
gerous, for the authorities. However, the processes caused by the power elite 
itself cannot be easily stopped either.  
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11. Conclusion 
 
Azerbaijan is ruled by the same parochial family clan that was brought to 
power by Heidar Aliev. Continuation of the clan’s power will result in the 
degeneration of society as a whole. If this occurs, then any options are possi-
ble – not excluding the serious influence and dangerous strengthening of 
fundamentalist Islam. It is natural that the structures of civil society (which 
are gradually developing in the country) try to resist the negative tendencies 
leading to the degradation of the people and the state. Yet it is difficult to 
speak of any real success when we realise that democratically minded per-
sons and the political and non-governmental organisations alike have to re-
sist not only internal opponents, but also the surrounding world. It would be 
far more difficult for the ruling clan to maintain power if this, for whatever 
reason, was seen as unsuitable for the West and Russia, and Iran, and even 
Armenia.  
 
 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: 
SYMBIOSIS OF POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS  
Torgrul Juvarly & Ali Abasov  
1. Introduction 
 
Forecasting the Future 
 
‘A politician thinks about the next elections, a statesman – about future gen-
erations’. 
 
Today it is generally recognised that Azerbaijan must undergo comprehen-
sive reforms, or else future generations will face far more serious problems. 
Sadly, the most recent set of elections, and the consequent situation, have 
shown that Azerbaijan has plenty of politicians, but few statesmen. Suffice it 
to refer to statements made by leading politicians regarding the outlook for 
Azerbaijan: it is difficult to see even medium-term forecasts. Over the next 8 
to 10 years, Azerbaijan will rapidly be getting richer – to be followed by an 
equally rapid fall in oil revenues. If, by the end of this period, the country 
does not manage to carry out a programme of reforms, and it does not reach 
a level of efficient export production, then it might well enter a period of 
chronic economic crisis. Azerbaijan has quite a limited period of time – 
roughly the next 10 years – in which to find a way to mobilise all its re-
sources, so as to minimise future challenges and threats. Initially, this in-
volves breaking out of the rather large list of countries that are classified as 
‘lagging behind’.  
 
The November Elections: an Economic Perspective 
Capital 
 
Strange as it may seem, the role of capital (particularly national capital) in 
the political processes in Azerbaijan has yet to be sufficiently studied. Eve-
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ryone knows (or suspects) that it is capital that gives the political structure its 
systemic nature, and that capital is also the reason why this structure prefers 
to act predominantly behind the scenes. Such processes are frequently re-
peated in many CIS countries, but the peculiarities lie in the differences – in 
the pace of the institutional reforms, in the barriers to business, and in the 
gradual reduction of the level of corruption 
  
Failure to Create a Competitive Environment 
 
This article does not analyse the purely political implications of the Novem-
ber parliamentary elections: our focus is on aspects directly related to eco-
nomics. Let us first take note of only one central political and economic out-
come of the most recent elections: once again, the aim of creating of a com-
petitive political environment has failed, thereby jeopardising the opportuni-
ties for creating a setting conducive to economic competition in the post-
election period.  
 
Symbiosis of Politics and Economy 
 
We argue that there is a symbiosis of politics and economy in Azerbaijan. 
Here it is essential to understand the interaction between the expanding pri-
vate sector and the state-controlled part of the economy. The state-controlled 
section is still considerable: the state has visible levers of administrative in-
fluence, which it uses actively in order to solidify its monopoly positions. As 
long as this type of relation prevails, normal progress towards a market 
economy will meet artificial barriers. Indeed, the country’s market economy 
is starting to resemble a mere imitation, just like its democracy.  
 
Discussions and Assessments 
 
In the following we discuss the economic basis of the latest elections, as well 
as the current economic situation. We consider the strategies of economic 
development in Azerbaijan as compared with some CIS countries, and ana-
lyse some of the governmental institutions that regulate the Azerbaijani 
economy. It will be important to assess the degree of their transparency of 
these institutions, their independence and their relations to political groups. 
What we seek to do is to investigate the degree to which government institu-
tions are able to rationally regulate the economy. Finally, we present possi-
ble formats for changes to the existing system, in the context of future sce-
narios for Azerbaijan. 
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2. The Starting Point for Azerbaijan 
 
Oil and Developing Countries 
A Fight for Control 
 
In those developing countries that are blessed with rich natural resources 
(hydrocarbons in particular), the struggle for power, which culminates dur-
ing the election period, is essentially a fight for control over these resources. 
This struggle begins with the presidential elections, then the parliamentary 
elections – but does not extend to the municipal elections, which is quite in-
teresting in itself. For these developing countries, their status as ‘oil-
extraction’ countries is a basic obstacle on their path to democratic develop-
ment. They are dependent on the benevolence of the West (especially the 
USA), because Western countries have taken it upon themselves to serve as 
the ‘beacon’ of democracy – whose rays, unfortunately, fail to reach all the 
countries around the globe. 
 
Post-Soviet Examples 
 
Of the post-Soviet countries, the ‘oil-extraction’ countries of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia have, through their own experiences, 
proven the applicability of this trend, previously attributed only to ‘third 
world’ countries. In all post-Soviet countries with hydrocarbons we see the 
same picture: economic reforms are slowing down. These reforms are inhib-
ited by the huge sums of oil-generated money, which create a false sense of 
security within the government. Objectively, the slower pace of economic 
reforms means that the oligarchic or bureaucratic capital is being strength-
ened. An extreme case can be seen in Turkmenistan, where all political 
processes have been completely frozen. Azerbaijan is a special case: the de-
velopment of the oligarchic and bureaucratic capital deformed the economy 
and perverted society as it grew, all the while paving the way for its own 
self-destruction.  
The political elite within these oil-extraction countries is preoccupied not 
with their need not to achieve political power as such – but to achieve abso-
lute power. Their power is then sufficient enough to establish the institutions 
of totalitarianism (or, given the predominant democratic rhetoric in the mod-
ern world, to establish the institutions of authoritarianism). Quite naturally, 
such a mentality gives the ruling elite an opportunity to become associated 
with the very state itself, so any criticism against the authorities is automati-
cally interpreted as an anti-state activity. Given such distorted logic, all insti-
tutions – particularly law-enforcement agencies like the police, security 
forces and the army – are constructed from the perspective of protecting the 
authorities, rather than protecting the state; and from the point of view of 
protecting and strengthening the regime, rather than protecting and strength-
ening national security. National security and, in part, internal stability, are 
supported at the expense of the same natural resources, with one or more 
influential outside actors being invited to manage these resources.  
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Oil and/or Democracy 
 
The main topic of discussion amongst Azerbaijani intellectuals is ‘oil and/or 
democracy’. This issue remains less than an attraction for both the ruling 
elite and the influential foreign oil companies (who came to Azerbaijan for 
completely different reasons than democracy). The low attractiveness of de-
mocracy means that it is often seen as an annoyance, if not a palpable head-
ache. After all, on what level, aside from the rhetorical, can one debate and 
conceptualise democracy as long as the authorities are preoccupied with 
constantly converting the country’s political resources into economic ones, 
and vice versa, to enable them to be both political and economic elite? Is 
such a profitable combination of responsibilities really possible in a democ-
racy? How to funnel the political resources and economic flows into the 
sphere of power, while maintaining a dogmatic commitment to the letter of 
the law of democracy? What to do about the democracy ‘showcase’ – the 
presidential and parliamentary elections – knowing that the falsification of 
the election results, having turned into a complicated technology, requires 
huge financial resources, even if this might be acceptable in a country with 
the existing capital concentration and corruption levels?  
On the other hand, ‘democracy’ does not mean that oil companies should 
permit the establishment of trade unions and their enterprises, or that these 
companies should acknowledge the right of local employees to strike, or to 
get salaries equal to those of foreign specialists. It is far easier, and cheaper, 
to strike a deal with the authorities. Of course, neither of the parties is inter-
ested in making the conditions of this negotiated deal known to the world 
democratic community, which might be shocked by the arrogance of such 
neo-imperialism. Those democratic countries in the West that turn a blind 
eye to the ‘petty misdemeanours’ of their oil companies (in the developing 
countries) have, on several occasions, become hostages to their ever-growing 
appetites for ‘bread baked from the yeast of technology’ – the desire to con-
vert economic and political resources. Taking these scenarios out of the 
equation in the future, an opening for globalisation accompanied by deple-
tion of natural resources would be possible only in the case of extreme po-
litical short-sightedness.  
 
Capital and Politics: A Uniquely Azerbaijani Situation 
 
As mentioned, and no matter how paradoxical it may seem, the role of capi-
tal in the political processes in Azerbaijan has not been well studied yet. 
Everyone knows or suspects that it plays a major role, yet it is obvious that 
this capital is principally acting backstage, behind the scenes. Many proc-
esses are literally replicated from one CIS country to another, but with essen-
tial differences: in the pace of institutional reforms, in the barriers to busi-
ness and in the gradual reduction of the level of corruption.  
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The Need for a Future Direction 
 
An obsession with the differences in the levels of development of various 
countries is playing a significant role in the background of the Azerbaijani 
situation (the situation whereby, in the next 8–10 years, Azerbaijan will rap-
idly grow richer). Oil revenues will then start to fall just as quickly, and, if 
the country has not sufficiently established an efficient export capacity by 
that point, one may not exclude the possibility of future, chronic economic 
crises. The country has little time: in the course of this decade it must man-
age to mobilise all its resources, if it is to mitigate future challenges and 
threats.  
Statesmen think about the future generation, whereas politicians think 
about the next elections. Almost everyone understands that the country 
should be starting to begin its reforms today, so as not to overburden genera-
tions to come. However, the past elections, and the situation surrounding 
them, have shown that Azerbaijan has enough politicians – but few states-
men.  
 
3. The Economy and the Parliamentary Elections: Connec-
tions  
 
As explained above, this article does not analyse the purely political implica-
tions of the November parliamentary elections: it focuses only on the aspects 
directly related to economy. Let us simply take note of one central political 
and economic outcome of the last elections: yet again, the aim of creating a 
competitive political environment has failed, thereby jeopardising the oppor-
tunity for expanding the environment, in order for economic competition to 
take place in the post-election period.  
 
Capital and the Current Elections 
A New Level of Impact 
 
On the surface, there were great similarities between the previous and cur-
rent Azerbaijani elections: election fraud, an uneven playing field for the 
candidates during the election campaign, strict control over electronic mass 
media and frequent prohibitions on freedom of assembly and association. All 
the same, the most recent Azerbaijani parliamentary election proved unique 
in one sense: for the first time, capital became the most influential element 
of the electoral fight, and in a highly visible way. Elections are always syn-
onymous with spending, but this time the pressure of the money was so great 
that some economists started to argue that the dumping of hundreds of thou-
sands of ‘shadow’ dollars onto the market, in pursuit of votes, could lead to a 
drastic rise in prices (as quoted in the newspaper Echo, 3 November 2005). 
On the other hand, doubts have also been voiced about the ability of such 
short-term investments to provoke a collapse of the economy. This is an es-
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pecially relevant point given that the level of inflation was not even influ-
enced by the arrest of one of the top officials in the Azerbaijani economy.  
 
A New Barrier to the Election Race 
 
The paradox of the last elections, which were organised exclusively under 
the majority system, boiled down to the fact that, for the first time, barriers 
placed in the path of someone wishing to enter the electoral race proved easy 
to overcome. Also people with quite modest capital managed to enter the 
race. Having sincerely believed in the relative fairness of the elections, such 
people tried to compensate for their lack of sufficient funds (for campaign 
advertising) through direct contact with the voters. However, the results 
showed that these were romanticised delusions on the part of such candi-
dates: they found themselves in competition with a well-established state 
machinery, as well as with the directors of meat-processing plants, bankers, 
customs officials and other rich people, who had also decided to make a try 
in the electoral fight.  
 
Parliamentary Composition 
A Preliminary Evaluation 
 
By preliminary evaluation (preliminary because of the additional elections of 
May 2006, where 10 more MPs are to be elected) the composition of the new 
parliament was formed by three categories of contenders: 
The first group used the unlimited resources of the authorities (right 
down to making direct falsifications) due to their political proximity to the 
authorities, or to the clan.  
The second group bet on capital (their own or provided), literally buying 
their parliamentary seats. There had already been a prior attempt to imple-
ment this kind of business project: in the 1995 elections, entrepreneurs (vari-
ous rich people who, in most cases, had made their fortunes in Russia) had 
tried to make it into the parliament. However, they had failed, because Presi-
dent Heidar Aliev realised that such a parliament might not be that easy to 
control. Furthermore, rumours linked this scenario to Russia, and indicated 
that Russia wanted to have its own ‘influence agents’ in the parliament. Such 
a complicated situation was very dangerous for the authorities, which were 
still unstable, so the President did everything possible to block the emer-
gence of MPs with capital in the future parliament, be it ‘Azerbaijani Dias-
pora’, or homemade ‘new Azerbaijanis’.  
The third, rather numerous, category in this election fight leaned on both 
of the previous resources. For example, oligarchs of the ruling elite put a 
certain number of their appointees into parliament, having supported candi-
dates from the ruling party in return.  
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Other Notable Candidates 
 
At the same time, a certain number of MPs made it to parliament without 
having the support of the authorities. This was because it was simply con-
venient for the authorities: selection was based on the loyalty of these indi-
viduals, and, in special cases, by the need to demonstrate a ‘democratic’ en-
tourage. Elements of this kind of entourage are also seen in the ‘profes-
sional’ composition of the new parliament: formally, it has 23 lawyers and 
17 economists –not a small figure for a parliament consisting of only 125 
MPs. However, it seems that brilliant lawyers and smart economists were 
left out.  
 
‘Economic’ Election Developments  
 
Yet another ‘economic’ novelty of the recent elections was the change in the 
behaviour of major capital. The death of Heidar Aliev made it possible for 
many representatives of the ruling clan to breathe freely, giving them a 
chance to play an independent game. Indeed, some of them have, for quite 
some time and with a measure of success, used these new opportunities to 
improve their political and economic resources. The drastic exacerbation of 
the pre-election situation has shown just how seriously this new threat (de-
riving from their own ‘tributaries’) was taken by the authorities. The game 
might have become even crueller, but President Ilham Aliev managed to in-
tervene in a timely manner. The arrests of the Minister of Economic Devel-
opment and the Minister of Health, as well as of the former Minister of Fi-
nance, on charges of conspiring to overthrow the current authorities, deliv-
ered sizeable dividends to the president. The majority of these people (and 
those arrested later) fell victim to the political turbulence in the country, 
caused by the pre-election situation.  
 
4. Arrests of Influential Actors: Background  
 
Initial Reactions 
A ‘Conspiracy’ Theory 
 
Initially, the arrests had the effect of an exploding bomb. They had a signifi-
cant impact on the pre-election situation, and they even caused a degree of 
confusion. An unexpected approach was found within the mood of the vot-
ers, and a certain strategic plan began to develop with regard to radical 
changes in the political situation in Azerbaijan). Perhaps this plan was 
drafted with the help of Russia: the influence of this country on the authori-
ties of Azerbaijan grew after the events in October, whereas the influence of 
the USA declined.  
The authorities skilfully bundled all their potential and real opponents 
into one conspiracy scenario, having declared the day of the arrival of the 
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former Speaker of the parliament, Rasul Guliev, as the beginning of a coup 
d'état, financed and prepared by the arrested ministers. But: could the Minis-
ter of Economic Development, Farhad Aliev, really have been a member of a 
conspiracy? Was there any reason for him to undertake this dangerous role? 
Just like the arrested executive manager of the presidential administration 
(Akif Muradverdiev), the Minister of Health (Ali Insanov) did not conceal 
his opposition to the president, and he – at least theoretically – could be con-
sidered to be a member of a conspiracy on the basis of one of the clan’s 
principles.  
In fact, by that time, rumours had been flying around for over a year 
which suggested that the President had decided to reject the services of the 
second ‘clan pillar’ of the authorities (people Armenia), and these rumours 
were confirmed by several steps which were then taken. By contrast, Farhad 
Aliev seemed to behave within the framework of the general line of the 
Azerbaijani bureaucrat-oligarchs: almost all of them, explicitly or implicitly, 
tried to get their appointees into the parliament. This was no secret, and, un-
til recently, the authorities did not see any crime in it (apart from one occa-
sion when the President did advise the officials to steer clear of politics). The 
euphoric unity of the authorities during the period of presidential elections 
had passed; Ilham Aliev probably realised that new centres of power were 
emerging in the country, and that it would be possible to manage these new 
centres using his father’s old methods. It is the specificity of the symbiosis 
of politics and economy of Azerbaijan that led to a simple conclusion: when 
you have a lot of free money, you do not have to ‘put all your eggs into one 
basket’. Furthermore, this conclusion involved the realisation that any capital 
is unprotected until it has created a system with the political guarantees nec-
essary to protect itself. The mistake of the former minister was that, through 
his political games, he raised his profile too much (but, alas, not enough for 
the West), and suddenly became seen as a reformer, who, though not good 
for a rotation, was at least good enough to the frighten president. This was 
considered to be transgressing the permissible limits of ambition, and thus 
required public persecution and punishment (which he did indeed receive). 
This managed to cut, in one blow, all the Gordian knots that existed in the 
standoff between the authorities and the opposition, and with its own intra-
clan ‘dissidents’.  
 
‘Political Corruption’ 
Interestingly, the authorities have not yet selected the final explanation for 
their own ‘autumn cleansing’. Once again, propaganda has been portraying 
these events as if a major anti-state conspiracy had been uncovered and that 
the country was embarking on a large-scale fight against corruption. The 
former theory requires solid proof, whereas the latter is the continuation of 
the campaign (which naturally gains momentum among out-of-favour mem-
bers of the royal court). Perhaps this is why the situation remains unclear and 
the further development of these events seems in jeopardy. Government 
propaganda specialists have even created the term ‘political corruption’, al-
though nobody can really explain just what it is supposed to mean. 
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Political In-Fighting 
 
The recent heavy fighting between the heads of the MED and the State Cus-
toms Committee had to end up with one of them losing. Farhad Aliev lost, 
having publicly stated, not long before the arrest, that threats had been made 
against his life. He even approached the Ministry of the Interior on these 
grounds. The sacking of the minister had been discussed for quite a long 
time, but his arrest came as a surprise to everyone.  
 
Arrests and other Relevant Events  
 
Regardless of whatever may or may not have occurred, the murder of the 
prominent Azerbaijani journalist Elmar Guseynov, as well as the discovery 
of a gang belonging to police officer Gadzhi Mamedov (involved in high-
profile murders and racketeering), and the consequent arrests of several 
highly-placed officials of the Ministry of Interior, stand out as events which 
indicated yet another major political crisis. The effects were eased by the 
consequent election collisions, but the political and economic echoes will 
linger for quite a while. 
 
The Arrest of Farhad Aliev  
 
The arrest of Farhad Aliev, who held many of the keys to the Azerbaijani 
economy, could not help but have significant consequences. This is so, even 
though Heidar Babayev was appointed to his position on the same day, and 
Babayev, as the head of the Central Bank, is well-versed in economic issues.  
 
Farhad Aliev and Azpetrol 
 
The private Azpetrol holding, formerly headed by the brother of the Ministry 
of the Economy (he was also arrested), is a basic element of the Azerbaijani 
economic system. It was officially founded in 1999 on the basis of several 
existing companies, and almost certainly enjoyed the support of Farhad 
Aliev, even though Rafik Aliev was a capable and energetic businessman. It 
has huge assets at its disposal – according to some assessments, amounting 
to as much as USD 250 million, plus the new assets of the holding in 
Moldova. The total assets of the Farhad Aliev clan, from the under-
represented ruling power in the southern region (the Jalilabad), exceed the 
stated figure several times over (perhaps more than 1 billion USD). Obvi-
ously, to destroy such an industrial and financial empire would be extremely 
irrational. It is no less obvious that such major assets would become the sub-
ject of severe re-distribution. It is not by accident that, in the Russian press, 
Azpetrol has been called the Azerbaijani YUKOS (although comparing M. 
Hodorkovsky and F. Aliyev would not be proper, as they are personalities of 
different scales). But the legal dilemma is not that simple either. So far, it is 
not clear how one could take these assets away, since the company has been 
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working transparently, with annual audits and its practice of providing credi-
tors with the lists of shareholders of the company. In recent years, moreover, 
it has been an active partner of EBRD, and the top manager of this holding 
was the former EBRD representative in the country, Thomas Moser. It ap-
pears that, for this reason, the company is still alive, and has been trying to 
support its activities by making counter-statements to the information given 
by the authorities. Farhad Aliev himself refuses to answer the questions of 
the investigators, and has not pleaded guilty. Theoretically, nationalisation of 
the company is possible, as would be transferring its management over to the 
state, but this could cause negative reactions on the part of foreign investors. 
However, the first step has already been taken: the shares of the company 
have been transferred to Ibragim Mamedov, who used to own only 5% in 
one of the companies of this holding. This was because the Arbitration Court 
viewed the complicated structure of re-documenting property as a violation 
of the rights of one of the owners, and as elements of an irregular deal.  
 
Farhad Aliev and Other Companies 
 
Other events have followed. For example, the country may lose Barmek, a 
company that, four years ago, won a tender for the management of the elec-
tricity distribution networks of the capital, as well as Sumgait and the dis-
tricts of Azerbaijan to the north of Baku. The company, headed by Gusein 
Abdulov (a Turk), not only improved the supply of electricity, it also began 
actively introducing a European management system, to make it transparent 
within society and in its contractual relations with the government. On the 
other hand, the work of a distribution company indirectly exposed weak-
nesses in electricity generation, which has remained in the hands of the gov-
ernment. This could not help but cause frustration in the ministerial offices: 
some of their representatives even demanded that this company leave the 
country. And here we should note that Farhad Aliev was the patron of this 
company.  
Currently a struggle is taking place against all the companies or enter-
prises that are related, to any degree, to the former minister. Active inspec-
tions of Azeralumini are underway. Compared to the troubles of AzPetrol, 
the legal situation here is simpler: the metallurgical complex has formally 
been given up in favour of management, and the state has the ability to can-
cel the relevant contract. Judging by the sudden visit of the UK-based bil-
lionaire industrialist Lakshmi Narayan Mittal to Azerbaijan, who has just 
bought the Ukrainian industrial giant ‘Krivorozhstal’ for 4.2 billion USD, he 
probably intends to work in the Azerbaijani non-ferrous metals industry. The 
deal with such a major businessman would, of course, partially reduce the 
negative effects of the persecution of the disfavoured team.  
  
The Re-Distribution of Property 
 
However, a negative point about redistribution of property is that it can be 
hard to know where to stop. Work is now underway with some quite suc-
cessful privatised enterprises: Baku electric stamping plant (Bakelectro-
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stamp) and Baku steel-smelting plant (Bakipoladtekme). Their owner, Zul-
fugarly, and his brothers, have been arrested. At the same time, an investiga-
tion is underway concerning the cable and isolate plant in Mingechaur, the 
NCT plant, which produces plastic pipes. Once again, this involves success-
ful enterprises that have started to export their products.  
One could argue that the series of PR campaigns pursued by the former 
minister will cease. These campaigns have involved the distribution of 
money under the auspices of NFPP, city fairs under the motto ‘Buy home-
made goods’, and finally, the lack of a fight against monopolies. From the 
point of view of a monopoly, Farhad Aliyev was no angel, but he did imitate 
anti-monopoly activities and thus drew interest towards this topic.  
 
A Final Note 
 
It is unlikely that the changes now underway in the structure of the authori-
ties will pass painlessly. Even the destruction of a bad system may cause 
problems. Nevertheless, we can trace a natural conformity behind all these 
events. The vertical line of power in Azerbaijan is growing stronger, and 
everything that might possibly hinder this – also within the ruling clan – will 
be ruthlessly suppressed. In this consolidation there is no room for ‘potential 
outsiders’. 
 
5. The new Parliament: Current State of Affairs  
 
Initial Optimism 
 
Optimists pinned great hopes on the recent parliamentary elections. They 
counted on the renewed parliament not only to be able have a greater impact 
on the activities of the government (such as control of the government, and 
the budget), but also to bring better order to legislative activities in the 
sphere of the economy. For example, it was hoped that the new parliament 
would establish clearer control over those legislative acts that ensure imple-
mentation of relevant laws, as it is in this area that legislation has a very dif-
ficult time. And yet, just a year before the elections, these expectations 
proved illusory. The previous parliament calmly passed the law on banks, 
without daring to discuss – even theoretically – the subordination of the na-
tional bank to the parliament. Similarly, important laws were discarded, 
among them ‘On investment activities’, ‘On oil and gas’, an Anti-monopoly 
code, and ‘On education’. All talk about the possible development of the law 
‘On the oil fund’ ceased. Even the Western financial structures that had been 
insistent on the latter question stopped raising this issue, limiting themselves 
to the EITI (‘extracting industry transparency initiative’), which had been 
proposed a few years ago by British prime minister Tony Blair. It became 
obvious that the ruling elite did not intend, under any circumstances, to part 
with its control over the financial flows in the country. The optimists have 
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been disgraced, and it is unlikely that the new parliament will be any better 
than the previous one. Furthermore, a ‘semi-oligarch’ has been put in the 
seat of the Speaker, having bought the victory in his constituency.  
 
Comparative Perspective 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
The results of Azerbaijan’s elections are also interesting from a comparative 
point of view. The same optimists could have noticed that, despite its au-
thoritarian regime, Kazakhstan has managed to make significant economic 
progress. Especially important is the fact that this progress was achieved not 
only thanks to the high GDP indicators and industrial capacity growth rates 
(which is quite natural, given the oil prices), but also thanks to the constant 
interest of the President towards institutional reforms in the economy, or at 
least to the point where they do not threaten the authoritarian regime itself. 
Since it is unknown where this limit is, the regime is nevertheless rocked by 
the new realities.36 Moreover, the scale of the changes and the intelligence of 
the Kazakh President seem to have worked. Willingly or unwillingly, he has 
created an excellent economic basis for the future democracy. Kazakhstan 
has implemented a great number of reformist steps that Azerbaijan has not 
yet made, or is just beginning to make. This country created the best banking 
system in the CIS. The implementation of an accumulative pension insur-
ance scheme started back in 1997, and the practice of mortgaging housing is 
working. Kazakhstan has long entered into international financial markets, 
and is successfully developing its own financial market as well.  
 
General Note on Comparisons 
 
It is traditional that, when considering someone else’s experience, the au-
thorities, and a significant portion of our society, tend to concentrate on the 
negative points, ignoring the positive elements. In the new Georgian democ-
racy, one notes the reduced living standards of the population, but ignores 
the fact that, in 2005, the Georgian budget was comparable to that of Azer-
baijan, and that this was achieved not only with the help of external aid, but 
also through the implementation of a strict budget policy and by the suppres-
sion of corruption. It seems that we do not wish to notice the vital factors. 
Just as in Ukraine, the Georgian supreme power has definitely become 
‘changeable’, and for the indefinite future, nobody will be able to usurp it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36  See D. Furman, ‘Post-Soviet regime in Kazakhstan’, compendium Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia, 2004, Moscow 
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Russia 
 
With this in mind, we should note that this article is only attempting to bor-
row the worst political experiences of Russian ‘guided democracy’ (i.e. the 
vertical management of the country, the elimination of the opposition, and 
the control over electronic mass media). No attention is paid to the important 
changes taking place in Russian education, science and healthcare. The tar-
get setting in the Russian economy does limit itself to poverty reduction. It 
also implies that a comprehensive Russian development strategy has been 
created up until 2025 (which additionally implies that we are searching for 
Russia’s place both in the world and in the explosive technological ad-
vances). The appearance of such an economic doctrines shows the viability 
of the Russian elite (of both the pro-authorities and the anti-authorities), and 
also indicates the unspoken but constructive dialogue between these elite.37 
Nothing of this kind exists, or is anticipated, in Azerbaijan – and this is the 
fault of the authorities. 
Of course, in Russia, this is accompanied by a crude redistribution of 
property, in favour of the bureaucracy. But this country has definitely gone 
down the road from oligarchic to bureaucratic capitalism. In Azerbaijan, 
there has been no ‘oligarchic’ capital by definition: as we have seen, eco-
nomic power is inseparable from political power, and this results in the pres-
ence of oligarchic-bureaucratic capitalism. Azerbaijan has never had ‘Rus-
sian-style’ relations between the business and the authorities. Capital was 
formed by the bureaucracy, who were fully subordinate to the top person in 
the country; for that reason, one could never imagine, even hypothetically, a 
dialogue between the authorities and business. Interestingly, in the 1999 
World Bank evaluation, under the ‘power capture’ index, Azerbaijan ranked 
number 1, whereas Armenia ranked last.38 The situation has not changed 
significantly since that time, since business has merged even more closely 
with the authorities.  
Nevertheless, the ideas of democracy come across as insuperable. In Rus-
sia itself, many observers note that the Putin model of reforms will sooner or 
later face obstacles of a fundamental nature, as the development of the coun-
try is impossible without the establishment of a self-regulating and fairly 
open system. The fairly rationally current working system, trying to reach a 
balance between the bankrupting of YUKOS by the liberalisation of Gaz-
prom shares, and the suppression of freedom by the establishment of the 
public chamber, is already in trouble.39  
 
The Path of Azerbaijan 
 
To return to Azerbaijan: its thorny path to democracy is imposed by the 
gradual economic advancements that arguably automatically lead to Western 
standards of political life. Let us take a look at whether this path is possible 
in principle, given that other paths are not considered an option by the au-
thorities and the West – in this case, the USA. 
                                                     
37  Expert magazine, 45, 2005, p. 25. 
38  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, April 2000, p. 24 
39  E. Yasin. Whether democracy will find its place in Russia, 2005, Moscow  
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6. The Azerbaijani Economy:  
Finally on the Path to Democracy 
 
‘Economy First, then Democracy’ 
 
The President of the country frequently refers to a formula (by his father) 
that has become quite common in the post-Soviet environment: first, we 
need to improve the economy of the country, and only then can we think 
about democracy. In 2004, the President repeated this fairly simple thesis in 
Strasbourg, during a speech in front of the representatives of the European 
Parliament. In fact, the development of the economy in this area was not 
really the fruits of the efforts of the entire society, but rather ‘manna from 
heaven’ that should fall upon Azerbaijan. And this is what is happening, to a 
certain degree.  
 
Positive Indications 
 
The main macro-economic indicators of the country seem to point to an ex-
cellent situation. Total GDP growth in 2005 will, it seems, have achieved 
about 26% growth. Furthermore, relative industrial output growth is ex-
pected to reach more than 33%.40 The income of the population is outpacing 
inflation. In terms of investment (the investment growth rate over the 11 
months of 2005 was only 11.9%, three times lower than last year), the econ-
omy is shifting into the mode of sustainable revenues from the oil sector and 
there has been growth in domestic investments. Wonderful new perspectives 
seem to be opening up for the country. 
 
The Need for Balance 
 
The implementation of projects like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan or the Baku–
Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline clearly mark a new milestone in the develop-
ment of both the Southern Caucasus and the entire Caspian region. The dec-
ade-long epic, full of internal drama, is now over. Over these years, Azerbai-
jan quite often gave in to the FOC. Some of this was inevitable, whilst some 
could have been avoided, had there been enough political will. But this is all 
in the past, and a new starting point for the economic history of Azerbaijan 
will now be witnessed. One reason for this might be that the country’s ap-
proximate oil and gas reserves have been calculated (excluding unforeseen 
situations), and that the nature of relations in this sphere has started to 
change. On the one hand, in the future, Azerbaijan will face the need for cau-
tious and efficient use of the flow of oil dollars which will hit the country 
very soon, and all attention is now concentrated on the state oil fund. On the 
other hand, the revision and the evaluation of new oil and gas opportunities 
                                                     
40  As presented by the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan, Macroeconomic indicators 
for January–November 2005 
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for the country are now underway, in particular, transit of Central Asian oil, 
and in the future, possibly also Russian oil.  
The economic revival underway in the regions is obvious, and there have 
been attempts to begin implementation of a series of projects of nationwide 
importance. The official registration of entrepreneurs has been simplified. 
All these things are happening on the wave of income growth and the de-
mands of the people. The government is raising salaries and student scholar-
ships, but in selected narrow social groups it fears pushing up the inflation. 
In the last months of 2005, it was announced that the salaries of fairly large 
groups of public servants would be raised (by 30% for doctors). Finally, 
people started talking about an exchange rate adjustment for the private de-
posits, which is to start in 2006.  
 
Examining the Growth Rate 
 
However, it is not uncomplicated to believe this impressive horizon for the 
upcoming future. First of all, one cannot help but be confused about the ab-
normal nature of this growth. The growth of the budget in 2006 by almost 
70% (or GDP by 30.2%) is testimony to some extraordinary processes in the 
economy (it is notable GDP growth rates of the coming year may rise as 
much as 40% if oil prices remain at a level of USD 50 per barrel). Here we 
may note some of the assessments made by an expert group from the Azer-
baijani NGO PFMC. This assessment studies the impact of oil on the econ-
omy of the country, and is indicated below (referring to the results for 2005). 
 
• The shares of oil and oil products in the country’s exports con-
sisted of up to 84% of the total amount. 
• The share of the total investments of oil sector I consisted of up 
to 63.77%, and when including foreign investments, up to 86.7%. 
• The shares of oil sector in the GDP rose up to 42.9%. 
• The shares of oil incomes in the state budget are evaluated at a 
level of approximately 40–45%. It is expected that, in 2006, this 
figure will grow to 60%. 
• Over the last 9 months of 2005, the official exchange rate of the 
manat against the US dollar grew stronger by 310 manats, or 
6.3%, and rose to 4,593 manats. 
 
Secondly, rapid growth is always a challenge that requires an adequate 
response, or else it will only deepen the social divides in society. In the ab-
sence of strong state institutions, such growth always makes the rich even 
richer, and the poor even poorer. Add to this the macroeconomic balance, 
and the situation becomes precarious indeed. 
 
Main Macro-Economic Indicators and Azerbaijan 
 
However, thus far, the Azerbaijani economy may also come across as very 
‘correct’ in terms of the main globally-accepted macroeconomic indicators. 
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Let us name these standard parameters (in italics) and evaluate the corre-
sponding levels in Azerbaijan.  
The level of the national budget deficit should not exceed 3–5% of the 
GDP. Over the last 8 years, it has never crossed this limit. Furthermore, in 
several of those years it went down to zero and even transformed itself into 
budget profits.  
Public debt should not exceed 60% of the GDP. In Azerbaijan, it has 
never crossed the limit of 17%. Based on the results of this year, public debt 
will not exceed 15.6%. Even now, when the country has started to accumu-
late debt, it is unlikely that the level will cross the 25%/ GDP threshold.  
The total volume of the gold reserves should be sufficient to cover the im-
port expenditure for at least three months. Together with the oil fund, the 
volume of the gold reserves covers this threshold several times over (USD 
2.3 billion). This even forces the Central Bank to restrain the growth in cur-
rency reserves, due to the significant growth of the price of national currency 
in the country.  
The critical level of unemployment should not exceed 10–15% of the total 
able-bodied population. Official statistics do not reveal the unemployment 
level in the country, as they record only the number of people applying to the 
employment services. However, we may assume that the programme de-
clared by the government, for the creation of 600,000 jobs (over a period of 
two to three years), has, to a certain degree, taken into account the real un-
employment level in the country. But with no less than 1 million labour mi-
grants outside the country (and assuming that approximately 4 million peo-
ple comprise the economically active population of the country), the unem-
ployment level is high, although not critical.  
The ratio of the current payments to the servicing of the foreign debt 
should not exceed 20% of annual export revenues Annual payment for ser-
vicing the foreign debt varies between 1–1.5% of budget revenues, and is 
even less for exports.  
The growth of the bulk of the cash should correspond to the growth of 
production. In recent years, the bulk of the cash has been growing quite rap-
idly (on average at a rate of 20–25% per annum). However, the one-sided, 
oil-based development, and the ‘dollarisation’ of the economy, make it diffi-
cult to assess real cash needs. It is known, however, that the rate of cash 
turnover (of the manat in Azerbaijan) has always been in the range of 12–
17%.  
To secure the investment process, the level of savings in GDP should be 
equal to or exceed 10%. This level has always been above 10%; in some 
years, since the investment component of GDP has been as much as 50% of 
GDP.  
The share of foreign goods in individual sectors of the national market 
shall not exceed 10–20% etc. This indicator is poorly analysed, but many 
new industries have emerged in the consumer sector, so one should assume 
that the country is below this minimal norm.  
Within the framework of these indicators, the Azerbaijani economy may 
come across as having good perspectives and being quite protected. How-
ever, the process of evaluating the state of the economy operates with many 
other parameters. For example, the banking system is small (just over 15% 
of GDP), and the turnover of securities is 4.4% of GDP (largely at the ex-
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pense of short-term state securities). Even after the recent rapid budget 
growth, the ratio of budget revenues to GDP will rise to roughly 25%. Fur-
thermore, many social indicators of the economy are quite low. We must 
conclude that rumours of the wonderful health of the Azerbaijani economy 
are somewhat exaggerated. 
 
7. The Economy: Regulated by whom, and how?  
  
The Influence of the President 
 
It appears that the answer to the question of who regulates the Azerbaijani 
economy, and how, may boil down to the unlimited authority of the presi-
dent, who easily exceeds the boundaries of the constitutional framework 
when he considers it necessary. And from this perspective it is not difficult 
to explain the excessive authority of the president’s administration, which 
co-ordinates all spheres of life in the country. However, in practice, the 
economy requires a constant professional approach other than the bureau-
cratic one.  
 
Agency Relations 
 
The system of relations between the agencies responsible for the economy of 
Azerbaijan is not a simple one. It is a paradox, but the chairman of the Cabi-
net of Ministers is a purely nominal figure who governs but does not rule. 
The ‘economic’ deputy ministers perform the duties of assignees in various 
sectors of the economy, although they all have a different weight in decision-
making process (the problems and crisis situations of agriculture and the 
food market were within the realm of the first deputy prime minister, Abas 
Abasov, whereas construction, foreign credit lines, and, until recently, emer-
gencies, were controlled by the deputy prime minister, Abid Sharifov). Other 
deputy prime ministers are either involved in humanitarian issues, or are 
merely nominal figures – like deputy prime minister Eyub Yagubov, for-
mally responsible for industry and energy. Importantly, Azerbaijan has no 
deputy prime minister responsible for the financial sector, although would 
certainly be appropriate in the new conditions.  
 
The Prime Minister and Others 
 
The power of the prime minister is limited by the president, as well as his 
administration (at the top of the scale), and by various fairly influential and 
wealthy independent figures of the economic establishment (at the bottom of 
the scale). The most influential personalities in the management of the Azer-
baijani economy are the Minister of Economic Development, Heidar Ba-
bayev, and the head of the Azerbaijani customs, Kyamaletdin Heidarov (who 
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was recently appointed Minister of Emergencies and vacated his previous 
position in favour of his deputy). The exclusiveness of these people is ex-
plained not only by their significant capital, but also by their proximity to the 
president. All the other economic agencies of the country are, to a greater or 
lesser degree, part of the range of the above-mentioned entities. The National 
Bank might have been another influential economic decision-making centre, 
but its direct subordination to the nation’s President significantly lowers its 
capabilities. On the other hand, the deteriorating macro-economic situation 
in the country will serve to brings the National Bank to greater prominence.  
 
The 2006 Budget: Current Forecasts 
 
And what of the budget of the country for 2006? Its growth is quite impres-
sive, although, in comparison to the other CIS countries, budget revenues are 
low indeed: just over 3 billion new manats (1 ‘new’ manat is equal to 5000 
‘old’ mantas, at the exchange rate of 4500 old manat to one dollar used in 
the budget).41 The budget deficit is not to exceed 1.3% of GDP.  
A peculiar feature of the 2006 budget is that investment expenditures are 
set to grow by 3.8 times. USD 450–600 million will be spent on improving 
the delivery of energy alone, and about USD 600 million will go to military 
expenditures. Declared budget priorities are as follows: development of the 
non-oil sector, tourism, entrepreneurial support and support for national in-
dustries, poverty reduction, regional development, as well as the develop-
ment of the banking and the financial sectors. The latter, as a rule, did away 
without budget support, usually relying solely on the placement of budget 
organisation resources within the banking system. However, the establish-
ment of the home mortgage fund made the country face up to the need to 
support the charter capital of the new structure, which will rise to about 130 
billion ‘old’ manat. Budget funds have also been allocated for the establish-
ment of the charter capital of the State Investment Fund. 
 
The 2006 Budget: Grounds for Concern 
Investment Wastage 
 
Many economists are concerned about the increased investment component 
of the budget, which, under regular conditions, should actually be a source of 
optimism. There are solid grounds for this concern. In fact, neither the treas-
ury nor the chamber of accounts (which is not even admitted over the 
threshold of many major ministries), work to their full capacity in Azerbai-
jan.42 In these circumstances, the probability of a situation whereby invest-
ment is corruptly wasted is very high indeed. 
  
                                                     
41  As quoted from ‘The law on the budget of the AR for 2006’, Halg gazeti 
42  Turan Economic Monthly Review, September 2005 
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Transparency 
 
There are other worrying points about the 2006 budget that have to do with 
its transparency. In accordance with the law on the budget system, at the 
time of drafting the budget it is mandatory that the revenues and expendi-
tures be disclosed. The 2006 budget elaborates on all budget expenditure 
items in a fair amount of detail, but budget revenue structures remain a 
closed subject – not so surprisingly, since it is within the expenditure part 
that the inflation threats are hidden. The structure of expenditures seems to 
include an entire set of anti-inflation measures. As far as the revenue part is 
concerned, it becomes obvious that the authorities are attempting to conceal 
the fact that a portion of the 2006 budget revenues will be created at the ex-
pense of oil revenues. On several occasions, the Minister of Finance stated 
that budget growth would rise to 40%, even when excluding transfers from 
the oil fund. However, in such a case, it becomes unclear why one had to 
resort to these emergency and dangerous (from a macroeconomic point of 
view) infusions. According to some scrupulous calculations, the growth of 
the 2006 budget will rise to up to 85%, depending on oil (i.e. on high oil 
prices and a transfer from the SOFAR). Of course, the rapid growth of the 
budget was dictated by the pre-election situation, which demanded victori-
ous deeds, and this is why, in the next few years, these growth rates will 
most likely return to a more realistic level. It appears that this is a minor act 
of slyness on the part of government, who do not want to reveal just how 
dependent the economy is on the oil factor. However, here we should recall 
the recent statement of the head of the Chamber of Accounts, who believes 
that the basic ‘budgeting feed’ of corruption stems from this badly formu-
lated revenue part of the budget. This is related both to the shadow sector of 
the economy, and also to the complicated budget relations within the oil and 
energy sector of the country. In other words, the debt within the energy sec-
tor completely overshadows the activities of these major enterprises and 
paves the road towards financial abuse. The exaggerated costs of several ma-
jor state companies and the growth of the prime costs of produced goods 
(hardly assessed by anyone) result in a reduction in budget revenues. Here 
we could recall the statistics of the high social taxes, which indicated that 1.4 
million people were covered by this tax, whereas the economically active 
population of the country is roughly 4 million. Unaccounted jobs are the 
shortfalls of the budget. 
 
Unrealistic Forecasting 
 
Economists are doubtful about the predicted oil price, as calculated in the 
budget. If retail prices for crude oil exceed the USD 40/barrel in 2006, as 
included in the budget, then the additional export revenue will be distributed 
between SOCAR and SOFAR on a 50/50 basis. If the retail prices for crude 
oil exceed USD 50, than the State Oil Fund will receive 75% of the differ-
ence, and state oil company will receive 25%.  
Growing oil revenues predetermine the fact that the development of the 
banking sector a top item on the agenda. It is developing rapidly, and could 
even be a source of pride for the government, were it not for the shocking 
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parallels with the banking systems of other countries. We shall not touch on 
Kazakhstan, whose banking system has long been acknowledged as the best 
in the CIS. At one meeting in 2005, the IMF representative in Baku, Bezil 
Zavoiko, reminded us that the capitalisation of the largest bank in Estonia 
(with a population 4 or 5 times less than in Azerbaijan) is three times higher 
than the capitalisation of the Azerbaijani monster, i.e. the international 
bank.43 It is obvious that this cannot be not related to the institutional devel-
opment of the entire Estonian economy, including the banking sector. For 
this reason, there is nothing surprising about the fact that the volume of the 
banking market, as against GDP, is only 16%, although very recently it had 
been below 10%.  
  
Lack of Alternative Sources for Borrowing 
 
Azerbaijan also lacks alternative sources for borrowing. This means that the 
price of money in the country is not elastic, and that the banking sector plays 
the role of a single legislator (in terms of the price of money in the country), 
and that this deprives the financial system of necessary elasticity. Other 
sources of financial resources (such as the stock market, insurance market, 
pension funds) are formed very slowly. Half of the turnover of the stock ex-
change was made up of transactions with state securities, whilst the rest was 
formed by corporate shares and bank bonds, and just as small a fraction were 
shares of enterprises. The entire turnover of the stock market in 2005 rose to 
roughly 4.4% of GDP. The insurance market in the country is even smaller 
(0.8% of the GDP). Of course, the insurance market is growing, but two 
thirds of these resources will be channelled to foreign insurance companies 
for re-insurance. As to the pension fund, it may become a financial pillar for 
the economy only after the completion of the pension reform, set to start in 
2006.  
 
8. New Challenges – Old Answers 
 
Banking 
 
Throughout 2005, the National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA) acted as a centre 
forward in fighting inflation, by raising the price of the national currency. It 
undertook this role eagerly, deviating from the more detailed and compli-
cated tasks that are within its competence (for example, reforms of the finan-
cial system, furnishing it with the ability to transform savings into invest-
ments). Strengthening the national currency is the easiest way to fight infla-
tion, but it exacerbates the lack of competitiveness of Azerbaijani goods on 
foreign markets. For this reason, the government resorted to a wide range of 
anti-inflation measures, and the President was even forced to issue a special 
decree on this matter. The NBA also tried to address some of its problems. 
                                                     
43  Ibid. 
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In particular, the growing value of the manat may reduce the dollar turnover 
in the country. As of early December 2005, foreign currency deposits in the 
banking system rose to 81.2%, 44 which is very important, given the back-
ground of the denomination of the manat as of 1 January 2006. Although 
denomination is usually a mere technical exercise, judging by the experience 
of the other countries, it may give room for inflation, although the central 
bank has issued reassurances that this ‘technical inflation’ will not exceed 
1% of total inflation. 
The banking sphere is always reproached for failing to perform its basic 
function: crediting the real sector of the economy. Bankers commonly reply 
that industrial production in the country is underdeveloped and, even given 
enough resources, they would not be able to find sufficiently efficient pro-
jects for crediting. As far as the active work of the banks with small and me-
dium-sized enterprises, or with the agricultural sector, it is related to the fact 
that external creditors can be found for these projects, and such crediting is 
performed at their expense. Annual customs reviews show that the share of 
oil and oil products has, in recent years, been at a sustainable level of be-
tween 85 and 90% all export.45  
 
Development of the Non-Oil Sector 
 
It is self-evident that the country needs to develop the non-oil section of its 
exports. Possible points for a breakthrough here include non-ferrous metals, 
oil machinery, oil chemicals, construction materials, and a whole series of 
agricultural sub-sectors. To the already familiar construction boom, we 
should add the growth of the new enterprises producing construction materi-
als, in the capital and elsewhere in the country. The significant growth of the 
number of these enterprises is, quite naturally, a response to the boom in 
housing construction. Agricultural processing started to develop quite rap-
idly. Among the positive developments, we may note a significant growth in 
leasing transactions. The aggregate capitol of the leasing portfolio of compa-
nies active in Azerbaijan has already reached USD 25 million, whereas the 
total capacity of this market is evaluated at USD 250 million (although in the 
latter case we are talking mostly about the development of agricultural leas-
ing). However, any move toward exporting is practically impossible without 
powerful protection. Furthermore, Azerbaijan already has quite powerful 
conglomerates, in the form of financial and industrial groups (FIG), capable 
of controlling both the import and export of goods – and every FIG has a 
connection to the name of some minister-oligarch. To a certain degree, this 
explains why the government has not been willing to address problems that 
were seemingly on the surface – from promoting the packing industry, to the 
normal functioning of the Export Promotion Fund. The country has no in-
dustrial policy, and it is unlikely to have one in the foreseeable future.  
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Economic Axioms  
 
Many economic principles are axioms. For example, it is well known that it 
is better to import capital into the country rather than goods, that it is better 
to import new technologies and equipment than readymade goods, and that 
direct investments are always better than credits and loan. However, from 
the very beginning, the Azerbaijani economic system was formed in such a 
way that individual economic groups were given the opportunity to have a 
free rein. This is where the sad results enter: the customs are too powerful 
and controlled, whereas, on the other hand, the banking system is weak, has 
a hard time getting the right to borrow from global financial markets, and is 
barely capable of adapting to major inflows of capital. Furthermore, the en-
tire structure of economic management has been distorted, and many minis-
tries keep on acting both as of regulators of the relations in an industry, and 
as proprietors. A whole series of ministries and agencies function as the oli-
garch’s ‘backyard’.  
This is how the situation usually works: initially, the state structures start 
to shape up around the minister (as they are quite easily controlled by the 
minister himself). Then a structure evolves whereby private holdings 
emerge, where capital is being transferred, as well as private construction 
companies or networks of stores. Here we should mention the ‘offshore ef-
fect’, whereby the major capital initially leaves the territory of the country, 
and then returns into the country in the form of an offshore foreign firm. For 
this reason, a real foreign investor cannot enter any segment of the market 
without having a contact with one of the oligarchs who controls this sector of 
economy. The President of the country also has direct access, but his posi-
tion is frequently predetermined by the position of influential groups and 
agencies and private interests.  
 
Relations between the State and Foreign Companies 
A Complicated Relationship 
 
Relations between the state and foreign companies have recently been char-
acterised by complications. Of course, sooner or later these relationships had 
to acquire a working nature, with all the relevant consequences. But the 
presence of open pressure on various foreign companies (outside of the oil 
sector, of course) can already be felt. How to explain this new phenomenon 
in the Azerbaijani economy? This is most likely because the ‘fat’ that shaped 
and formed oligarchic economy feels cramped in its established limits, and 
strives to expand its field of activity. At the same time, any unlawfulness is 
perceived by foreign investors as a danger signal. Furthermore, the visible 
hassle within the authorities can scarcely act as an attraction for foreign in-
centives – especially since several laws that would provide both an incentive 
and a protection for foreign investments have not been passed after all. 
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Foreign Investors: the Surface Impression  
 
On the surface, Azerbaijan formally remains an attractive country for foreign 
investors. The total gold reserves (when calculated jointly with the oil fund) 
are at present 2.3 billion USD.46 By mid-2005, the foreign debt of the coun-
try had already fallen by USD 86 million and is at present only USD 1,502 
billion. Some capital has come into the country, but nobody dares to have 
major direct investments, and no one will. What serious investor will come 
to a country where the judiciary is underperforming, where there is no com-
petitive environment, and where monopolies rule? Many potential investors 
know that they will face the resistance of the serious monopoly groups, con-
trolled by members of the government itself.  
 
Constant Need for New Solutions 
The Anti-Monopoly Department of the Ministry of Economic Development 
 
Furthermore, today the mere recording of new opportunities is not enough, 
and there is a need for a constant search for new solutions. We could men-
tion the activities of the anti-monopoly department of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development as an example. Some time ago, there was a separate 
anti-monopoly committee, directly subordinate to the President of the coun-
try. Then for some reason it was merged with the Ministry of Economic De-
velopment. Recently, this department has been monitoring the monopoly 
spheres, without overburdening itself by presenting proposals to reduce the 
level of monopolisation, even in the spheres where this would be possible. 
At the same time, today there are plenty of real proposals already. For exam-
ple, take cement production, where a real deficit can be observed, due to the 
construction boom: a group consisting of an Azerbaijani, a Chinese and an 
Iranian company are ready to create to the new cement enterprises in the 
country, and a German company is ready to supply modern equipment in 
order to produce this cement.47 The real anti-monopoly policy boils down to 
the following: it uses the mechanisms of power (privileges, tax preferences 
etc.) in order to reduce the pressure and tension in a certain market segment, 
support new industries and enterprises as a counterbalance to the older ones, 
and eventually create a competitive environment. But for all this to happen, 
the anti-monopoly agency needs to have high status, including access to the 
top person in the country. 
 
Providing Foreign Investors with the Necessary Demand 
 
As a rule, investors are attracted to sufficiently large markets. If the country 
is small, it is of key importance for the investor to enjoy a high demand in 
the country, to compensate for the insufficient physical volume of the mar-
ket. Recently, demand has grown somewhat, but the level of poverty remains 
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very high, even though through some miracle the authorities reduced poverty 
down to 29% in 2004.  
 
The Creation of New Jobs 
 
In order for a breakthrough to occur, structural reforms, normal relations be-
tween business and the authorities, a well-conceived investment policy and 
the creation of new jobs are required. In the last case, there seems to have 
been some progress, as over the past two years, the country would appear to 
have created 300,000 new jobs. In one of the most recent statements made 
by the president, a figure of 340,000 was even mentioned.48 However, the 
concept of a ‘job’ is so vague that we could boldly divide this figure by two, 
if not by four. Judging by the official data, only half of them are permanent 
jobs, and from the remaining half, we should subtract those with extremely 
low productivity, or those of people on the verge of becoming redundant. It 
is enough to say that a visible portion of the jobs is created in the agricultural 
sector, where the number of working people generally always includes the 
number of families in the households, who in actual fact already participate 
in the economic activities.  
 
Lessening the Reliance on Oil 
 
Oil creates the illusion that any problem may be addressed, since big money 
is coming into the country. With regard to industrial production, the constant 
pedalling of GDP growth becomes not only senseless, but also dangerous. 
No less than a third of GDP growth relates to oil, and the plan is to cover the 
anticipated reduction in investment expected in the next few years by using 
the growing IFI loans.  
Many economists are asking themselves: are the rapidly growing oil 
prices capable of compensating for the reduction in investments? Most of 
them say ‘no’, since, from the point of view of content, these resources cre-
ate excessive consumption, inflation and imports. For many reasons, the 
economy does not manage to spend this money quickly enough.  
Global oil prices keep growing, opening new perspectives for the gov-
ernment. First, there is an opportunity for all the investment expenses of 
AMOC to be paid off in advance, and this means that, in the immediate fu-
ture, the state share in the profitable oil may become quite impressive. Sec-
ondly, beginning in 2006, the state budget will be receiving a tax on AMOC 
profits, and this amount may rise to USD 220 million. 
It may well be that the authorities are lucky – but they have as yet to 
prove that it is the entire society of Azerbaijan that is lucky. The economy is 
entering a turbulent time in its development. There will be many problems 
related to the growing exchange rate of the manat (even today an entrepre-
neur that had received a cheap manat loan will have to repay it using the 
manat of a higher value), the balance of payments (there will be no deficit in 
the trade balance, but investment incomes leaving the country will grow sig-
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nificantly). And the newly created jobs may disappear just as quickly as they 
appeared.  
People still speak of the ‘Holland syndrome’ with caution, although all 
the classical signs of this illness are evident: the shift of the economy into 
consumption mode, the unstoppable growth of value of the national cur-
rency, and the lack of control over the government. The chances of a Hol-
land syndrome appearing have been questioned by prominent Azerbaijani 
economist Ogtay Ahverdiev, who believes that this is impossible, due to a 
wide array of production activities represented in the country.49 This much-
debated syndrome initially appears in an economy in connection to the im-
peratives of the exchange rate policy, so such optimism would seem some-
what naive. 
 
The Mid-Term Perspective 
 
From a mid-term perspective, the developmental direction of the country has 
become more precise – in its statements, as well as in its confident reliance 
on the transit capacities of the country, the development of its internal infra-
structure in the broadest meaning of the word, and the SME development.  
In these circumstances, is it possible to reform the economic system 
whilst avoiding political turbulence? This is the question of the day. It is also 
important to bear in mind that the price of every mistake in the economic 
development of Azerbaijan is becoming much higher. The difference be-
tween the new opportunities for the country and its institutional underdevel-
opment has already become too apparent.  
 
The Public and Private Sectors: a Remaining Lack of Balance 
 
The country has still failed to find a balance between the expanding private 
sector in the economy and the state-run part of the economy. The latter part 
is still great. There are levers of administrative influence at its disposal, 
which it can put to active use in order to reconfirm its position of monopoly 
– as it also does in the private sector. 
 
The Judiciary: Problems 
 
The judiciary is the target of the vast majority of the entrepreneurs’ com-
plaints, as it visibly hinders business development. The new head of the Su-
preme Court has tried to explain the system of bribery that exists in courts by 
a ‘low level of awareness’ among entrepreneurs. However, the latter group 
are confident that even the most justified dispute of any decision needs to be 
‘reconfirmed’ by providing a bribe to the court. They also argue that any 
dispute with a state agency or enterprise, or with the major monopolists, is a 
priori doomed to failure. Additional opportunities for abuse are created by 
the lack of regulation as to how long it takes for a court case to be resolved. 
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At the same time, instead of considering this factor in such cases to be an 
oversight of the compliance with procedural norms, the courts of higher in-
stance consider it to be part of the essence of the case itself, which in turn 
leads to court cases taking a great deal of time to solve it. Some cases have 
been considered by various instances some 60 to 70 times. According to 
Alekper Mamedov, Head of the Association of Entrepreneurs of Azerbaijan, 
roughly 30 cases have been deemed by the constitutional court of the coun-
try to be not in compliance with the Constitution. This should mean one 
thing: the case should be resolved in favour of the appealing party. But this 
does not happen. Furthermore, total confusion exists in the execution of ju-
dicial verdicts and decisions.  
 
Inflation 
 
It is premature to speak of the problems of inflation in the past tense. This 
factor is seemingly the reverse side of economic growth, but nevertheless the 
government proved unprepared for it. It is in this realm that we once again 
become witnesses to the backwardness of the institutional mechanisms in the 
financial system.  
Quite a few countries have tripped up on the reforms of the utilities that 
usually provoke inflation. In the case of Azerbaijan, we could say that this 
part of the reform is just beginning. The growth of tariffs for electricity, gas 
and water is inevitable. For the latter two, this has already started and is ex-
pected to continue. The state has been reassured that this practice not only 
leads to a rise in prices, but that it also increases inflation expectations. 
However, the state has not realised – or rather it does not want to realise – 
that one should prepare for such reforms in advance. In the end, in the scale 
of the infrastructural preparations which are necessary, the process of install-
ing electricity, gas and water meters is insignificant. Yet there is a critical 
lack of them, because the moment for their installation was lost, and it has 
now become difficult to assess the real needs of the country and its people in 
relation to the sources of energy.  
 
A Final Analysis 
 
Over the recent years, when GDP per capita has been at USD 1,517, the 
government has constantly declared that the people of Azerbaijan hold the 
world record in investment growth rates, GDP and budget revenues (depend-
ing on which indicator looks most impressive at any given time). The Minis-
try of Finance reported that, in 2006, Azerbaijan will be number one in the 
world in terms of GDP growth rates. This, of course, reflects the country’s 
growing (and short-term) contribution to the global economy. However, the 
citizens of the country are entitled to ask, ‘Well, what does that mean for 
us?’ and the answer will make hardly anyone happy: nothing, or almost 
nothing. Economic growth is taking place not thanks to the reforms, or to 
increased productivity, but due to the rising oil prices. And this makes the 
economy highly vulnerable, while the increased pace of this growth requires 
The Symbiosis of Politics and Economics 143 
a completely different fine-tuning of the economy and other work with soci-
ety. 
It is for this reason that society barely shares the official optimism. For 
example, it seems that despite the growth in the average wage in the country 
(USD 127), the quality of life is not improving to any notable degree. The 
number of social threats and worries has grown. The opportunity for a per-
son to make a rapid horizontal or vertical movement across the social cate-
gories of the country is visibly limited by corruption. Corruption rules, hav-
ing penetrated the most sensitive pores of the social organism: education, 
healthcare, the military. Quite naturally, all these factors lead to social apa-
thy within society. The corruption is of a systemic nature, and society does 
not trust the authorities. Society sceptically notes that instead of real fight 
against corruption, the authorities have simply sacrificed yet another one of 
their disgraced representatives – whose inheritance is then immediately split 
between favoured oligarchs, in full view of the public. 
 
9. Azerbaijan: Capacity for Change? 
 
The Authorities 
  
The authorities announce that they are in favour of the democratisation of 
society, but that one cannot over-facilitate or impose such processes, since 
the state may then find itself in the hands of ochlocracy or of crazy manag-
ers. They also love to speak of Azerbaijan’s ‘special path of development’ 
towards democracy. And yet, they have again managed to create a parlia-
ment by relying on the old format: a parliament that is obedient and without 
any principles. Any outsider aspirations of gaining a seat in parliament are 
branded by the authorities as an attempt at gaining the supreme power and, 
in their eyes, are thus unjustifiable. Meanwhile, society itself is seen to be a 
somewhat under-developed, embryonic creature, incapable of making the 
right choice without hints from the ‘top’.  
 
The Opposition 
An Imitation of Democracy 
 
The opposition, for their part, argue that the authorities are only imitating 
democracy. Additionally, they argue that, in reality, the authorities are will-
ing to preserve the existing corrupt bureaucratic regime, and that they are 
even resorting to the entire tool-kit of totalitarianism. The opposition wanted 
to have an honest fight for a seat in parliament, but this did not happen. It is 
for this reason that the rage of the revolutionary rhetoric on the eve of elec-
tions was indeed justified. It reflected not only the protest against the exist-
ing order, but also the protest against the subconscious feeling of being 
‘doomed’.  
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Attitudes within society 
 
The opposition also believes that society is, to an equal degree, cautious 
about drastic changes and the maintenance of the current state of affairs. It 
does not favour politicians, and went into the shadow happily, surrendering 
the political arena to the politicians. But changes are inevitable, as is the 
choice of society. They are motivated not only by the well-known external 
realities, but also by the internal situation in the country. The opposition is 
accused of being destructive, yet this destruction is provoked to a far greater 
degree by conflicts within the ruling elite, which are becoming ever more 
embittered. For example, the head of the capital’s police force has publicly 
made serious accusations against the Minister of the Interior.50. In turn, the 
Minister of the Interior has spoken of assignments of the President of the 
country which were not to be discussed publicly anywhere in the world.51 
The Minister claimed that, in 1997, upon instruction from the president, he 
organised the prison escape of some members of Abuzar Abuzarov who 
were arrested in Azerbaijan. Seemingly, this was at the request of the mayor 
of the Dagestani city of Derbent (who justified this request by saying that the 
minister could help to organise the hypothetical protection of the 120,000 
Azerbaijani population of this city). Furthermore, in the pre-election political 
confusion, the Minister of Education personally selected students for a mas-
ter’s programme abroad, although this function had already been delegated 
to another agency.  
This destructiveness is further made clear if we take a look at the polari-
sation of the mass media prior to the elections: various journalists collected 
compromising data on the former Minister of Economic Development, and 
also against the head of customs. The complete merger of the political and 
economic elite in the country turned out to be a major problem for the state. 
As yet the process has remained manageable, but it is gradually moving be-
yond state control. The difficult yet best decision is for a transformation of 
the system from the top – but this is hardly possible without the procedures 
required in order to limit the power and guarantee the accountability of the 
authorities to society. In large measure this explains the embittered nature of 
the recent fight for the parliament, which stood out as one chance to create a 
healthy society.  
However, just as in many of other oil-producing countries, the authorities 
are still relaxed and generous in promising a fantastic economic future. On 
the other hand, the opposition sometimes imposes the feeling of an upcom-
ing catastrophe, a feeling not generally shared in society. People work hard 
for their living, and they follow the inflation and the enrichment of the ruling 
elite. And they hardly think that the main point is that Carthage should be 
destroyed immediately. The extreme economic assessment also confuses the 
people and in turn polarises society.  
 
 
 
                                                     
50  Turan agency, political news, 29 September 05 
51  ANS TV Channel, Interview with Minister of Interior Ramil Usubov, 24 July 05 
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The Observations of Etibar Mamedov 
 
We should note an interesting observation of one of the leaders of a moder-
ate section of the opposition, who pointed out that power in Azerbaijan is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of people who have money and 
power, but that this group is just as small as the opposition, which had lost 
the broad support of society. This is observation was made by Etibar Mame-
dov, leader of the Party of National Independence, once a central opposition 
activist, who lost much of his political baggage in recent years. It is possible 
that this statement was dictated by hurt feelings, since he is no longer ac-
cepted by the authorities or by the opposition. But at least in terms of the 
current political momentum there is one piece of truth in it: in the upcoming 
years, both parties will have to appeal to society and try to win its sympa-
thies. The opportunities for the authorities seem to be wider in this case. 
However, the authorities, as the ruling entities, are also more vulnerable. In 
any case, this can provide a sort of a chance for society. The capacity for 
change will grow within the economy as well, although it is vital to distin-
guish clearly between illusion and reality. 
 
Problems in Terms of Dynamics 
 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the Azerbaijani economy may look fairly 
healthy. It is only when we start to assess it in terms of dynamics that we 
begin to notice how complicated the situation is. Firstly, it is becoming more 
and more difficult to address the emerging macroeconomic difficulties. They 
are multiplying, and they have to be addressed. For example, if the govern-
ment does not facilitate structural economic reforms, and does not undertake 
a series of other serious measures, the exchange rate of the manat will keep 
rising all the way until 2011. Secondly, fully-fledged economic development 
can be continued only on the basis of serious export incentives, on the im-
proved productivity in certain sectors, and on the establishment of a com-
petitive economic environment. As of yet there has been no disaster, but it is 
possible in the future.  
Currently only the sectors that are in the hands of the ruling economic 
elite are proving cost-efficient, primarily thanks to protectionism and mo-
nopolies. However, even their success is not a given, since, as a rule, the 
owners (usually an oligarch) do not want to resort to the services of manag-
ers, seeing them as simply an extra mouth to feed, and that, when property is 
separated from management, they are not an element of development. These 
owners portray a manager as some sort of thief who seeks to steal their prop-
erty and become a millionaire. Many managers in the world do indeed be-
come millionaires, but this is thanks to their talent, energy, and, not least, 
thanks to the perfectly legal ownership of the enterprise’s capital. But the 
Azerbaijani oligarchs do not want to share. The problems, it appears, boil 
down to the fact that good managers need a transparent picture of the com-
pany. The general belief is that one does not want to give it to ‘alien’ man-
agers, but to ‘our own’ managers – and they are a critically small group.  
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Let us look at these problems from another angle. A real strengthening of 
the national currency is always a reflection of the strengthening of the econ-
omy. But this has barely anything to do with Azerbaijan, where not a single 
reform has been completed, and the one-sided development of the sector of 
natural resources is apparent. The growing flow of oil dollars will keep 
stimulating demand, not supply. ‘Gastarbeiter’ money remittances from 
Azerbaijanis working in Russia, Ukraine and Turkey (barely recorded in the 
economy) also contribute to the same thing. Azerbaijan should have in-
creased the supply in the economy; this relates to the sphere of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, to put it kindly, SMEs in the 
country are extremely restrained. At the same time, the value of this eco-
nomic group is unquestionable: it responds flexibly to changes in the econ-
omy and is capable of a providing a sensitive regulation of supply in the 
economy. SMEs secure half of the GDPs of many advanced economies. 
However, in Azerbaijan today this group is lost in trying to preserve them-
selves in the non-market environment.  
These statements may come across as unfair. In the end, in 2005, a figure 
of 200 billion ‘old’ manat has been allocated for the purposes of developing 
this sector, and next year this figure will rise to 400 billion. However, the 
procedure for the distribution of credits from the national fund for the sup-
port of entrepreneurs (the group that has been allocated these privileged 
credits) remains closed, even in the circumstances of the seeming publicity, 
in terms of project assessment, and allocated funds. In the entrepreneurial 
environment, distrust towards banks (there was a common practice, known 
as ‘hats’, whereby bribes were made to bank officials for the purpose of get-
ting loan allocations etc.) is now being replaced by distrust towards the Min-
istry of Economic Development. This distrust is further exacerbated by the 
fact that there is no data on the efficiency of the crediting of any SME, even 
though these loans have already been handed out for several years now.  
Instead, we are informed that, as a result of this crediting, 25,000 jobs 
have been created – a fact which is impossible to check. It would be far more 
interesting to hear a story of an enterprise whose productivity doubled as a 
result of crediting, and of the purchase of modern equipment and good man-
agement. Unfortunately, the process of establishing a technological park, and 
industrial settlements, takes too long, even though these generally motivate 
the development of small and medium sized enterprises. To this we should 
add the fact that the emerged financial and industrial groups almost never 
resort to the services of SMEs, at a time when the government keeps re-
proaching major transnational companies for not involving local entrepre-
neurs in their work. However, in all developed countries, this type of busi-
ness has, for a long time, been grouping around major enterprises, and this is 
the global development trend for SMEs. At the same time, the government 
never let a chance pass by to reproach major transnational companies for not 
involving local entrepreneurs in their work.  
These topics have been emphasised because they relate to the process of 
the democratisation of relations in capital. It may appear naïve, but democ-
ratic relations in the environment of major capital (in the relations of the ma-
jor capital and less successful SME colleagues) are an integral part of the 
process of democratisation of society.  
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Oil Strategy 
 
The country’s problems also include the persistent uncertainty over the strat-
egy of how to use the resources of the Azerbaijani oil fund. True, there are 
some objective difficulties involved in this issue, but it is also apparent that 
the government is unwilling to lose control over these huge resources. This 
will happen as soon as the activities of the fund get straightened out and ac-
countable to society. The objective of such funds is not usually limited to 
‘insuring’ the future of the economy. It is also about giving a signal to do-
mestic and foreign investors that the economy is quite solvent. It goes with-
out saying that when the stabilisation fund is kept above a certain level, this 
significantly improves the investment attractiveness of the country. This 
amount will differ from country to country, and relates to the balance of 
payments of the country and to foreign debt. However, since this limit has 
not been set, its upper limit varies arbitrarily.  
This in turn leads to constant macroeconomic disputes with regard to any 
of the stabilisation funds. For the Azerbaijani economy to work without re-
cessions, money has to keep coming back into this fund, at a minimum level 
of the amount of what was taken out (oil also has this feature: it is irre-
placeably taken out of the national wealth of the country) plus the inflation 
percentage. Yet everything seems to be happening in quite the contrary 
manner, with money being taken from the country’s economy and kept in 
foreign banks. The objection to this is simple enough: in Azerbaijan, there 
are barely any non-oil industries to ‘digest’ these oil dollars. Although this 
objection is probably true, in practice this leads once again to the fact that 
the problems have to be addressed through the rational evaluation of the 
economy, the need for a clear assessment of the cost-efficiency of various 
sectors, and the permanent monitoring of productivity in such sectors, re-
cording growth aspects.  
 
Handling the Inflow of Foreign Currency 
 
The expected inflow of foreign currency into Azerbaijan in 2006 is estimated 
to be USD 2 billion, of which USD 1.1 billion will be used within the coun-
try (to service foreign debt and to purchase conveyances and equipment that 
make it possible to prevent additional inflation). However, the Azerbaijani 
economy still has very few financial ‘pumps’ that would enable the excess 
money to be directed out of the economy. The oil fund alone is not enough 
for these purposes. For example, the relatively high level of inflation in Rus-
sia is explained by the fact that the country also lacks such ‘pumps’; an ac-
cumulative pension system is just in the making in this country, and its stabi-
lisation fund has not been institutionalised to any degree observable in the 
oil funds.52 Here the appeals of the economic bloc to the government of 
Azerbaijan to liberalise the export of currency from the country are no acci-
dent. The head of the national bank has previously spoken about this on sev-
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eral occasions, and on New Year’s Eve the Minister of Finance made a re-
minder about this very opportunity.53  
Yet the expansion of Azerbaijani capital outside of the country would ap-
pear to be even more effective, although this should be accompanied by the 
monitoring of the employment situation in the country. One example is Ka-
zakhstan, which has been decisively entering other countries with its capital; 
we might recall the participation of the Kazakh capital in various enterprises 
in Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia. In Georgia, Kazakhstan is ready to par-
ticipate in the construction of high-voltage power lines, the construction of a 
tourist resort in Kobuleti, and in the purchases of Tbilgas shares. Kazakh-
stan’s biggest bank, Turanalem, has started working in Azerbaijan, having 
become the channel for the expansion of the Kazakh capital abroad. The 
bank is ready to be involved in all types of activities in Azerbaijan, including 
financing enterprises, mortgaging and leasing.  
As yet, Azerbaijan has no such plans. So far, the sole effective expansion 
of Azerbaijani capital abroad has been the purchase of an oil terminal in Jur-
juleshti, Moldova, by the Azpetrol company. But it seems that this deal is 
also in jeopardy (although, in January, the President of Moldova made sev-
eral optimistic statements about further development of this investment 
deal). However, this deal is probably jeopardised. It would be excellent if 
Azerbaijan could invest more effectively in Georgia, particularly in regions 
with an Azerbaijani population. Back in May 2005, Azerbaijan’s Minister of 
Finance announced the possible participation of Azerbaijan in the core capi-
tal of the Georgian port in Batumi and Poti. Here we might recall the Ukrain-
ian proposal for a joint venture in order to transport Caspian oil to Europe 
via the Odessa–Brody route. In other words, capital is growing in the coun-
try, and its external expansion would be a health promotion exercise for the 
economy, which has begun to have ‘hot’ money.  
The development of fine-tuned mechanisms for funnelling oil dollars into 
the national economy continues to be a top item on the agenda. During the 
period of inflow of big money, every major economic activity of the state 
should be strictly evaluated against its possible consequences. The country 
has now established the State Investment Fund, and this in turn requires the 
establishment of a development bank and/or an investment bank. The in-
vestment fund itself may become a new catalyst for inflation unless public 
investments are scrupulously thought through and targeted towards a long-
term effect – and also at blocking the overflow of this money to the con-
sumer market, as this inevitably leads to inflation. Furthermore, the state 
should constantly be preoccupied with the nature and the speed of the return 
of this money back into economy. It can be difficult to calculate the effect of 
the development of infrastructural projects, for which this fund will primar-
ily be working, on the economy. For example, road development will require 
a projection of the future transit expected on these roads. Unfortunately, such 
evaluations are very rare in Azerbaijan.  
There are plenty of other fine nuances in the work of investment funds. It 
is important to assess not only the direction of investments, but also the for-
malisation of their use. Just as in the neighbouring countries, the funds of 
Azerbaijan’s investment fund should be allocated to projects with a pre-set 
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ceiling cost. These projects cannot, and should not, be either excessively 
cost-efficient or working at a loss. There will always be an investor for an 
extremely cost-efficient project, and the targeted public investments should 
be reasonably aimed at implementing these unprofitable but socially impor-
tant projects. It is interesting to note, for example, that in Russia there is a 
provision whereby the profitability of projects receiving investments from 
the fund should be below the average profitability across the country. In 
terms of form, the state should pursue the establishment of public–private 
corporations in important sectors of the economy, with a future transfer of 
constructed objects into the private investor on a concession basis. This 
country should have strong and serious private companies, capable of par-
ticipation in infrastructural projects. 
Implementing the Reforms from Above: Associated Problems 
Corruption 
 
The opportunity for Azerbaijan to implement reforms from the top has not 
yet been exhausted, but it is rapidly diminishing. The corruption and mo-
nopolisation of all spheres of economy become a serious obstacle to even the 
seemingly most rational steps of the government. In particular, the regional 
development programme (which is, in essence, positive) quickly turns into a 
‘corruption-feeder’. Corruption is most dangerous in places where it blocks 
the development of a competitive business environment. Not surprisingly, 
the establishment of an export promotion fund has constantly faced prob-
lems. Lobbyists are themselves frequently invisible, yet their activities are 
quite visible, and the permanent source of corruption – mutual non-payments 
in the main economic sectors – persists.  
For a long time, corruption found justification in the difficulties of the 
transition period. Representatives of the authorities love to repeat this simple 
thesis: corruption is everywhere. However, unless it faces resistance, the cor-
ruption monster tends to spread and lead a life of its own. Here we should 
recall that, by the mid-1990s, the idea of legalising shadow capital caused an 
outburst of rage within society. Today, society has put up with this proposal 
and even finds positive aspects in it, yet it seems that this is something that 
the ruling power itself does not oppose. If this capital becomes legalised, the 
ruling power could lose its final levers of influence on the management cen-
tres at the top bureaucratic level. Moreover, these centres are starting to be-
have quite independently.  
For all these reasons, the authorities prefer to preserve the corruption 
pyramid in the shape that it is in today. Thus the chances of at least a partial 
dismantlement of this pyramid are diminishing, for example, in such socially 
important spheres as education and healthcare. After recent events involving 
the replacement of the top leadership in the Ministry of Health, serious re-
forms are expected to start only after revisions are made to the system of 
medical education, the strict attestation of doctors and the introduction of 
principles of health insurance. In the judiciary, the corruption spree has only 
worsened. The year of the official fight against corruption failed to bring any 
tangible results – except for the arrests of several heads of district military 
commissariats in Baku, but this is only at the medium level of the corruption 
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pyramid. Furthermore, those in power do not want to record the arrests of 
corrupt major bureaucrats as an anti-corruption measure, since that would 
inevitably disclose the fairly serious corruption mechanisms still at work in 
the country.  
 
Democracy is the Sole Alternative 
 
Further economic development becomes problematic even without the issue 
of the democratisation of the public structure of the country. One cannot live 
under an illusion for too long, for instance, regarding to the ‘corruption lu-
bricant’. And one cannot build an open market economy under conditions 
whereby the judiciary and the legislative branches are subordinate to the ex-
ecutive, to state-oligarchic capitalism, and to the growing outrageousness of 
monopolies. In this sense, there are no alternatives to democracy in Azerbai-
jan – whether it begins from the top, with the authorities, or with the people, 
fighting from the bottom.  
Unfortunately, the resolve of the authorities to effectively fight corruption 
raises great doubts. References to the fact that some countries have managed 
to develop economically without democracy are ill-founded: this happens 
only where there is a sustainable tradition of private property (as in Chile), 
whereas Azerbaijan is a country that is, in all respects, in transition from to-
talitarianism to a new authoritarianism – in turn building the new ‘rationale’ 
of the principles relating to democracy and market relations. 
For these reasons, it is becoming harder and harder to reanimate the lost 
pace of economic reforms which have fallen hostage to politics. In many 
areas of reform, Azerbaijan lags far behind Russia and Kazakhstan, and 
sometimes this backwardness appears impossible to overcome. Thus, ac-
cording to the evaluations of economist G. Ibadogly,54 given that we achieve 
the annual budgetary growth of 25%, planned from 2006, the growth of the 
average wage in 2006 will be equal to that of Russia in 2005. And when, in 
2009, the country achieves a GDP per capita of USD 2000, this will be equal 
to the Kazakh indicator of 2001. Add to this the peculiarity of the corruption 
mechanisms, which turn the problems relating to the quality of goods and 
services into a secondary issue. It appears necessary to develop the kind of 
innovations that will require privileges for the import of new technologies 
into the country. Although the President did declare that the country has its 
own capacity for implementing a series of projects, the advantage of direct 
foreign investments is self-evident: new investments are usually accompa-
nied by capital, as well as by new technologies and the culture of manage-
ment.  
Finally, no matter how harsh the games of the West may seem, Azerbai-
janis should get used to the thought that, unless their country involves itself 
in global games, it will not advance at the expense of oil dollars alone. Im-
perative here is accession to the World Trade Organisation, with consequent 
market liberalisation.  
From a sober perspective, the authorities would certainly develop long-
term development trends for the country, trends that would not only reflect 
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the level of the country’s revenues from oil and the transit of oil, but also 
from the perspective of directions for growth. As yet there is not a single 
survey devoted to even a rough calculation of the national wealth of the 
country. Furthermore, nobody monitors the Gross Domestic Product, al-
though only GDP can provide an unambiguous picture of economic devel-
opment. In reality, little is known about the productivity of various sectors, 
and about the ultimate demand and supply across the economy. But we can 
be quite hopeful about the fact that the work on developing a employment 
strategy for 2006–2015 has finally been completed, and may hope that it will 
reflect the evaluations of effective employment in the country. Azerbaijan 
has launched a system of national accounts which quite accurately informs 
us of the painful points in the economy. Immediately after the first accounts 
were issued in 2002, the State Statistic Committee made issues for 2003–
2004. Unfortunately, there are few users of this serious product among 
economists, whether state or non-governmental. Finally, the government has 
shown almost no interest in introducing a population register, even though 
active migration processes make this field extremely important. Prior to the 
parliamentary elections, a complete register of voters was never created 
(such a register could easily have been updated between the elections), even 
though this is what the European structures insistently recommended. The 
introduction of the accumulative pension fund system will definitely force a 
return to the idea of a register of voters, although under Azerbaijani condi-
tions this will involve the well-known dangers for the citizens of the country 
with regard to ‘having control’ over them. Such worries are already visible 
in Russia. Azerbaijan is a small country, so a meticulous statistical review of 
the economy could become a significant element for the energetic and fool-
proof development of the economy.  
 
10. Conclusions 
 
The moment of truth has come for Azerbaijan: one must learn to distinguish 
between politics and the economy. As long the complete system of symbio-
sis continues to rule supreme, it does not appear possible for the country to 
make a normal transition towards a market economy. Instead, the market 
economy will remain imitative in nature, just as the case is with the Azerbai-
jani democracy.  
The post-election situation proved to be a crisis of sorts. Hopes for the 
West, as well as a revolution from the top and from the bottom, have been 
exhausted. The sole hope that remains lies with the changing generations, 
without which, it seems, nothing will happen. There is the possibility of an 
external push – as with a war between the USA and Iran, or the continuation 
of the war with Armenia – but the state, unprepared for these events, will 
find itself in an even worse situation, defined by the temporary rule of ‘pa-
triotic’ forces. Some hopes were pinned on the January session of PACE, as 
this was supposed to discuss and decide on the parliamentary elections in 
Azerbaijan. In the case of sanctions of this organisation, and the facilitated 
movement of Azerbaijan in the direction of Russia, Azerbaijan would have a 
chance for a quick growth of political activity in the country. However, al-
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though the issue of depriving the Azerbaijani delegation of its voting power 
(until the summer PACE session) was discussed three times in the commis-
sions of the parliament, the mandate of the Azerbaijani delegation was even-
tually approved, although with significant reservations and recommenda-
tions. 
The most dangerous thing about the authoritarian rule of the country is 
that it sees society as a destructive force. The authoritarian power dwells on 
itself, and is less partial to any kinds of partnership with society. The au-
thorities are equally worried by the development of the municipalities and 
the growth of NGOs in the country. This is even more surprising since the 
chairpersons of the municipal associations and enterprises are mostly mem-
bers of the ruling party ‘Eni Azerbaijan?’ Furthermore, at least half of the 
NGOs are quite successfully controlled by the authorities themselves.  
It is enough to note the statement of a member of parliament (a brother of 
the previous President and an uncle of the present one) to evaluate the gen-
eral situation in the country: ‘NGOs create disorders and confusion around 
the globe. They is created to rob the wealth of their countries. Everyone who 
believes himself a patriot should treat NGOs as enemies, and one should 
fight them.’ (Zerkalo, 16.06.05) 
However, there are also reasons for optimism. The Azerbaijani democ-
ratic opposition still exists, and it continues its activities despite all attempts 
of the authorities to provoke it into a forceful standoff and finally destroy it. 
Furthermore, society is slowly getting richer, and will inevitably create the 
momentum for change. As noted by Russian political expert Boris Kagarlit-
sky ‘A hungry person does not have the strength or the energy for a riot. 
Revolutions happen when a satisfied person is left hungry for one day’. Fi-
nally, despite everything, within the authorities themselves, the effect caused 
by the fact that the major economic groups are becoming autonomous from 
the current authorities, will grow. Initial attempts have not succeeded, but 
this does not mean that no further attempts will follow. Azerbaijani capital 
will definitely look for a basis in society.  
In the end, nobody has ever refuted the laws of economics. As soon as the 
economic system starts to slow down and serious economic crises emerge, 
the ‘Siamese’ political and economic parts of the authorities will find them-
selves in a tough standoff.  
 
